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ABSTRACT
The thesis presents an analysis of the transnational political groups of the 
European Parliament, relating this to theories of political parties, parliaments 
and representation, while emphasising that existing comparative studies applied, 
to Europe are of limited value in explaining the nature of political 
organisation at the European level. The thesis postulates that it is essential 
that the political groups be analysed in terms of the nature of the European 
Community itself as a fluid polity and illustrates the problems of 
understanding European Integration as a political process. An analysis of the 
functions and role of the political groups is carried out and the study 
concludes that the groups function effectively as organisers of the European 
Parliament, with integrative and representational functions, but that at this 
stage of their development they cannot be seen as European parties. The study 
is based on research and analysis carried out through interviews conducted by 
the author as an active member of the European University Institute Survey team 
for the Study of MEPs, and supplemented by interviews with EP and political 
group officials.
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Introduction.
Conflict, Consensus and Representation in the European Parliament.
1

Tho European. Parliament, «s « marjInAllsad parliament
The European Parliament (£P) is not a "real” legislature in the sense used in 
national political systems or political theory. It does not consist of or relate 
to an executive body, although it forms part of an established system of 
Institutions where executive functions are exercised on a legal basis. While 
the direct elections accorded a legitimacy to the EP, its mandate is not 
clearly defined. The nature of its representative functions has yet to be 
clarified and the onus lies with the members to express this functlion. The 
national parliaments and the Council of Ministers are reluctant to Increase the 
Parliament's powers and to fully recognise its electoral legitimacy. In some 
ways, so too are its electors. This is partly due to the nature of the 
electoral systems and the variety of constltiuencies represented by the XEPs. 
Contacts with the national parties are not of a regular nature, and so many 
party representatives in the EP are isolated from the mainstream of political 
life in the member state.
The concept of representation is therefore crucial to the understanding of the 
EP and its members. The problem we face is - Who are the political actors in 
the European Parliament and what is their representative role? How are 
opinions and interests articulated in the EP? The Eurobarometer (surveys of 
public opinion in Europe) indicates that the EP has little or no meaning in the 
daily lives of the citizens of the European Community (EC). So the EP is, in a 
sense, alienated from the electors.
This dissertation examines what and whoa the EP purports to represent. Vhile 
by the very nature of its constituent aeabers, the EP represents the views of 
many national political parties and to a certain extent those of the national 
government and polity, there is also a certain Europeanisation of the party 
positions. This can be attributed to the party group. It is also worth noting 
that the XEPs are to a large degree isolated froa the national party, the 
national parliament and the mainstream of national politics. The thesis thus 
examines whether members of the EP can be seen as acting on a distinctly 
European representative basis or rather as constituency delegates.
"Party group" or "political group" are the names gi^fn to the parliamentary 
groupings or alliances of party representatives of different nationalities along 
the lines of a perceived allgnaent or coamon traditions. These are groups 
which are officially recognised by and operating within the EP. They reflect In 
some measure the major political forces in the Community. "Party delegation" is 
still the term normally applied to representatives of a national party within 
its group although in fact the HEPs may not necessarily be delegates in the 
sense applied before 1979, when they were automatically delegates from the 
national legislature, with dual national and European mandate.
The question as to the nature of the party groups in the EP is therefore 
relevent. Vhat is the political group in the EP context? The issue of whether 
the group represents the sum of the policy positions and attitudes of the 
component party delegations, or a political entity in Itself, must be addressed.
For example, some scholars and at least one group Itself (the European People's 
Party), have claimed that the groups are European parties of the future.
In addressing the Issue of whether political parties at the European level are 
feasible, It must be kept in mind that such a system may not evolve in the EP 
or in the present European party federations. Cooabes (1979, p. 106) reminds 
us that it is not even certain that the present political groups in the 
Parliament will form the basis of future European political parties. So the 
analyst of the EP groups must next examine the wealth of literature on parties 
and party systems. The groups may resemble parties but the group system may 
not actually constitute a system, and it is postulated that the groups are in 
such an embryonic, pre-party stage at this point that only a discursive sortie 
into the literature and discussion of the prospects for such a system is all 
that is necessary and useful at this point. In addition, the EP does not relate 
directly to a "polity" as such, but rather to a set of member states and to an 
institutional, albeit constitutional setting of the European Community. There 
is no European government, for example, although we are aware that the EC 
possesses its own governmental process, albeit not established in a single 
institution.
Vhat then is the role of the representative? Does the group fulfill the 
functions of the provider of structure, representative of interests and opinions, 
focus of communication and other functions of parties, for example? Does the 
group, as the major political organisation in the EP , have a coherent identity 
of its own and what would this consist of? Is the group cohesive, and In what
10
ways? If not, what are the strains on cohesion? Vhat are the major cleavages 
in the HP, and are these identifiable along group lines? Vhat is the level and 
degree of inter- and intra-group cooperation and conflict?
Methodology
In the light of these queries, we must then ask what is the conflict of 
loyalties, the cleavage structure, and the nature of the representative function 
in the SP as a sui generis institution in the EC structure? In order to 
address these problems, this researcher carried out two distinct sets of 
interviews over time.
Informal interviews were carried out from 1980 to 1986 with officials of the EP 
secretariats, group secretariats and party federationsas well as discussions 
with Commission and Council officials. These were unstructured interviews 
which were carried out by this researcher with officials of several different 
nationalities and in several different languages. Basic questions were 
presented to all respondents and replies were given in confidentiality. Some 
information was not forthcoming when respondents chose not to reply and this 
has in some cases resulted in incomplete data. The Intention of these 
interviews was to probe these actors - bureaucratic and support staff - on 
their perceptions of the role of the EP, the functions of the groups, and the 
present and future development of the system of political groups in the EP.
These interviews, approximately sixty in all, lasted from thirty minutes to 
eighty minutes each. The Interviewees were probed for their information on
ü
specific groups and activities, as well as for their general perceptions of the 
groups and individual political actors. The questionnaire for these respondents 
foras Appendix A.
In addition, this researcher was co-author and active participant in structured 
survey interviews which formed the European University Institute study of the 
European Parliament - a survey of members of the EP which sought to examine 
the experiences, attitudes and perceptions of XEPs with regard to the 
performance of the first directly-elected Parliament, the role of national 
parties and the groups, the commitment to Europe, the need for institutional 
reform and KEPs' representational roles and career patterns, as well as their 
perceptions of the distribution of power in the EC bodies.
This EUI survey afforded researchers special access to XEPs by providing them 
with the opportunity to interview each XEP in person. A scholar attempting 
this task alone would have been unable to draw up such a comprehensive survey 
and administer it to KEPs from ten member states. However, this cooperative 
method of comparative, multilingual research has resulted in a unique data set 
which will be illustrated throughout the text.
XEPs were interviewed in 1983 by this researcher and other members of the EUI 
survey team. (See Appendix B for questionnaire used). Interviewers 
administered a partially structured and pre-coded questionnaire while 
interviewees were also allowed to "speak their minds" at some length through 
the use of open questions. Attempts were made to interview all KEPs and the
tl
overall response rate was 80.7%. This rate refers to 331 respondents fron nine 
member states (Spain and Portugal had not yet Joined the EC and Greek XEPs 
were Interviewed some months later for technical reasons) and all political 
groups. Tables 0.1 and 0.2 give the number of respondents according to 
nationality and group. Full individual confidentiality was assured by the 
research team and replies to open questions are quoted anonymously. This 
survey is unique in that the questionnaire was translated professionally by EUI 
translators and was administered in the mother tongue of the XEP being 
interviewed in order to ensure an accurate set of data and comprehensive 
interviews. On average, each interview lasted 60 to 90 minutes.
The questions reflected the major concerns of analysts of the EC and the major 
crises and developments of the time. Hence, it is historically based for that 
reason. The Ionescu/Korgan study (1988) of the EP complements the EUI survey 
as it tackles different and more recent Issues in the development of the 
European Parliament.
On the basis of these result;:, the issues of loyalty and cohesion in the 
political groups and the question of what are the minimum criteria for the 
group to constitute a political organisation are examined.
The methodology adopted for this thesis is designed to facilitate an evaluation 
of the current conceptions and theories of the EP, its functions and 
prognostications for the future. This researcher further investigated both 
recent and historical attempts to define the EP and to challenge many of the
I *
Tabla Q.\ Raapoadgnts ta SUI Qiiastlsnnalr» hv party ymnp 
V39« S-23:PARTY GROUP
CATEGORY LABEL CODE
ABSOLUTE
FREQ
RELATIVE 
FREQ 
( PCT)
ADJUSTED
FREQ
(PCT)
CUM
FREQ
(PCT)
SOCIALIST 1. 96 29.0 29.7 29.7
EUROPEAN PEOPLES 2. 88 26. 6 27.2 57.0
EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC 3. 49 14.8 15.2 72.1
COMMUNIST ANO ALLIES 4. 32 9.7 9.9 82.0
LIB. AND DEMOCRATIC 5. 28 8.5 8.7 90.7
EURO. PROGR.DEMS. 6. 16 4.8 5.0 95.7
TECH. COORD.-INDEPS. 7. 5 1.5 1.5 97.2
UNAFFILIATED 8. 9 2.7 2.8 100.0
DK,NA,NOT ASCERTAINE 9. 8 2.4 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 331 100.0 100.0
VALID CASES 323 MISSING CASES 8
Tabi« 0.3.__R— pondants tn BUT Questionnaire hv nutInna11tv
RELATIVE ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ FREQCATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT) (PCT)
BELGIUM 1. 23 6.9 6.9 6.9
DENMARK 2. 13 3.9 3.9 10.9
GERMANY 3. 68 20.5 20.5 31.4
FRANCE 4. 52 15.7 15.7 47.1
IRELAND 5. 14 4.2 4.2 51.4
ITALY 6. 67 20.2 20.2 71.6
LUXEMBOURG 7. 6 1.8 1.8 73.4
NETHERLANDS 8. 23 6.9 6.9 80.4
UNITED KINGDOM 9. 65 19.6 19.6 100.0
TOTAL 331 100.0 100.0
VALID CASES 331 MISSING CASES 0
assumptions of previous comparative studies which relate the EC and the EP to 
the context of either a nation state or of an international organisation. This 
involved an examination of the literature on comparative political development 
and political parties. 5ext, the documents of the EC and the EP were submitted 
to analysis, along with documentation of the political groups of the EP. The 
political actors and officials were then interviewed again, and finally the data 
sets were analysed in order to place the EP in the context of comparative 
studies and to understand the role of political groups.
The party groups In the European Pari lament: -
The notions of cohesion and of political integration suggest a sense of 
identification with the group to which one belongs - Indeed a sense of 
belonging to the group itself. This Implies a similarity of interests or goals 
and a structure whereby such consensus is achieved, whether it be in 
generalised, normal or specific conformity. Generalised conformity is defined 
as a decision to conform automatically in response to patronage and pressure, 
while normal conformity signifies a disposition to support the party "by and 
large". Specific conformity denotes adherence to the leader's position on a 
particular piece of legislation or decision (Barber, 1966). The group is the 
only feasible agent of integration which resembles the political parties of 
which most MEPs are members. But the EP is a relatively recent institution in 
a fluid polity whose rules are made, maintained, and amended not by the 
European institutions but by the representatives of the member states. Caombes 
admits that the role of the political groups resembles that of political 
parties in EC member states. He adds;
But their awn internal cohesion, and their distinctiveness in terms of 
political principle and attitude, while they are greater in some groups 
than in others, are much less than in major political parties at state 
level" (1979, p. 31).
the groups are new political phenomena which may not always adequately address 
themselves to the needs and aspirations of their entire membership, or of the 
amalgam of very diverse members. Such diversity will be explored throughout 
the thesis.
The purpose of this study is to explore the cleavages, cohesion and 
representational roles of the party groups in the directly-elected EP. The 
underlying theme of this exploration is the obverse to that of belonging in the 
group, i.e., marginalisation or even alienation. There are strong indications, 
from observation and empirical research, that there is a sense of frustration, 
alienation and estrangement on the part of the XEPs with regard to their 
groups, the EP as an institution, and their relationship with the political 
structure of the decision-making in the EC, and also with the member states.
The problem might be expressed as follows:
- Firstly, there is an estrangement from the national political 
environment, and from domestic political parties, and from the national 
parliament, especially with the decline of the dual mandate.
- Secondly, the EP has been in a position of alienation from the other EC 
institutions, particularly up to the time of the Single European Act of
1986, due to the EP's lack of substantive legislative power. Vhlle the SEA 
made only a slight alteration to the formal powers of the EP, that body 
is attempting to interpret these powers widely.
- Thirdly, XEPs have expressed their frustration with regard to the 
fulfilment of their needs, aims and interests. The groups may offer the 
only viable means of counteracting these frustrations, although in some 
cases they increase such problems, depending on the notion of 
representation of the individual XEP. If the group happens to be a 
vehicle for the expression of the KEP's Interests, it cannot be fully 
successful in this function, due to the very nature of its 
transnationality, diversity of membership and the disparity of 
representational roles.
- Finally, the EP presents different career options for different XEPs. In 
general it is often seen as a stepping stone to other prospects of 
careeradvancement or as a final experience before retirement. Others see 
it as a viable career in Itself or as a forum for convinced Europeans to 
advance the cause of a federal Europe. For another set of XEPs, it is a 
means to achieve the execution of policies perceived as worthwhile.
Vith regard to the political environment, the thesis examines whether the 
groups operate in a political vacuum with little relation to the tangible 
realities of political power. The Parliament regularly passes or approves 
reports and resolutions, (often on issues over which the EP has no control), 
which result in no action being taken on them at national or EC level. The EP 
has in the past been regarded as ineffectual in its relations with the Council.
n
The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1985-86 on institutional reform of 
the EC treaties is an example of this, when most member states remained 
reluctant to relinquish to the Parliament power or any opportunity for input 
into the proceedings of the IGC.
There are suggestions that the desire of the EP for Increased powers may 
constitute an attempt to evolve as a "real" parliament. The Assembly of the 
Council of Europe has no real powers but an important difference from the EP is 
that the EP has mostly full-time politicians and operates in a quasi-federal 
structure where there is a legally based delegation of some national decision­
making functions to the EC. A large number of XEPs are full-time political 
activists and are dedicated to a term of five years to work in what remains at 
first sight an ineffectual debating assembly.
Representation
Vith regard to identity and national representation, the XEPs remain national 
delegates and are chosen on national party platforms in their own country.
Ion-nationals are not permitted to stand for election in another member state 
at present. XEPs hence remain national delegates in a European institution 
while at the same time finding it difficult to maintain contact with the 
national party and domestic political scene and policy making.
On the European level, meanwhile, XEPs had little immediate impact on EC policy 
making and few powers of control over EC decision-making processes, apart from
its budgetary powers, although the SEA has increased the Parliaaerit's scope of 
legislative participation.
Representational roles are rendered difficult to define by the scarcity of 
direct constituency links. This poses the problem of whoa to represent and 
with whoa to identify. The analysis of how XEPs feel about representation is 
therefore pertinent, as seen in the EU I study of the EP. Vith regard to group 
aeabership, we atteapt to investigate how the XEPs function in groups. The 
constraints of group aeabership, as well as the benefits, will be referred to 
when appropriate.
The fallowing are soae of the questions which eaerge in the study of groups as 
political organisations. Is there a logic in collective action in the groups? 
Vhat does it achieve? How necessary are the groups and how well do they 
function? Are they handicapped by the lack of governaent and opposition in the 
EP, and by the absence of real power, in order to function well?
Furtheraore, the EP1 s isolation froa both EC and national decision-aaking 
centres is coapounded by its geographical isolation. Although the U.S. Congress 
also involves travel, the representative there belongs to the political 
coaaunity in Vashington, while there is no peraanent EP presence at the level 
of politicians in the European Coaaunity system. Hence, no single city is 
identified with the EP and its work, and there is little sense of continuity,
«
stability or focus, although Brussels is becoming the focus of the Parliaaent’s 
work.
\1
The KEPs also have less contact with the national parliaments and parties, 
thereby increasing the distance from domestic politics. Ve examine briefly the 
efforts being made by KEPs, the domestic parties and national parliaments in 
order to overcome this isolation and sense of "representation in a vacuum”, of 
"a floating cocoon out of orbit", expressed in survey interviews by many KEPs.
This thesis further argues that a legislative socialisation process in the fora 
of Europeanisation is taking place. There is a development froa Initial 
aarginalisation of members froa states on the periphery, and the newer members, 
to adaptation to the continental system of legislative practices. A procedural 
alienation precedes the learning process of norms of parliaaentary and 
coaaittee behaviour as an Initial noralessness gives rise to the need to learn 
the rules of the game in this new institution.
Alienated linguistically in a plurinational and aultilingual parliament, aany 
KEPs find it difficult at first to establish inforaal contacts with each other, 
and find that this aust be done through the foraal group network and structure, 
or through advisors and assistants. Therefore, the essence of political 
Intrigue and soae of the eleaents of bargaining and Inforaal coalition- 
foraation are lost. Mechanistic cooperation appears to be the nora at first 
rather than a type of eaotlonal solidarity, although legislative socialisation 
later plays its part in deepening cooperative aethods.
Isolation froa the nuances and national political traditions of one's own party
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and political culture is another factor. It soon becomes obvious to the MEP 
that new political languages oust be learnt. There is also marginalisation of 
some MEPs from the standard consensus in the group to which s/he belongs, and 
from the voting patterns of other group members. The context of such non­
conformity are also analysed.
Institutional marginalisation from the EC Institutions is also examined. The 
formal powers of the EP are limited and examples of the EP flexing its muscles 
and attempting to exert real power and become more Institutionalised are 
relevent.
In conclusion, there is evidence of isolation from the exercise and influence of 
power in member states, the Council of Ministers and the European Council.
Membership of the European Parliament implies certain environmental conditions 
which do not apply either in a national parliaments or in other international 
assemblies. Such membership comprises different offices, roles and contraints 
from those in national parliaments, behaviour is different and subject to 
different influences, as are attitudes and policy-formation processes, and the 
ways and means of making decisions. This thesis asks whether there is a 
problem of cohesion in the groups and in belonging to the groups. Are there, 
for example, major problems of adjustment to the dictates of the group? Vhat 
are the costs and benefits to the individual MEP of group membership? Are the 
MEP’s aims and ambitions fulfilled in the group ?
2\
Cohesion
It will also be asked, in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, how cohesive the groups are, if 
at all. Vhat are the most salient cleavages and how are they expressed? Is 
there alienation from or contact with the other groups? How easy is it to 
join a group and what are the pressures to join, remain a member and conform? 
Vhat are the conditions of group membership? This leads to the broader 
question of how the power game - the struggle for influence and bargaining - is 
carried out in the group.
In studies of political parties and legislative behaviour, legislative cohesion 
of the party is regarded as the desired norm in order to ensure stable voting 
on issues of relevance to the parties, their electors and to their chances of 
holding governmental office. Janda (1980) states that, in a cohesive party, the 
party members tend to vote in the same way on issues before the chamber. For 
Janda, the concept of coherence (which is operationalised with reference to six 
basic variables, the first of which is legislative cohesion) relates to 
Anderson's definition of consensus as "the degree of congruence in the cultural 
orientations of various individuals and groups comprising an organisation". He 
points out that party scholars are interested in the issues which obtain 
consensus, in the level of consensus obtained for different Issues, and in the 
distribution of consensus across party organs (1968, pp. 396-397). Janda 
points out that consensus deals with attltudinal agreement, primarily, among 
party members, in this conception. Janda feels that attitudinal agreement is 
important, but it is also important to know how, if at all, that disagreement is 
expressed in intraparty politics. He therefore chooses to focus on the concept
ZZ
of coherence, which he defines as the degree of congruence In the attitudes and 
behaviour of party members.
Janda also refers to studies of party cohesion and factionalism which have 
sought to identify the source of coherence and its consequences upon party 
effectiveness. The nation of party/group effectiveness will be referred to in 
assessing the reasons and rationale for group pressure on KEPs.
Ozbudun <1970, p.305) sees party cohesion as the extent to which, in a given 
situation, group members can be observed to work together for the group in one 
and the same way. This definition is useful as a pointer to legislative 
behaviour. It is concerned, however, with observed behaviour and omits any 
reference to attitudinal questions and agreement on policy priorities. These 
are encompassed in Janda's definition. Observed behaviour would Include roll- 
call voting and the maintenance of conformity as defined by Barber (1966), for 
example. The nature of cohesion probes the extent to which parties of similar 
ideological persuasion resemble each other across national boundaries. This 
attempts to go beyond "similarity" to "agreement" on the nature of the political 
system, its goals and its future. This is particularly pertinent to the 
attitudes of the party groups and their members regarding the very existence of 
the EC political system and of the E? in the EC.
Cohesion or conflict may be explained by the following variables:
1) Leadership and the exercise of leadership presssure
*2) Internal group structure and allocation of offices
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3) Humber and diversity of nationalities in the group
4) Ideological variety and diversity
5) Policy differences and priorities
6) Different heritages of party systems and origins of the constituent parties 
in the group
7) Different origins of the groups and their raisons d'etre
8) Disparate goals and alms of the XEP vis-à-via the group
9) Perception of group membership
10) Perceptions of the nature of the EP and of its role
11) Sense of identification of the XEP with the group
12) Nationalism
13) Europeanism
14) A different type of Europeanism to that professed by the group
15) Personal desire of the XEP to stand out or be different (and pay the price
if necessary).
16) Party loyalty
17) Concept of representation
18) Loyalty to specific interests or interest group 
Incentives to cohesion Include;
1) Payoffs, e.g. positions in committees, on group Bureau, spokesmanships, 
appointments as rapporteur/report draftsman
2) Publicity in the group
3) Use of group resources, i.e. information, public relations machine, know-how 
and expertise, network of contacts and of experts, political and technical
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advice, back-up and support for committee meetings. The group network offers 
some form of procedural socialisation and saves having to find everything for 
oneself and by oneself
4) Membership and sense of belonging. Possibility of influencing the group and 
the leaders, peer group support and solidarity
5) Payoffs in the group leadership structure after a certain amount of time
6) Fear of alienation from the group and of isolation within the group, with 
loss of peer group esteem and support. Fear of disapproval of colleagues.
The strains on group conformity would include the persistent recourse by the 
XEP to conformity in voting and general behaviour on only certain specific 
issues (specific conformity), rather than generalised conformity. In addition, 
recourse by the individual member to the use of the legislative instruments at 
his/her disposal, e.g. parliamentary questions, motions for resolution, own 
initiative reports, etc., either as an individual or as part of an alternative 
grouping or informal club, may place strains on the maintenance of cohesion. 
Pressure from the national party or government source on an HEP or a party 
delegation in a group, for support on an issue upon which the group has a 
different position or voting record, places constraints on the loyalties to the 
group as the primary source of discipline and mandate.
Evidence of cohesion on policy attitudes is expressed in a number of ways.
These include policy statements, statements on ideology or belief system, overt 
behaviour in general, general attitudes (EUI survey), agreement on issues and 
expressed willingness to follow the group line and the leadership.
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The EP as sui generis: -
Finally, the EP must be seen in the wider political environment. There is no 
theoretical or practical model which is directly comparable to the EC. It is 
sui generis. It has to be explained in known categories although these cannot 
fully describe the political community of the EC. Federalist and functionalist 
approaches seem to yield little in current analysis of this "quasi-polity”.
Rather, I would suggest that the European Community may be seen as a "fluid 
polity”, in Sartori's terms, where parties and party systems have not as yet 
assumed the role which they occupy in established polities (Sartori, 1976, p. 
255). Sartori reminds us, in the study of quasi-parties or semi-parties, that 
inchoate forms not only tend to defy classification, but tend to be misrendered 
by classification.
The European Parliament qua parliament is neither a legislature nor the forum 
of government and opposition debate. It does however possess legally-based 
powers of law making under the EC Treaties. The sui generis nature of the EC 
itself has a separation of powers which do not run along the lines of a 
national system. Vhereas in the national systems, parliamentary government is 
normally seen as "party government", the executive body of the EC is the Council 
of Hinisters and to some extent the Commission. The parties play a mainly 
supervisory role at the European level in the EP and party competition takes on 
a different hue than in the national parliaments of the EC member states. Th* 
parties have no Influence on the determination of the tenure of office of the
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Council of Ministers, although they possess the power, as yet unexercised, to 
dismiss the entire the entire Commission, but not individual members.
While the EC is a normative federation or confederation, in substance it has 
intergovernmental features. The European Community has been referred to as a 
"would-be polity", and while it is not within the scope of this thesis to 
investigate the complicated question of whether the EC constitutes a polity, we 
shall seek to describe the political environment within which the EP has its 
place. The EC is not yet a political community as defined by contemporary 
political theory but we do not rule the possibility that it might become a 
fully-fledged political community. The nature of the EC remains a crucial 
question for political scientists as attempts are made to understand and define 
it. Hearl's notion of a "two-tier polity" (national and Community) might be 
mentioned at this point as an illustration of the state of the art of the 
definition of the system of national political systems and the upper structure 
cf the European institutions (1977). This is useful to keep in mind in the 
analysis of the conflicts of loyalties in the EP, with regard to the primacy of 
national or European loyalty or representation in the groups.
In this regard, we shall assess the institutionalisation of the EP and the role 
of the party groups in the Parliament, the changing functions of representation 
at the EP level and the prospects for the development of a European party 
system.
Chapter One
The European Community: A Fluid Polity

U __ Origins and Scope
The European Community has not so far conformed wholly to existing definitions, 
either of an international organisation or of a federation of states, while it 
displays features of both, the EC is distinctive for what is absent within its 
structure as much as for what it consists of, although our concerns centre on 
whether it can be said to constitute a political community or a polity in the 
making.
It is useful to begin by focussing on the tangible, observable nature of the 
Community. This is important since delving into the complex network of 
theoretical approaches to federalism and functionalism may result in a feeling 
that one has not quite put one's finger on the essence of the Community.
The Community is a political organisation of twelve democratic states, who are 
to some extent interdependent and hence have surrendered some measure of 
national sovereignty in order to cooperate on certain policy areas . This 
interdependence is the crux of the interrelationships and the mosaic of complex 
relations in the EC at several levels. These tiers encompass national, regional, 
European, and other or special interests.
These states have certain policies in common. It has been persuasively argued 
that the member states have reached a stage of interdependence where they need 
a common economic policy, to maintain equilibrium between thri economies, 
provide a framework for their economic development, safeguard their Interests
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in and contribute to the management of the wider international economy". For 
Finder (1986), despite the fact that the EC Is a trading power (and partner) on 
the scale of the United States, "far too little" had been done in order to build 
up an internal market, with common policies and a transfer of powers to the 
Community from the states' banking institutions and finance ministries. Such 
interdependence, Pinder argues, merits further integration with presumably a 
transfer of some sovereignty to the Community. Vhile the EC constitutes a 
trading power and an organisation of states, the Single European Act has 
further established the structures for a single internal market. The EC is also 
a customs union and a community organised around the central concept of a 
commmon market with its basic freedoms of movement for goods, labour, capital 
and enterprise, with common policies and its own resources. These elements are 
based in the founding Treaties, related legal instruments and the SEA (1).
This Community was established in 1952. The EC was not a movement which 
emanated from a ground-swell of public opinion which felt that, In the era of 
post-war recovery and of disenchantment with the nation-state, European 
cooperation was necessary. Rather, the European cooperation process was 
imposed from above by courageous political actors of the time such as Monnet, 
Schuman, Spaak, de Gasperl and Adenauer, who sought an alternative to 
nationalism and who considered it opportune, for a variety of motives, to 
attempt to form a supranational means of cooperation.
The European movement was largely a movement of Intellectuals and former
f
resistance leaders, and as such, the EC was an Initiative of the élite, which
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did however succeed in gaining government support and eventually somepopular 
support. Political parties were not actively involved, except through their 
governments. The nation-state was, and still remains, the basic unit of the EC. 
EC membership was not defined by region or interests, but by member state. 
Representation in the various institutions was according to member state size 
and political weight and the nation-state remained supreme (2).
The original conception of the EC was of a community of economic or functional 
integration by sectors - beginning with the areas of coal and steel production
- which would then lead to a political community in a federalist United States 
of Europe. The writings of the early decades anticipated a "spill-over" effect 
from the economic to the political, and from the nation state to the Community. 
The assumption behind this approach was that the functional integration as a 
counterweight to national alliances was expected to bring about a "transfer of 
loyalties" from nationalism to European loyalties, on the part of the economic, 
political and administrative elites of the member countries (Haas, 1966, 
Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970 and Wallace, 1985.) and also on the part of the 
political actors, as analysed in the study on the alleged "Europeanisation" of 
the HEPscarried out by Kerr in 1964 (Kerr,1973). The reader is referred to the 
many studies of the original conceptions of the EC, and the notions of 
federalism, functionalism and divided loyalties in the European Communities, 
which do not fall within the scope of the present work (Wallace, Wallace and 
Webb, eds. 1977, Keohane and Hye, eds. 1972, Kolinsky, ed. 1978).
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K. Wallace holds that interest in the EC had already decreased by the 1960s as 
the national government regained its self-confidence as a result of the 
economic boom of the 1950s. The 1950s saw exciting initiatives for European 
political, economic and security co-operation, many of which - the most far- 
reaching - also failed during that decade. The 1950s are as distinctive for 
what they did not achieve as they are for what they did succeed in launching. 
Failed initiatives include the proposals of the Ad Hoc Assembly on a European 
Political Community, and the proposed European Defence Community. The mooted 
deep-seated changes in the political system (i.e. towards a process of 
confederalism) did not mobilise popular support or much party support during 
this period.
So what endured were the "minimalist” compromises of economic Integration, by 
functional methods under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 
progressive establishment of a common market (EEC) and common atomic energy 
programmes (Euratom). While these were innovative Treaties, the more radical 
European Defence Community (EDC) never really saw the light of day. This 
initiative, although ratified in some member states of the ECSC, was not 
ratified by the French Assembly on 30 August 1954. The de Gasperi proposal for 
a European Political Community, which was regarded as the necessary political 
corollary to the EDC and which envisaged both a common foreign policy and an 
integrated internal market directed by a European Executive subject to the 
democratic control of a directly-elected European Parliament, was seen as "an 
attack upon the core issues of national sovereignty" (W. Wallace, 1983, p.2) and
*
was never ratified.
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Over three decades later, the internal market proposed by de Gasper i is now 
approaching realisation. The date of 1992 has been set as the target date by 
the Commission's White Faper on the Internal Market in 1965, and by the Single 
European Act.
With regard to de Gasperi's proposed "common foreign policy" and Executive, the 
European Political Cooperation procedure does not fully constitute a common 
foreign policy, and a European executive does not appear to ha*7e ever been 
mooted as a serious possibility at the political level. The EP was directly 
elected for the first time in 1979, even though such elections were provided for 
in the Treaties CArticle 138, EEC Treaty), and the notion of a European 
Executive subject to a directly elected EP’s "democratic control* would not be 
accorded serious debate by national administrations or academic scholars, 
despite the aspirations of the EP's Draft Treaty on European Union (1984).
Much of the literature on the EC in the 1960s refers to a European Government 
and sos:e also proposed the idea of a European party system (Vredling, 1971, and 
Bonvicini, 1971 and 1975). Ueunreither (1972) had proposed that the Commission 
become a European Government, and this was one of the original roles which it 
was considered would devolve to the High Authority/Commission in the original 
plan of Monnet and others, that the Commission would be the "mctor of 
integration” and take upon itself some quasi-executive functions.
It is useful to point out that there was no overt need for a new "state" or 
political community in post-war Western Europe. The states and political
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systems were already well-established. There was no revolution, no invasion of 
territory (since 1945) and no general anarchy which had to lead to the creation 
of a new political order. However, confederations and unions of states cooe 
about for a variety of reasons and not only because of a need (perceived or 
otherwise) for a new "state". The "confederation" of states of the EC caae 
about for a very specific purpose which has since then developed in depth and 
scope.
1.2.1 The legal and intergovernmental nature of the Community
Vhile there is no central executive or European party system, there are four 
main institutions, provided for in the founding Treaties and the 1965 Merger 
Treaty. These are the Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of 
Justice, and there are some auxiliary institutions and "complementary entities" 
which have legal status (Bieber, 1985, p.9). The EC possesses a body of law, 
upon which it is based, and although it has been called an "Incomplete legal 
framework", nevertheless, the Community's legitimacy is based on its legal 
system.
Veiler and Xodrall (1985, p. 163) state that the Community was and is a creature 
of law. They point out that while there would be a more or less organic socio­
political entity without a constitution (or a France without the 1958 
constitution), there would not be a European Community without the Treaties, and 
they surmise that it will be a long time before the Community assumes an 
organic social/economic/political identity apart from its legal framework.
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Elsewhere, Veiler suggests that the most dramatic incident in the evolution of 
the EC as a supranational legal order, was not in the "empty chair" crisis of 
1965-6 when the French withdrew from the Community for several months, a 
crisis resolved by the Luxembourg agreement on the importance of "vital 
national interests", but rather in the legal revolution whereby the Community 
"Grundnorms" (basic norms) were established in 1963-4. This was when the 
European Court of Justice introduced the doctrine of the same "Direct Effect" of 
Community law as of national law and the possibility of individual claims, 
should a member state introduce or fail to introduce a law which has the effect 
of disturbing the Common Market’s operation. This commenced with the Van Gend 
en Loos case (Veiler, 1985, p.4). The second "Grundnorm" is the "supremacy 
clause", whereby Community law was to be held by national courts as supreme and 
over-riding any conflicting national law (Veiler, ibid, p.5).
These elements of Community law are raised as they Illustrate the essentially 
legal nature of the Community (3). This is despite the fact that the Community 
has no enforcement mechanisms, and that Community law is the most visible sign 
of a European authority and this authority has weakened in recent years 
(Vallace, 1982, p.2). The EC, legal in origin, is legal in the bases whereby it 
might be amended or radically changed. The issue of "extra-territoriality" 
advanced the scope of the Community's legal mechanisms, with the decision of 
the Court of Justice on 27 September 1988 that the EC can apply its competition 
rules to companies which are based outside the EC territory. The political 
Impact for the 1992 scenario could be widespread.
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The IGC, the Intergovernmental Conference of EC member states, which resulted 
in the Single European Act, further reinforces the Treaty-based nature of the 
EC, including the decisions to Incorporate European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
and the European Monetary System as they operate at present, in the EC, despite 
the evolving nature and previous extra-Treaty status of these means of 
cooperation. In addition, the EC is not simply a legal entity. It has an 
Impact and influence even on a daily basis on the lives of citizens of 
Community member states. The incorporation of the environment, monetary 
policies, economic and social cohesion and other policy areas into the SEA 
illustrates that such issues are regularly dealt with by the EC and Involve 
transnational cooperation.
It must be emphasised that the EC is a political entity, albeit a fluid one, and 
not simply a legal conception. It is characterised by daily inter-relationships 
of the Community and national institutions. However, the EC does not legally or 
politically control or manage such policy Issues as the creation of a common 
security policy, the establishment of a central bank with a common currency, 
energy, development aid, education, culture, foreign policy and European 
citizenship CEP Resolution on the SEA, Doc. A2-175/88).
It is postulated by this writer that the EC is still limited by its very nature, 
i.e., firstly, it began as a legal concept, and secondly, as the IGC amendments 
to the Treaties have illustrated, it is largely intergovernmental in structure 
and decision-making. The IGC itself was a conference of the representatives of 
the member states, with some minimal participation by the Commission and the
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Court of Justice, and some cursory attention paid to the EP. The EC is sui 
generis and is also a creation of the member states. The EC's legal basis 
provide for a common market, and implementation of these provisions is not 
intergovernmental, although extension of the EC's powers beyond these 
provisions is a matter for the member states to decide.
The EC has set itself ambitious objectives in most spheres of activity and as 
these objectives evolve, the means to achieve them fall outside the EC legal 
system. The Draft Treaty on European Union of the European Parliament was very 
attentive to this problem which was not tackled to the same extent by the SEA.
The EC constitutes a "democracy of nations" (Veiler and Xodrall, p.173), as it 
can be viewed as democratic with regard to the representation of the member 
states by the Councilof Ministers, and the decision-making processes of the EC 
Council. However, "democracy of the peoples" remains undefined. The Citizens' 
Europe (or Peoples Europe) was the subject of a European Council statement at 
Fontainebleau in June 1984. A Peoples Europe Committee, known as the Adcnnino 
Committee, reported to the Dublin European Council in December, 1984, and to the 
Brussels European Council of March, 1985 on the measures to implement a 
People's Europe. Some of these measures form part of the 1992 Internal Market 
initiatives.
The concept of a democracy of peoples directs us towards the question of where 
the EP fits in and how it represents its voters. V. Wallace (1982, p.5) 
maintains that the Community was not created to be representative. He contends
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that its essentially technocratic nature was counter-balanced to a limited 
extent by the creation of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee. He perceives that the problem of representation has become more 
acute as the European Council and the Council of Ministers have become the 
focus for policy making.
Vhile he does remind us that governments are represented in Brussels and 
oppositions are not represented effectively in the Council-Commission dialogue, 
he does not refer to the direct representation of the voters by the EP, and he 
appears to conceive of the Parliament as a means of balancing the Interests of 
different governments and groups (1982, p.5). I would contend that this 
underestimates the scope of the EP as a representative body. The Parliament, in 
accordance with the EEC Treaty (Art. 137), is composed of the representatives 
of the peoples, represents the people who voted for it in 1979 and 1984, 
despite the fact that these direct elections were organised in member states.
The nature of the EC's formal powers, and may be summarised with regard to its 
legal system and the Treaties,in particular, as we have seen. However, there 
had been a substantial increase in the exercise of non-Treaty-based fuctions 
and powers in the Community over the last decade in the fields of EPC and 
monetary cooperation, for example. The SEA gives Treaty status to such 
cooperation, although in effect it describes the situation as it existedserved 
perhaps to "freeze" in a legal framework those cooperation processes which were 
still in a state of evolution.The notion of competences refers to powers 
accorded to the Community's institutions by the member states. The member
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states possess the power and authority, as a body in Conference, to amend or 
increase the competences accorded to the institutions, under Articles 235 and 
236 of the EEC Treaty, by means of an Intergovernmental Conference.
The EP does not possess the competence to carry out such amendments or 
increase in Community competences, although it has taken upon itself to propose 
such initiatives. Vith regard to the EP's Draft Treaty, Veiler and Hodrall 
(1985, p. 173) suggest that in some way it can lay claim to greater legal 
legitimacy than either the American Constitution or the Swiss Constitution, as 
the Parliament which provided the impetus for the Draft treaty was directly 
elected by citizens of the member states. However, the Community's claim to 
"legitimacy" is only valid through the agency of the governments of the member 
states. V. Wallace (1982, p.l) states that the acceptance of a European 
Community has not been accompanied by any transfer of loyalties from the 
national to the European level. There is however a relationship nature due to 
the direct elections which links the EP with the citizens by the very act of 
holding those elections. This thesis investigates, inter alia, the concepts of 
the groups and KEPs of representation and the nature of the representative 
function.
1.2.2 The EC as a political community.
In order to set out the political environment within which the EP operates, it 
is considered necessary to understand the EC as a political community. The EC 
is a non-unitary system, i.e., it consists of several member states in a
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constitutionally quasi-federal organisation« The Council can arrogate new 
authority to itself with member state agreement. The intergovernmental nature 
of the EC ensures that such amendments to the decision-making process cannot 
in fact be effected in the face of opposition from a member state. The Danish 
referendum on the SEA of 27 February 1986 (like the British referendum on 
continued membership of the EC in June 1975) is an example of opposition by 
some political parties and some portion of the electorate to the perceived 
threat to national sovereignty and the continued protection of vital national 
interests.
The European Community has been referred to as a "would-be" polity, thereby 
implying that it has not attained the status of a polity. It is not within the 
scope of this chapter to fully investigate the complicated question of whether 
the EC constitutes a polity, but rather to seek to sketch the environment within 
which the E? has its place. Ve can only briefly refer to the other largely 
unsuccessful attempts to define the EC and illustrate thereby that the EC has 
no comparable model. Haas» Lindberg and Scheingold, among others, attempted to 
define the Community but little progress has been made in clarifying its 
complexities and evolving nature. The EC has been a prisoner of its own 
institutional set-up and of its historical origins. It is historically 
determined by its post-war origins and objectives. How it is to survive and 
even surmount its origins as represented in the member states is a question 
which must at least be raised here, and although several scholars have devoted 
time and effort to this problem, its intergovernmental quality has been 
enhanced rather than undermined by the EC's development.
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1,2,2 Iha SC in crisis
Most of the writings, and some press coverage, about the EC over the last 
decade or so have informed us that the EC is in crisis, and limps weakly from 
one crisis to another. Many of these studies are value-laden in expecting the 
EC to perform in certain ways along certain norms. Pinder, for example, is 
explicit about his "decentralist, federalist" normative approach, in advocating 
full economic union of the Community. He concludes that the "root cause of the 
Community's failure to develop may be identified in the right of veto" (1985, 
p.103). Thus, Union legislation enacted by majority votes of both Council and 
Parliament, as proposed by the EP's Draft Treaty, would "eradicate this cause of 
Europe's impotence". It is noted that the SEA went some way in that direction 
by introducing majority voting in some aspects of internal market decision 
making.
Other writers point to the divergence of the economies of the member states and 
suggest solutions to this divergence by introducing the concepts of 
differentiation, a two-speed Europe and variable geometry. Such an approach 
suggests that there is a need for the Community to combat the problems of 
divergent economic development of the various member states and to reduce the 
alienation of the peripheries from the centre, and so proposes a reformed 
Community-level Regional Policy, coupled with common industrial and 
environmental policies and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The world 
economic crisis has been seen as necessitating more urgent EC action to fight 
unemployment and inflation (Levi and Pistone, 1980, pp. 16-18, Wallace, 1982,
Veiler, 1985). Europe, it is suggested, needs to present a common voice in 
world politics, and to act as a competitive unit as a viable trading competitor 
with the U.S. and Japan.
The Community was for some time severely handicapped by its inability to create 
new forms of revenue. The limit on 7AT receipts at 1.6% of the tax base 
remained insufficient for the effective implementation of existing policies, let 
alone new ones. Common policies were therefore not deemes feasible at a time 
when a tiny percentage of the GST of the member states constitutes the 
Community budget. In recognition of this situation, member states have agreed 
to the raising of the VAT limit.In addition, the EC was seen as being 
Institutionally unwieldy, especially in tht; wake of several enlargements, and 
thus in Dt^d of institutional reform. Veiler C1985, p. 11) succinctly 
summarises the disease as follows: "in an almost religiously observed ritual the 
Community engages two or three times each decade in a process of discussing 
institutional reform". The malaise is always the same: lourdeur, Democratic 
Deficit and irrelevance. The proposed cures are always the same: improved 
decision-making, more powers to the European Parliament and an increase of the 
competence of the Community (see, for example, the Vedel report, the Tindemans 
report on European Union of 1975, the report of the Three Vise Men, etc.). The 
political will, it was constantly stated, was lacking, while the "lourdeur" of 
the Community's institutional procedures reinforced the Community's negative 
image, some national governments' disillusionment with the Community and the 
weakening of European cooperation.
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The Three Vise Ken's report in 1979 validly pointed out that institutional 
reforms alone are unlikely to improve the "climate", particularly in the absence 
of the priorities of the Community itself (Vallace, 1982, p.7). Vallace places 
the responsibility for Community inertia on the national governments. The 
issue of institutional reform was re-opened in 1985/6 by the ICC in the wake of 
attempts by the European Council to improve the institutions (e.g. Dooge report) 
and to make the Community more relevant (the Adonnino People's Europe report). 
The nature of the EC's legitimacy, representativeness, authority and meaning in 
citizens' everyday lives also deserve attention in this context.
Some observers have suggested that without a European Government, common 
policies are not possible, whether in the areas of economics or of foreign 
affairs (Levi and Pistone, 1980, p.67). The EC’s decision-making structure 
forms a mosaic of ill-assorted pieces with many lacunae. Jfichelman (1981) 
reminds us that the EC decision-making process is carried out by national, 
Community and private sector bureaucrats and by the upper echelons of the 
national political élite. He further states that the E? remains weak due to the 
fact that the decision-making is élite-dominated, bureaucratic and non- 
deiiio%«r (A .
Power resides with the national governments in the absence of a government at 
the EC level of decision-making. The EC is not a political organisation of 
representatives as is evidenced in the United Uations, as it possesses a quasi- 
federal body, the Commission, and a directly elected assembly, neither is it a
state. It has no government, no territory which is by first claim its own 
possession, no full power system and it is not a confederation of states.
In the EC’s relationship with the member states, the EC was viewed at first as 
something beyond the nation-state, and Hoffman (1966, p.909) suggests that it 
was also something less than the nation-state. For many member states, the EC 
was seen - and still is to a large degree - as a part of state foreign policy. 
Hoffman refers to nation states that pour into their foreign policy the 
collective pride, ambitions, fears, prejudices, and images of large masses of 
people (p.862). Each state participates in the Community as a separate entity, 
each with its own political culture, norms, institutional structure and decision- 
making procedures. Each of these is to a certain extent merged into the 
Community acquis, while each state also attempts to maintain and protect Its 
perceived vital Interests. Nationalism succumbs to consensus politics at 
Council level on those issues which are not perceived as vital, and a certain 
amount of redefinition of "vital” takes place in the national governments and 
administrations. The acceptance of the right to invoke the veto in the 
protection of vital national Interests under the 1965 Luxembourg agreement 
implies the acceptance by the Community actors of the importance of national 
interests.
The SEA alters this situation by limiting the number of situations within which 
the veto may be used by majority voting for a greater number of areas and 
policies than hitherto. The SEA is therefore significant as a political
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compromise between those participants at the Milan European Council who
favoured major Institutional refora and those adamantly opposed to It who 
favoured the retention of the veto. The SEA links institutional changes to 
efficiency in decision making in specific areas, such as the Internal market, by 
greater use of majority voting, such as harmonisation, freedom of establishment, 
mutual recognition of qualifications and the Regional Fund (Fitzmaurice, 1988).
U __EC decision-making and the institutional system
The Commission acts as the "motor of integration" in initiating EC legislation, 
with some management and implementation powers (Article 145, EEC Treaty). The 
Single Act (Article 10), while conferring on the Commission powers to implement 
EC rules laid down by the Council, also allows the Council to reserve the right 
to exercise powers of implementation itself, in an amendment of Article 145. 
This illustrates that while the Commission has more latitude in its role, the 
Council reserves the right of a final say. The Commission is regarded 
primarily as the guardian of the Treaties (Soel, 1985, p.11), which implies that 
the Treaties are in need of a protector. This is a task which is normally 
assigned to the head of state In the constitutions of many member states. It 
is the Commission which monitors the implementation into national law of EC 
directives, regulations and decisions, which takes infringement proceedings 
against member states, and manages the Community funds and implementation of 
policies such as food aid to ACP countries.
The Council of Ministers makes the final decision on what becomes EC law. 
Observers have suggested that there are legitimate concerns about preserving
democratic accountability in the Community, relating to the Council of Ministers 
"whose authority seems set to grow as increased majority voting steadily shifts 
more decision making to the centre". Its "direct accountability to either the 
European or national parliaments is often tenuous", it has been contended (4). 
The European Parliament is consulted on most EC policies, Commission draft 
legislation and on the EC Budget.
The European Council, the Conference of Heads of State and Government, which is 
outside the Treaties and institutional structure, meets three times a year in 
order to iron out major problems of coordination of EC policy in a top-level 
intergovernmental structure. Bieber (1985, p.34) rightly points out that the 
Conference of the Representatives of the member states (COREFER), which is not 
an institution of the EC, but "formally a type of intergovernmental cooperation* 
often prepares or complements EC legislation. This is a regular meeting of 
officials from member states at diplomatic level. Unresolved issues are then 
referred to the Council.
Legislative and executive functions are, according to Bieber, horizontally 
divided between the Council and the Commission. The Parliament fulfills co­
decision and control functions and judicial control is exercised by the Court of 
Justice. However, the Council remains the closest to an executive decision 
maker within the institutional structure, while the Commission has management 
competences and proposes legislation. The Parliament's co-decision powers had 
been limited to the conciliation procedure until the Single Act expanded this
procedure, while not going as far as the Italian proposal on co-decision put 
forward during the IGC.
Bieber states that the composition of the institutions alms essentially at 
legitimacy, and therefore all member states are represented. However, 
representation and legitimacy may not coincide happily and the fact that member 
states are represented in all institutions and that the members of the 
institutions are, according to the Treaty, not given any mandate from any 
member state, does not imply legitimacy (5).
Bieber presents a succinct list of criticisms of the institutions of the EC in 
terms of efficiency, legitimacy and balance. Each of these criticisms will be 
addressed briefly. Firstly, he states that the institutions of the Community 
are still not considered by its own citizens as producing and guaranteeing 
solutions for vital problems. This implies that the problems are soluble, and 
at the EC level, this may not always be the case. In addition, the Community 
has no real executive. Its role, for example as a problem solver for vital 
problems, has never been clearly defined, except perhaps in strictly legal 
terms. Nor has the scope of its actions and power.
Secondly, Bieber reiterates the criticism that the political options underlying 
decisions are hardly ever made public and are only indirectly subject to 
influence and control. The Community citizens do not see themselves as 
participants in the system, as seen in the EC's Eurobarometer surveys. I would 
add that the E P is alienated from the electors, and this in turn relates to the
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question of image and the relationship, if any, which the EC would wish to have 
with its citizens.
Bieber asserts that the Community lacks legitimacy and hence has not attracted 
the loyalty of its citizens. Legitimacy is not equal to, or even necessarily 
conducive to, loyalty, however, rather it comprises other aspects of the 
political process.
Thirdly, Bieber suggests that "the legitimacy of the system when producing 
decisions is doubtful”, and he elaborates that decisions are often not taken 
according to a "proper common interest", but rather according to a lowest 
common denominator. This is a form of diluted Intergovernmental ism, a 
decision-making process between and among states, where each state makes its 
views clear and surrenders little.
Bieber admits that the above criticisms could also be levelled at states, but he 
adds that the European Community is complicated by three main factors. The 
first of these factors is an incomplete legal framework governing the relations 
between the institutions. This is central to the problem of the EC as a fluid 
pclity. The EC is an Incomplete system with some powers, some checks and 
balances, a system of partial competences which possesses no European qua 
European executive, but rather decision-making by national representatives.
The second complicating factor constitutes what Bieber refers to as the 
"dynamic" conception of the organisation. I would suggest that the Community
be regarded as "fluid" or evolving and In this context the IGC represented an 
attempt to adapt the institutions to the dynamic nature of the Coaaunity. The 
third complicating factor is "the position of Parliament which, differs from that 
in national constitutions”. Basically, the EP does not constitute a Parliament 
in form or function (see Chapter 2).
l.A.l The EC m  » radical innovation
It has been suggested that the EC was a radical experiment of a quasi-federal 
organisation which attempted to pre-empt the nation state in at least some of 
its functions and powers, as well as its sovereignty. This assuaptlon must be 
questioned. Vas the EC really such a radical innovation? It continued to 
represent the interests of the member states and there was no yielding of 
substantial power in the key «ureas of defence or security, in aonetary union, 
or, until the SEA, in the internal market or foreign policy. As a radical 
movement qua radical, its effect on the political organisation of the member 
states is Halted. The assumption is made in many textbooks on the EC that the 
seeds of full economic - and, for some, political - union, were sown in the 
1950s and much disenchantment is expressed with regard to the Community's 
perceived Inability to fertilise the seeds and reap their benefits adequately in 
order to yield full "union". It is possible, however, that functional integration 
is the optlaua that can be achieved in practice and that talk of a political 
community is hence not realistic or practical.
Within the constraints of consensus governments, attempts at more profound 
European integration were made repeatedly, e.g., the Committee for a United 
States of Europe, the Monnet Committee, which met at official level for several 
years, the attempt of the Ad Hoc Assembly in 1953-1954 to establish a Political 
Community, and the Constitution which that Assembly wrote to that end, the 
Defence Community initiatives in the 1950s and the initiatives in the 1900s of 
de Gasperi and Fouchet.
1.4.2 The EC as a fluid polity
The EC functions as an economic community, as provided for in the Treaties. As 
such, it is achieving its goal of economic integration. The assumption that it 
should be a political community places the EC on an entirely new and more 
complex level of interaction, political communication and power structure. It 
is not a People's Europe, although this has been encouraged in recent years by 
the European Council, resulting in renewed efforts to bring about a European 
passport, flag, symbols, abolition of many frontier controls, removal of some 
residence controls, Increased rights of residence and establishmentand in the 
movement for a "Europe sans frontières" for a Common Internal Market in 1992.
The legitimacy of the EC in legal terms is not questioned. It exists, legally, 
therefore it is. However, its legitimacy in terms of representativeness has not 
been recognised. Its legitimacy is also bound up with the notion of its 
effectiveness (V. Wallace, 1982).
So
Wallace (1982, p. 2) suggests that legitimacy in any political community depends 
on:
1) Authority: acceptance of its decisions and actions
2) Relevance: link between its actions and the concerns of those it affects
3) Equity: a sense that costs and benefits are spread out fairly
4) Effectiveness: satisfaction of expectations with speed and efficiency
5) Representation: the balance between political groups and interests achieved 
in bringing Influence to bear upon the process of policy-making
6) Boundary: recognition that there is a framework of Interests and obligations 
which ties each group to all others within the community, and which 
differentiates the whole as a community from groups outside that community.
The Community possesses authority in legal terms and in its primacy of law.
Its relevance has been questioned in many spheres but the member states' 
governments themselves are in agreement as to its relevance and benefits to 
them. Attempts are being made to bring about more regional equity in the areas 
of convergence, regional policies and economic and social cohesion, through the 
ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) regulation of June 1984 and the 
incorporation of cohesion in the Single European Act. The latter aims at 
"reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the 
least favoured regions", and member states' economic policies are to be 
coordinated in order to achieve this and to promote the Community's "overall 
harmonious development", using the Structural Funds and financial instruments 
(Sub Section IV of Single Act, providing for a Title V to be added to Part Three 
of the EEC Treaty). Satisfaction as to the effectiveness of the Community is
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low, as seen in the Eurobarometers, and its hnnndarv is defined in legal terms 
and the EC is easily recognisable as an entity in trade with nations or blocs 
outside its boundaries. Representation is explored in Chapter 3 with regard to 
the European Parliament.
Ve have examined the nature of the EC as the political environment of the 
European Parliament. These discussions have explored the elements af the 
system of distribution of power in the EC and their implications in EC decision 
making. The EC lacks fundamental features of a polity, such as sovereignty. 
Vhile sovereignty lies with the member states, the EC cannot b« seen as a 
polity as it lacks its own sovereignty. However, the present evolution of the 
EC points to a recognition of the political power of the EC's institutions in 
terms of compliance with Treaty-based obligations and hence a surrendering of 
some national sovereignty in decision making.
It is therefore suggested by this writer that the EC be described conceptually 
as a "fluid polity" in Sartori's definition, where parties and party systems, for 
example, have not as yet assumed the role which they occupy in established 
polities. The place of parties and party systems is relevant to this present 
discussion as we seek to understand the EP's party groups. The literature on 
parties tends to assume the existence of a polity, and to relate parties to 
national political systems, regardless of whether such a polity came about at 
the same time as the political parties, which then exercised an integrative 
function in state building, or whether the polity evolved before parties were 
formally constituted.
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So, at present, Sartori's "fluid polity" suggests the concept of same form of 
political "system" in a state of flux, which has not yet fully defined its terms 
of reference. For example, the EC has doubled its membership ov*r the last 
decade or so, from six to twelve. It has also more than doubled the 
representation of HEPs in the European Parliament, which come frna twelve 
countries and over sixty national parties. The membership of tbs European 
Parliament has also altered its mandate, as it now consists of mostly single­
mandate members who are directly elected, in terms of political groups and 
membership. The EC's other institutions have also Increased in representative 
size since the enlargements.
This fluid polity has defined itself in legal terms and in so doing has also 
defined its parameters. It has not fully defined Itself in political terms. Its 
policies are widening in scope and extent, as it is now involved In more areas 
of activity than stipulated in the Treaties. The SEA has recognised this 
expansion of Community policies in environment, research and technology, in 
addition to social policies and economic and social cohesion. Tl^ e Community 
has been widely seen as becoming more politicised since the mid-1970s (Eenig, 
1979) and its scope now includes European Political Cooperation and the EMS.
In addition, the creation of the European Council has signified another 
political step in the "structural consolidation" (Sartori, 1976, p. 244) of the 
EC as some form of polity.
The EC is situated between a "formed" and "formless" polity. For Sartori, a 
formed state consists not only of a modern political system but also of the
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political systems whose identity is provided either by an adequate historical 
record or by a consolidation that has occurred prior to their independence. 
Formless states are polities whose political process is highly undifferentiated 
and diffuse or polities which are in a fluid state in a highly volatile and 
initial stage of growth (p. 244). "Formed" is broader than "structured" for 
Sartori and he instances Latin America where states are formed (i.e. 
differentiated and characterised by stability of interactions) "but one of th«ir 
subsystems, the party system, has seldom acquired, during its Intermittent life­
cycles, structural consolidation" (p. 244). This study suggests that while tbe 
EC is not fully formed, its party group system is acquiring structural 
consolidation.
The EC is fluid and in a state of growth. It is also already formed in terms 
of legal establishment through the Treaties. Sartori speaks of "structural 
consolidation" (in preference to Huntington's "institutionalisation") of formless 
states. Such a process is taking place in the EC, as seen in the institutional 
reform of the Community and in the developments in policy-making and 
Institutional cooperation. Terms such as "fluid" or sui generis capture the 
flavour of an evolving "would-be polity", as they best describe the political 
hinterland within which the European Parliament operates.
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Chapter Two
The European Parliament In the European Community

The European Parliament and the concept of the legislature - functions and 
powers
2.1 The EP and its working environment
The danger is of becoming engrossed in a game which is parliamentary in 
appearance but which is often without any political impact, and of seeing 
this game in isolation, as end in itself; of succumbing to the illusion 
that they are playing an authentic parliamentary role on a European scale 
while in fact they lack the means either to exercise power or to check its 
exercise (1).
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the place of the EP in the EC's 
institutional system. Ve examine the EP in its immediate environment, the EP 
as a legislature, and the distinction between formal powers and real functions 
of the European Parliament. Ve examine the EP as an Institution, and the 
possibility that it is a pre-pari lament with controlling and legislative powers 
in the EC and with regard to the nature of legislatures in theory. This will 
then prepare us to examine the party groups in the EP as parliamentary actors. 
Ve examine what kind of powers the EP possesses in the EC decision-making 
process and attempt to evaluate the political weight of such powers.
The theme is that the EP does not relate directly to a full polity, but rather 
to a a set of member states in the EC context, and even then in a marginal way, 
and to an institutional setting which possesses no central executive body. The
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XEPs are representatives of national states in an essentially “federal 
parliament". The EP has alienated from the EC's political decision making to a 
large degree. In addition, it is also estranged from the national political 
environment and the mainstream of political life. So it is doubly alienated, 
from other EC institutions and from those of the member states.
The European Parliament is not a parliamentary body in the sense used in 
national political systems or in the theoretical analysis of legislatures. It is 
not parallel to a parliament as (1) it does not elect an executive (2), <ii) it 
does not make policy decisions of the EC, and (iii) the EP's powers are not 
concerned with all aspects of economic, political and social activity as a 
national parliament would be, as its powers relate only to policies laid down in 
the Treaties. Article 4 of the EEC Treaty stipulates that those tasks entrusted 
to the Community should be carried out by the institutions. Constitutionally, 
also, the EP differs from national parliaments although its meabers come from 
states with a tradition of parliamentary government. It operates in a different 
framework and within different parameters, while at the same time possessing 
some functions which are similar to those of national parliaments. The fact 
that the EP's powers are Treaty-based does not preclude its concerning Itself 
with any subject it chooses.
In general, in the relationship of the EP with other EC institutions, the 
Commission submits proposal to Council, which then consults the EP. The EP 
then issues its opinion (report) which is then submitted to the Council and 
Commission. The Council takes note of the EP's opinion and tiie Coomission
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transmits a definitive (amended) proposal to Council. The Council of Ministers 
makes a decision on the basiis of this latter proposal. So in many issues, in 
the elaborating of proposals, the EP's has little or no role. In the 
consultation phase, the EP is consulted by the Council in an active though 
limited role. Vith regard to the decision making phase, the EP's opinion might 
have been taken into account by the Commission before re-submitting its 
proposal to the Council.
Its minimal Influence over the Council and its limited power over the 
Commission have until 1986 placed the EP is what it regarded as a very 
unsatisfactory role, except in the coopreation procedure with regard to the 
Budget. In addition, while the direct elections accorded a formal legitimacy to 
the EP, its mandate had not been clearly defined, nor had its empirical 
legitimacy (e.g. the content of a programme of government). The nature of its 
representative and other functions have not been clarified although they are 
taking shape. The SEA altered the balance of power of the EC institutions with 
regard to the cooperation and assent procedures, however, as will be 
illustrated.
The Parliament has found Itself in a situation of Institutional marg^^n^-Hrm 
from the other EC institutions. EC issues have on occasion proven to be more 
divisive in parliaments of the some member states than in the EP itself. The 
EP's formal powers are limited and its influence is undermined by environmental 
constraints, by relative lack of interest on the part of other EC institutions 
in its work, and by the reluctance of the media to accord it regular reporting.
It is, however, becoming adept at flexing its muscles and at attempting to 
exercise its Budgetary and control powers, and new powers under the assent and 
cooperation procedures, particularly since the implementation of the S5A as seen 
in its critical resolutions on the the SEA results (Doc. A2-178/88 of the BP).
Ve first set the EP in its immediate environment, as the democratic political 
party (and group) is the creature of its environment, and the most important 
aspects of that environment are, for Schlesinger (1985), those which shape the 
expectations and ambitions of the office seekers in the parties.
The EP plenary sessions normally take place in Strasbourg and occasionally in 
Luxembourg, which is also the location of the general secretariat of the EP, 
committee secretariats and of some parts of the political groups' 
secretariats. The Parliament also meets in Brussels, where the committee 
meetings are held most of the time. The rest of the time they meet in national 
capitals, or other cities of relevance to a particular investigation or hearing. 
Brussels is also the location for meetings of the groups, and the seat of most 
group secretariats.
This Parliament is a multipartite and multilingual assembly, with over sixty 
national parties; It is multinational, with twelve nationalities; it is organised 
in eight transnational political groups, and eighteen committees and 
delegations, and 518 members, which sit in three cities in three different 
countries (3). The Parliament works in a multi-level political system, composed 
' of national, supranational, transnational and sub-national levels (Hrbek, 1983,
L O
p. 2). In the EP, therefore, political conflict is multinational, multipartite 
and multilingual, with cleavages of left-right, urban-agrarian, Horth European- 
South European and other scales.
The parties are far more disparate and varied than in the national multi-party 
system, as they differ not only according to origin, development and links with 
the domestic party leadership, but also in terms of national mores and political 
culture. Party discipline is not maintained by such factors associated with 
national political parties such as the desire to attain offices or the power to 
remove a government from office, as these elements do not feature in the EP.
An additional feature is the language of politics. Firstly, there is the 
linguistic element, which places a strain on the ability to establish and 
maintain informal as well as formal contacts, and these must perforce be done 
through the formal network and structures of the party group, or through 
intermediaries such as advisors and assistants. The essence of political 
intrigue and some elements of bargaining, informal coalition formation and 
voting agreements, which are so much a part of legislative behaviour, are 
therefore to some extent lost to the NEP. This is a form of linguistic 
alienation which is experienced by many XEPs, although some XEPs may use their 
linguistic ability in a positive way to enrich their political vocabulary and 
scope for action.
The second element of the language of politics is the language of discourse and 
the associated process of legislative socialisation. Each party's political
vocabulary is not easily translated or rendered explicable. Each party 
possesses its own coded political language, an intrinsic element of its 
political culture. The novice NEP is therefore obliged to become involved in a 
learning process, in addition to the normal legislative socialisation process. 
The XEP attempts to form a comprehensible mosaic from the myriad of pieces of 
language, culture and norms, in order to be better equipped to be an effective 
political actor in the Parliament. There is a tendency for differences in 
political culture to be talked out in committees, rather than in plenary and 
this is perhaps the major importance of the committee system, when attempts are 
made to explain what is meant in the continuing learning process in the EP.
It has been suggested that activity in the legislative arena "proceeds on the 
assumption that all legislators are aware of and are in basic agreement" about 
their goals and actions, the actions of the assembly and the "game" to be 
played (Vahlke et al, 1962, p. 138). This is not the case in the European 
Parliament since the direct elections, as these elections provided the EP with 
new, mainly full-time politicians for whom the nature of the game was not yet 
clearly defined.
The geographical factor involves a regular dislocation of several hundred 
politicians and officials, which inevitably places considerable strains on the 
actors involved and on the results of legislative activity. There is no fixed 
seat for the Parliament, despite the EP's efforts to have one established (4).
The EP requested the governments of the member states to come to a decision on 
< this matter, as it is not within the competence of the Parliament, but rather of
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the national governments, to do so. Thus the EF is alienated (it need only be 
consulted on the matter) from the decision of the Council regarding where it 
should meet. Although the U.S. Congress, for example, also Involves travel, 
there is a sense of belonging to an established political community in 
Vashington. The EP has no such central meeting-place. There is no permanent 
EP presence in any one city.
The XEPs are tied to a political calendar and legislative agenda which are 
under executive control. The calendar is set in part by the Commission's 
initiatives and the Council's decisions, and partly by the EP's Bureau, its 
decision-making body . The EP can, however, decide when to deal with Council 
decisions and hence exercise some autonomy.
Travel and time constraints render regular contact between the M EPs and 
national political actors difficult, while at the same time the MEP is not 
deeply Involved in the core of EC decision-making, which is removed from its 
focus, in the Council of Ministers, COEEPER and the European Council. So the EP 
is alienated from the two main loci of power, the national and Community foci.
2.2 The European Parliament and the functions of legislatures
Coombes (1979) points out that the European parliament cannot be compared to 
parliaments within member states, not because it lacks the power or status we 
commonly associate with a parliament, but because the Community itself is 
unique or sui generis, despite being the creature of the member states and hence
its role was designed, with this sui generis Coaaunity in aind. It is a body in 
search of a role, although it possesses very clearly defined functions, set out 
in the Treaties, and working methods, set out in its own Rules of Procedure, 
over which it has full control, along with its own Budget. The EP was not 
intended to be a legislative body, however, in the ESC Treaty.
The EP is both more and less than a national parliaaent in teras of functions 
and scope. Vhile the EP cannot legislate or Influence a government, it 
possesses certain features which few national parliaaents possess. These 
features may be suanarised as follows:
(a) institutional autonomy - control over its internal organisation and 
rules of procedure (Article 142 of the EEC Treaty)
(b) budgetary autonomy - control over its own budget within certain 
liaitations, under Council decision of 22 April 1970 and Court of Justice 
case 208/80
(c> control of resources, and facilities (aaterial and non-material) of its 
members (secretarial assistance, docuaentation centres, office 
accommodation, etc.). This is a fora of professionalisation of the EP and 
such resources may assist in promoting careers in the EP Qtayhew, 1974).
(d) certain budgetary control powers, with aargin of manoeuvre over the 
non-obligatory aspects of the EC Budget.
(e) control powers over the Council, the "executive" body, through its 
equal legal status with the other EC institutions, peraltting it to take
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the Commission and Council to Court for failure to enact determined 
policies (Articles 137-144, BBC Treaty).
(f) cooperation procedure.
(g) assent procedure in external relations, under Art. 8 of SEA, applied to 
Article 237 (accession agreements) and 238 (cooperation agreements) of the 
EEC Treaty.
The status of the EP is that of a representative assembly, which consists of 
representatives of the peoples, according to Article 137 of the EEC Treaty. It 
controls amendments to the estimates of expenditure of the EC (4). In addition, 
it is autonomous of governments' tenure of office and its term cannot be altered 
by any executive or constitution.
For Loewenberg (1971, p.3), the structural characteristics of a legislature are:
(1) Its members are formally equal to each other in status, distinguishing 
parliaments from hierarchically ordered organisations
(2) The authority of their members depends on their claim to representing 
the rest of the community.
Loewenberg suggests that, because of the equality of their status, members of 
parliament are reluctant to employ sanctions against one another and hence 
parliamentary rules of procedure are reinforced by "folkways" and implicit rules 
of the game. On this point, with regard to the EP, see Question 7 of the EtJI 
Survey of KEPs, which sought to determine whether such informal rules of the
game exist la the EP, according to the XEPs. Some 75.5% (5=331) ci the XBPs 
interviewed stated that such infornai rules exist in the EP.
Table 2.1 Question 7, EUI Survey of the XEPs
Question 7.1: It is said that every legislature has its own "Informal rules of 
the game", that is, there are certain things members must do or must not do in 
order to be able to get things done. Do such informal rules exist in the EP?
CATEGORY LABEL ABSOLUTE FSEQ RELATIVE FREQ
YES 250 75.5»
10 70 21.1*
REFUSED 2 0.6«
DK, ITA, HOT ASCERTD. __2_________________2.72
TOTAL 331 100.0%
VALID CASES 320 
XISSUG CASES 11
Question 7.2: Could you tell me what some of these informal rules are and what 
happens if they are not obeyed?
Replies to the open question (7.2) referred repeatedly to the need for 
compromise, achieving the consensus of most political groups, preparing
colleagues in one's own group and other groups to support a motion.
Respondents emphasised that it was Important not to appear aggressive in 
promoting national or constituency interests but rather to learn to speak on 
behalf of Europe rather than on a regional problem.
Loewenberg's first characteristic of the legislature, equality, applies to the 
XEFs, unlike the differential weight of votes of the member states in the 
Council, while the second, authority based on representation, raises the question 
of the authority and perhaps even the legitimacy of the European Parliament and 
causes us to ponder whom or what it represents. It is not clear that the XEPs 
do, in fact, claim to represent the rest of the community nor what this 
community consists of.
Xayhew (1974, p.8> sees the functions of the U.S. Congress as those of 
legislating, overseeing the executive, expressing public opinion and servicing 
constituents. The EP, like the U.S. Congress, operates in a system of a
separation of powers. In the EP, that executive consists of the Council of
Ministers, who are elected nationally and the Commission, which has some 
executive functions and is not elected at all. In the U.S., Congress 
undisputedly has substantial power in legislation, unlike the EP, particularly in 
Budgetary control and committee hearings.
A cursory overview of the traditional role accorded to parliaments, and the
function of the parliament, as enunciated by Bagehot (1867) is relevant at this 
point. The original functions of statebuilding and consent to policy, which
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relate to earlier stages of Institutional development, can now in the twentieth 
century be broadly restated as linkage, conflict management, law-makicg, policy­
making and recruiting leaders.
Bagehot saw the functions of the British parliament, the "Mother of Parliaments" 
as elective, expressive, teaching, informing and legislative (including 
financial) and these functions retain much validity as a yardstick to explain 
the EP's role in the EC process. The first functions of the House of Commons 
was as an electoral chamber; "it is the assembly which chooses our President". 
The second is what Bahegot calls the expressive function, whereby Parliament 
expressed the mind of the English people on all matters which come before it. 
The third, the teaching function, is to alter society for the better, and to 
teach the nation what it does not know. The fourth, the informing function, 
lets us hear what otherwise we would not. Crick (1970, p. 46) suggests that 
this Informing function may first involve informing itself, and he includes 
methods of Inquiry, parliamentary questions, and the notion of answerability 
under this function. Lastly, the legislative function is as important as the 
executive management of the whole state, or the political education given by 
parliament to the whole nation. For Bagehot, the financial function is part of 
the legislative one, as he chose not to distinguish between financial and other 
legislation.
Von Beyme (1974, p.11) redefines these functions differently, in the light of 
late 20th century developments in Western European parliaments, as 
representation and articulation, communication, controlling, participation in the
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appointment and dismissal of the executive, legislative and recruiting. Each 
perspective places the legislative function as one among many other functions. 
Indeed, von Beyme suggests that communication rather than legislation appears 
to be the main sub-function of Parliament.
He states that the strength and functions of national parliaments are 
determined by a series of external constraints which he classifies as (i) 
Juristic and (ii) socio-economic constraints. Juristic constraints do in fact 
include the norms of the constitution, particularly the Interplay between 
parliament and government in the appointment and dismissal of the executive. 
The European Parliament is in fact subject to defined Juristic constraints in 
its relationship with the executive. Socio-economic constraints comprehend the 
party system which influences the government-forming function and helps to 
shape policy output, and also the system of interest groups and 
institutionalised channels for the expression of Interests in the system.
Vhile keeping in mind the danger of falling into a "functional trap", we 
summarise the EP's powers and functions in order to understand its character 
and how it works. Parliamentary "check-lists" runs the risk of resulting in a 
static view of the political system and the mechanics of such a system. Vhat 
follows is an attempt to describe the EP's work, taking Bagehot's and Von 
Beyme's functions as a yardstick so as to better understand the EP and the 
environment of the political groups.
Function 1: Representation and Articulation -
This is dependent on several factors:
(a) Unicameral or bicameral assembly: the SF, a unicameral assembly, could 
also be viewed as a directly elected upper house for the European tier of 
the EC as a multi-tier polity, where the EP represents the people and the 
Council the states.
(b) The EP represents some 300 million citizens and is directly elected by 
plebiscite, which is organised by the governments of the member states. 
Article 138 provides for its direct election by universal suffrage.
<c> The institutionalisation of the articulation of interests in parliament, 
including constituency or special interests.
Function 2: Communlcatlon/Eypr»gg-lnn (Linkage) -
This function of linkage between parliament (and government) and people is seen 
by many scholars as primary (Blondel, 1975), although von Beyme suggests that 
it is a disappearing function, as it Is reputedly being undermined by interest 
groups and the development of the government's direct links with the mass 
media. The EP represents the peoples of Europe as representatives of states, of 
political parties, and in some cases, of interest groups.
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Function 3: The controlling function (Including financial) - 
One observer referred to the EP's political weight by holding public debates, 
questioning the representatives of other institutions, holding committee 
investigations and issuing reports and passing resolutions as Parliament's role 
of tribune, as HEPs act on behalf of the electors, at times by "sheer moral 
pressure and simply by making themselves a nuisance" (Coombes, 1979, p. 22).
(a) The right to put questions - This is utilised exhaustively by XEPs. The 
Treaty (Article 140) stipulates that the Commission reply to the EP orally or 
in writing. XEPs utilise the written questions and oral PQs extensively, and in 
this way the activities of the "executive" of the EC are subjected to public 
political scrutiny by the EP. In the 1972 Summit Conference, Council also 
undertook to reply to EP Questions and if necessary to contribute to the EP's 
debate on the basis of a reply given by the Council (EP, 1984a). Council 
undertook to improve this procedure in the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on 
European Union (6). The 1974 Paris Summit undertook to associate the EP more 
closely with the work of the Presidency through reply to EPQs on European 
Political Cooperation. The use of PQs also acts as a means of following up on 
the actions of the Council and the Commisssion on the legislative amendments 
made by the EP. These PQs and replies are all published in the Official journal 
of the European Communities. Both the Council and the Commission have 
officials present at Question Time at all EP Plenary Sessions to reply to 
Questions.
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b) Interpellation with motions - This is also a major feature of EP sessions. 
Hearings, committees of enquiry, and question time are also utilised by the 
directly-elected EP. Such controlling and supervisory powers also Include the 
right to debate the Commission's annual report and the Presidency programme, to 
cross-examine the Commission in committee and to question the Council.
The only equivalent to a formal vote-of-no-confidence in the government is the 
EP's vote of censure on the Commission, its ultimate weapon, which although 
threatened, has never been utilised, as the EP has no say in the reappointment 
of the Commissioners and the Commission President (Article 144, EEC Treaty).
The function of control of the administration makes the Commission in effect 
collectively, and not Individually, responsible to Parliament. This supervision 
of policy outside the legislature, is seen by Loewenberg and Patterson as one of 
the most effective functions of the modern legislature. Combes (1979, p. 19) 
states that the real power of a representative assembly depends not only on its 
constitutional powers in relation to legislation, the budget and the appointment 
of the executive, but also on the political weight It is able to carry by 
holding public debates, holding committee investigations, issuing reports and 
passing resolutions. He surmises that the EP is now well-equipped for such 
purposes. The Council has now adopted the practice of inviting an Opinion from 
the Parliament on the Commission's draft legislation even In cases where this 
is not formally required by the Treaties.
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c) Budgetary control - Parliament's most important power is its budgetary 
control. Although the EP has specific powers over EC expenditure, which 
amounts to co-decision in the field of non-obligatory expenditure, it has no 
power over the raising of revenue (8). It has the power to audit the accounts 
of the EC. Under Article 19 of the Merger Treaty, the EP grants a discharge to 
the Commission on the implementation of the Budget after monitoring the income 
and expenditure of the current year and examining weaknesses and irregularities. 
Budgetary control provides for the control of obligatory expenditure up to a 
ceiling already determined by the Council and of non-obllgatory expenditure, on 
which the EP has the last word, and for the possibility to reject the entire 
Budget of the Community (by a vote of the majority of its members and two 
thirds of the votes cast under Article 203(8) of the EEC Budget and the 1975 
Merger Treaty). On this issue a broad consensus has been reached by the EPover 
the last decade. In December 1979, the EP rejected the 1980 Draft Budget by 288 
votes to 64 with one abstention. A provision was made by a Joint declaration 
of the Council, Commission and Parliament on June 30, 1982 on measures to 
improve institutional collaboration in the context of the Budgetary procedure 
(9). This is commonly referred to as the conciliation or cooperation procedure, 
first initiated in 1975 regarding legislative acts with financial implications, 
and proposals have been made on several occasions to apply it to other 
policies.
The Budgetary procedure consists of the Commission sending estimates to the 
Council, which adopts a draft Budget, and this is sent to the EP for a first 
reading and then back to Council. The Council gives it a second reading,
considering the EP's request for changes, and then the EP gives it its second 
reading, the most important stage, when it reconsiders the entire Budget and 
may reinsert earlier amendments which the Council might have rejected. After 
the meeting of the EP's Budget Committee, the EP then decides whether the 
Budget is adopted or rejected. Furthermore, the EP also devotes its attention 
to the problem of insufficient resources, the future financing of the Community, 
budgetary imbalances and budgetary guidelines for the forthcoming year. The 
EP, like the House of Commons, may not introduce bills to raise taxes or 
increase government expenditure. That is the function of governments.
Xoreau Defarges (1985, p.8) points out that the EP has the power to increase 
expenditure - a margin of manoeuvre - which the French national assembly, for 
example, does not possess. The amount within which the EP has this margin of 
manoeuvre is, however, limited to non-obligatory expenditure, which consists of 
a little over 20% of the EC Budget. The EP, like national parliaments, is bound 
by its previous legislative decisions.
Since the Community acquired its "own resources” for financing its expenditure 
In 1970, and the Budget has expanded to include intervention In agricultural 
markets, support for social, regional and industrial development, and aid to 
developing countries, the EP has been involved in this process through its 
substantial budgetary powers, which are related to the allocation and 
distribution of resources. The EP is reaping the benefits of the use of these 
powers in order to influence the policies and orientations of the Community.
Function 4: Participation In the appointment and dismissal of the axacirtiva -
This consists of participation in government formation or vote of investiture, 
the defeat of government by a parliamentary vote, and the dissolution af 
parliament by government. None of these exists in the EP framework. The 
parties in the EP do not compete for government, and do not appoint an 
executive for the Community. Vhile one cannot assert that parties in the U.S. 
Congress, for example, compete for government, nor that Congress creates an 
executive, nevertheless it wields real powers, while the EP has limited powers 
of control over the executive and policy formulation.
The opinion of the EP's Bureau (the agenda setting body of the EP consisting of 
the President and twelve Vice-Presidents, who are elected by the XEPs) Is 
sought on the appointment of the President of the Commission, according to the 
Stuttgart Declaration (10), although the EP has no parliamentary investiture of 
the Commission President. The Commission is in practice appointed by the 
governments of the member states, and the EP has no Influence over their tenure 
of office. The EP is not involved in any appointment procedure apart from the 
Court of Auditors, although some proposals in this regard were put forward and 
rejected at the IGC on the SEA.
The Commission as a body can be dismissed under Article 140 of the EEC Treaty 
in a motion of censure with no EP power of reappointment. Vhile the Commission 
is formally answerable to the EP, it is not the equivalent to an executive. 
Heither can the Council be considered as an executive as a unit, as it is a
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"highly segmented institution with its powers divided among different sectoral 
compositions'1 (H. Wallace, p. 180). H. Wallace correctly points out that the 
Council lacks the collective identity which would render it directly accessible 
to political control by the EP.
The Council, national politicians who are answerable to their national 
parliaments, has some "executive" functions, but it is dependent on the 
Commission as its source of legislative lntiative. This division of functions, 
where there is no direct political link between the BP and the locus of 
executive power in the EC, and where there is no exercise of a comprehensive 
control function presents a confusing myriad of Intricate functions which result
in a sense of frustration on the part of many XEPs.
Function 5: The Legislative Function
Under Article 137 of the EEC Treaty, the Assembly exercises advisory and 
supervisory powers conferred on it by the Treaty. In a study of national 
parliaments in Western Europe in the mid-197Os, it was generally agreed that 
the legislative function has generated into a "bill-reviewing role" (Von Beyme, 
1974, p. 16). In the EP, there is no formal right to initiate legislation. That
power lies with the Commission. The Parliament exercises the right to
promulgate own initiative reports and motions. These are not, however, legally 
binding on any government or institution. It may also produce documents of a 
quasi-constitutional nature, such as the EP's Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union. The EP's Secretariat states that few parliaments in the world
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possess the right to introduce legislative initiatives and those which exercise 
this right do so within narrow limits (EP, 1984a, p. 43). However, national 
parliaments, unlike the EP, have the final right of decision on legislative 
proposals put forward by governments.
The EP's "legislative powers" can be summarised as (i) the right to be consulted 
by the Council (Article 137, advisory powers); (11) the right of intiatlve: 
Article 138 provides for the Assembly to draw up proposals for a uniform 
procedure for its direct election; (iii) optional consultation of the BP by the 
Council (Council minutes of 24/25 Feb. 1964, p. 23); (lv) reconsultation of the 
EP by the Council; (v) rejection of the Commission's proposals (Buie 35 of EP's 
Rules of Procedure and amendments thereof); (vi) the conciliation procedure 
(European Parliament, 1984a) (vii) cooperation procedure under the SEA, with 
regard to the Internal market and (vii) the assent procedure on the conclusion 
of international agreements, consent to accession (Art. 237) and cooperation 
agreements such as Lomó, Mediterranean basin agreements and their associated 
financial protocols (Art. 238) under the SEA.
The EP therefore possesses a legislative role, but there ara limitations to a 
power of amendment which cannot be backed by final approval. Such limitations 
include basing EC actions on Treaty articles which do not stipulate that the EP 
must be consulted; prior discussion of proposals by COSEPER, before the EP 
examines such proposals and the Council's emphasis on unanimity, even at 
COREPER level, thereby delaying the transmission of such draft legislation to 
the Parliament (Coombes, 1979, pp. 22-23).
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The consultative powers of the EP have evolved in two ways: the extension of 
consultation beyond those cases provided for in the Treaties, and the 
development of procedures whereby consultation develops into co-decision 
(Lutton. 1985, pp.37-38). The Council consults the Parliament on numerous 
cases, in accordance with the 1964 resolution wherby it agrssd to the extension 
of consultation with the EP, and in addition the Commission invites the BP's 
opinion on its programme and on documents of a general nature. Consultation is 
also improved in amendments to Commission documents. Consultation by the 
Commission has increased since the direct elections and ths SEA due to the 
Commission's desire to improve the balance of powers in the interinstitutional 
triangle. The specialised committees of the EP carry out in-depth and often 
critical evaluations of proposed EC legislation, and produce reports on Council 
action and Commission proposals. These are not necessarily taken on board by 
the institutions concerned.
Coombes (1979) is of the opinion that the EP's lack of formal power of 
initiative in legislation is no real departure from normal parliamentary 
practice. Vhat he does perceive as a serious limitation is the EP's lack of 
formal power to reject legislative proposals. Vhlle such a formal power would 
not be likely to be the prerogative of the EP, he questions whether the EP's 
present powers could give it an effective means of amendment to draft 
legislation and positive use of the veto and he urges this utilisation of its 
present powers (p. 20) although the cooperation procedure under the SEA 
provides that the common position of the Council may be rejacted in the EP's 
second reading stage.
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The SSA introduced a new "cooperation" procedure, which applies to very specific 
cases, between the Council and the Parliament. These cases include legislation 
on the elimination of discrimination under Article 7 of the Treaty on the 
freedom of movement of workers, the right of establishment (Articles 49 and 54) 
and on the establishment of the free movement of services (Article 57) and 
finally harmonisation directives under the new Article 100a on the functioning 
of the Common Xarket. This latter provision excludes tax harmonisation, 
freedom of movement and provisions relating to the rights and interests of 
workers, thereby limiting the scope of the EP's Involvement.
The Parliament, in its resolution of 27 October 1988 on the results obtained 
from the SEA's implementation, pointed out difficulties with the cooperation 
procedure. Despite the political will expressed, when the SEA was finalised by 
the Council, for more involvement of the EP in the EC legislative process, in 
the first twelve months after the entry into force of the SEA fewer than half 
of the amendments which the EP had adopted at first reading and less than 25% 
of those adopted at second reading had been incorporated into legislation which 
the Council adopted. The Parliament has also criticised what it regards as the 
Council's failure to participate adequately in the planning of legislation 
introduced by the EP and the Commission and the fact that there is no 
requirement on the part of the Council to complete its first reading "within a 
reasonable time limit". The EP has also taken the Commission to task for not 
always publishing its modified proposals following the EP's first reading and 
for abandoning positions of the EP which it had previously accepted. A 
clarification of this procedure is clearly necessary (Doc. A2 - 176/88) and the
HP is rightly seeking to oak* maximum use of this cooperation procedure in 
order to coabat its perceived aarginalisation iron BC decision making.
The Parliament's dissatisfaction with the SEA in general with regard to its 
liaited scope, and the fact that it falls short of the EP's own project for 
European Union, has proapted the BP to consider the drawing up of a new draft 
proposal for European Union "before the 1992 deadline and it will be for the 
Parliament elected in 1969 to accoaplish this task" (Point 23, EP Resolution on 
SEA, Doc A2 - 176/88). It should be pointed out that the position adapted by 
the Parliament on the SEA in October 1988 is not a united position, as there 
are distinct differences of opinion within the Assembly on the SEA and the 
Parliament's role under the new procedure. In addition, the EP decided to reap 
the benefits of the SEA by amending it working methods in order to exploit its 
participation in the legislative process, to comply with the strict deadline 
during the second reading in accordance with the SEA and to ensure a political 
link between the first and second readings as well as the achieveaent of an 
absolute majority of the EP as a whole.
Function 6: The recruiting function
This function refers to the recruitaent of leaders for executive offices, from 
the legislative body, Bagehot's elective function. The EP is not Involved in the 
selection of government, as there is no legislative/executive overlap, or in the 
provision of XEPs for governmental posts. It has provided XEPs for Ministerial 
positions at national and regional levels in the member states, and in this way
the EP can be seen to function as the training ground for the executive, albeit 
a national executive. In addition the EP makes decisions concerning the 
elections of its own President and Bureau and the allocation of committee 
chairpersonships and positions. In this way, the EP’s Bureau performs a 
recruiting function on behalf of the XEPs although this is Halted In scope and 
these decisions do not greatly influence national or EC politics.
Despite the expectations of soae observers that the direct elections would 
lead to the formation of a European governaent, the political forces which 
doainated the elections Bade no effort to taka on this function (Steed, 1984, p. 
228). Neither was the office of the President of the EP a feature of public 
discussion during the elections, although the election of the EP President is a 
highly politicised issue within the EP with the foraation of voting coalitions 
by all groups.
It has been stated that the U.S. Congress exerts it Influence not by choosing 
the executives but by controlling thea, once in office, through the exercise of 
law-making, appropriations and Investigative powers (Loewenberg and Patterson, 
1979). This is clearly not the case in the EP which has limited powers 
regarding soae aspects of law-making, none in the raising of revenue, and few 
investigative powers, although it is seeking successfully to further utilise 
public hearings and conferences, thereby also exercising its educative function.
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2.3 Formal powers and real functions: decision« that matter
An important aspect of the EP is that it has legal status, which is similar to 
that of other institutions, which allows it to bring actions before the Court of 
Justice on constitutional and other matters. In this respect, along with its 
institutional, organisational and budgetary autonomy, the EP enjoys an authority 
which is lacking or not fully utilised in national parliaments (Coombes, 1979, 
p. 12). Organisational autonomy in adopting its own Rules of Procedure is 
provided for in Article 142 of the BBC Treaty. The BP haa also sought to come 
to a decision on its working place, and its position was upheld in the Court 
case of Luxembourg versus the European parliament in 1981 (case 230/81).
Budgetary autonomy relates to the expenditure for the KEPs (excluding salaries 
which are paid by national governments as no European Statute for KEPs has yet 
been adopted), staff, equipment, organisation of meetings, secretarial cost of 
the general secretariat and political groups, and recruitment. Staff expenditure 
is covered by the EC Staff Regulations. The BP's general budget consists of a 
little less than 1% of the Community Budget.
Under Article 175 of the EEC Treaty, the EP can take a Court action "should the 
Council or the Commission, in infringement of this Treaty, fail to act". Such 
an action, known as "recours en carence". was taken successfully by the EP with 
regard to the Council's "failure to act" in bringing about and implementing a 
common Transport Policy, which was provided for in the treaty. Such a
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precedent will no doubt sharpen the political interaction between the Council
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and Parliament. It also illustrates that the EP takes the undertakings of the 
Treaties seriously, and it is willing to act as "guardian" of such Treaties, 
despite the allocation of this title to the Commission, when it considers this 
necessary. It is willing to sharpen its political will in any other situations 
of failure to act, given its success in the Transport case (11). This case in 
effect constitutes the right of the EP to bring actions against the Council and 
the Commission, and in this way, to exercise control over the Council.
This ability of the EP to take the Council to Court had been contested in the 
past. The Court, in stating that the action was admissible, in effect 
recognised that the EP is able to institute proceedings against the Council for 
failure to act, and the report of the Parliament's Directorate General for 
Research and Documentation correctly stated that "the Parliament has thus 
secured a new power, providing it with a genuine right of supervision over the 
Council (EP, 1985, p. 177)".
The Parliament lacks the formal powers to reject legislative proposals and 
therefore it is important that it exercise its influence fully in obliging the 
Commission to respect its positions on draft legislation and to adhere to all 
provisions of the SEA, in order to pursue its representative role. A further 
lacuna in the EP's sphere of Influence is the fact that pre-proposal 
consultation by the Commission of interest groups, which is an elaborate 
process of some weeks' duration, is not subject to parliamentary involvement.
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The EP has been seen as a pre-pari lament, a parliament In the making, attaining 
legitimacy in the wake of the direct elections. Many scholars foresee a 
positive future for the parliament In its participation in the EC process. This 
discussion of its enhanced role is most often linked to its legitimation, its 
own institutionalisation, and improvement of its internal decision making, its 
Buies of procedure and institutional reform, for example, and also to the future 
development of a European party system.
The literature on institutional reform suggests, for example, that by giving the 
EP co-decisional power, the democratic deficit would be reduced and the SEA 
went some way in that direction. Veller's fears that reform would "render a 
decisional process which is already heavy almost unbearably so" (Veiler, 1986, 
p.13) have not been borne out. Institutional reform by its very nature Involves 
extensive review of the present system, streamlining of the decision-making 
process, as in the case of the IGC on the SEA, and hence a less cumbersome 
decision-making machinery. The allocation of co-decisional powers to the EP 
(already Initiated in the SEA) merits the risk of complicating the decisional 
process if it serves in some way to legitimise the EP's role and Involve it in 
the legislative process in a more active manner than hitherto.
The institutional provisions of the SEA provide for some co-decision (in the 
shape of cooperation), as a cooperation procedure is provided for in Articles 7, 
49, 54(2), 57, 100a, 100b, 118a, 130e, 130q(2) of the EEC Treaty as amended by 
the IGC. Consultation of the EP is replaced by cooperation, and the Council's 
qualified majority decision-making provided for under Articles 49, 54(2), and
56(2), as amended by the IGC, lays down that the Council act and issue 
directives in cooperation with the EP and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee. The tendency had previously been to associate the EP with 
the Economic and Social Committee in a purely consultative role under the 
founding Treaties.
In addition, the provisions of Article 149 have been substantially amended in 
favour of speedier and more efficient decision-making by the Council and fuller 
consultation of the Parliament. For example, the Council and Commission should 
inform the EP of the reason for the Council's common position, and also of the 
Commission's position on draft legislation (new Article 149, 2a and 2b ).
Hence, the notion of answerability is strengthened in the EP's favour.
Parliament is to approve the common position of the Council, or to take a 
decision on it, within three months, thereby reducing some delays (or lourdeur) 
in the process of making EC law. Specific time stipulations for the re­
examination of the EP's position by the Commission are also laid down in the 
Single Act (new Articles 149, 2(c) to (g) inclusive). The assent of the 
Parliament, by absolute majority of its members, is also required, under the new 
Article 237, paragraph 1, with regard to applications for EC membership, and 
regarding agreements concluded by the Council under Article 238 and this latter 
process has worked smoothly in the first year of implementation.
The EP is a representative assembly where policies are debated and where, 
regardless of the outcome and institutional impact, parties engage nevertheless 
in policy-making, in the party groups, which may be at variance with the EC
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Council, national governments or domestic parties. The assumption that the EF 
should be involved in "real” decision-making is normally made on the grounds 
that the EP is the "legitimate" directly-elected representative of the citizens 
of Europe and so should consist of real decision-makers. The HP's members are 
in fact decision-makers within their own Institution, with regard to reports, 
voting, passing resolutions, setting the agendas for committee and plenary, and 
in the election of its members to leadership positions. The crux is, however, 
whether these decisions matter in terms of (a) their result and impact on and 
for the body politic, and (b) the organisation of power of the EC and of the 
member states.
The problem is not simply who makes decisions, as here the EP would qualify 
adequately as inlts proposed reduction of agricultural prices in the debates of, 
and rejections of, the draft EC Budget, but rather whn the important
decisions. A large number of its decisions have little Impact on the 
governments of the member states, or the EC power structure. The EP possesses 
limited power and central power resides elsewhere. Vhlle the EP may have few 
powers, possesses lnfluencein its attempts to ensure that it is not Ignored by 
the other Institutions and governments. Its use of part-sesslons on such 
topics as unemployment and environmental issues is a case in point. lational ■
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parliaments have had up to several centuries in which to arrogate power to 1 
themselves. The EP, over Its three decades, has attempted, in the age-old 
tradition of parliaments, to emulate this example in a relatively short period. 
It is flexing its muscles, as in the rejection of the Budget and the Transport 
"failure to act" Court case, and this is a pattern which will continue.
Farther sore, the EP's powers and influence are sore than the sua of Its formal 
powers granted by the Treaty and statutory instruaents (Cooabes, 1979, p. 2).
Its potential is not liaited, although the utilisation of this potential depends 
on the perseverance and interests of its members and party groups. Xarquand 
(1979, p. 70), in his discussion of the conditions for the eaergence of a "new 
European political class", in the EP, suggests that the EP can choose to be a 
virile and assertive parliaaent or a parliament of "has-beens and never-will- 
bes". However, the alternatives are not as stark as Xarquand suggests as the 
EP consists of a wide variety of political actors, soae more dynamic than 
others. H. Wallace (1979) phrases this dilemma slightly differently. She asked 
whether the newly-elected EP would find a role for itself in grasping the nettle 
of the debate on the future political orientation of the EC. It is clear that 
the EP has taken on this role in its debates on institutional reform and 
especially in the writing of the Draft Treaty on European Union adopted in 1984 
and its consideration of a future Draft Treaty in the light of the SEA.
Sot only is the EP different from national parliaments in practice and from 
legislatures in theory, its constituent parties are also different. The sain 
functions of parties may be summarised as agenda-setting, policy choice 
formulation, policy decision-making, policy implementation and policy 
coordination. While the political groups engage in agenda-setting, policy 
choice formulation and policy decision-aaking, there are differences froa 
parties in an established political order of a nation state as the party groups 
operate in a sui generis political organisation at the European level. As in 
all parliaments, the XEPs are faced by soae nearly perennial problems with
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regard to their functions of "lawmaking". These include the formality of the 
debates, the overload of the Parliaaentary calendar, the complexity of the 
proposed legislative texts and the problem of maintaining contact with the 
constituency (Liberation, La Vie Quotidienne A l'Asseablta, 5 lov. 1988, p. 11).
Parties in the EP participate in the secondary level of politics, in the EC, 
where the primary loyalty is, or is assumed to be, to the national arena, in a 
multi-tier political system. The problems for parties in the EP, compared to 
those in the member states, are as follows:
Firstly, the problems of the EC have been traditionally put forward in the EP 
in generally non-political language and so the immediate environment is non- 
conflictual. Secondly, parties are not coapeting for governmental office and 
cannot influence the tenure of office of the "Government", whether conceived of 
as Commission or Council. Lastly, party groups, unlike national parties, are 
not the organisers of the electoral campaign, or of party competition in the 
election to the European Parliament. The political groups, as groups, lack any 
distinctive organisation for seeking support among, and maintaining contact 
with, an electorate (Coombes, 1979, p. 32). This lack of effective contact, 
despite some involvement of transnational federations, increases the EP's 
political parties' estrangement from the voters.
The EP has developed from a relatively consensual parliament to a aore 
conflictual one, where the party groups were theaselves fraught with cleavages 
and by fewer pro-European meabers. The EP becaae a less "federalist"
parliament, reflecting the major cleavages and interests within the BC. This 
institutional development could be interpreted as the beginning of the BP's 
turning away from a nominally federalist approach, supportive of the 
Commission, to a Parliament carving out a role for itself as a more dynamic 
institution. The pre-1979 EP was a parliament af dual mandate members and in 
that context the "divided loyalties" of these members (Kolinsky) became 
apparent. It had been suggested that the directly-elected EP would be more 
nationalistic and parochial than the pre-1979 one, as the latter consisted 
of "good Europeans" who put Europe first (Xarquand, 1979, p. 70). The EP and 
the national parliaments have generally been viewed as conflicting in 
competence and in claims to sovereignty, rather than as being complementary. 
This view of a nationalistic parliament has not been validated by the evidence 
of legislative socialisation and Europeanisation of the views of the XEPs. The 
EUI Survey points to a growing awareness of the positions held by the other 
group members and other nationalities and has led to intragroup cooperation on 
issues perceived as of transnational relevance. The issue of loyalty to a 
European party system presents a more fundamental problem, in assessing the 
XEPs' conception of representation in the EP.
Ve have attempted in this chapter to sketch the roles, functions and formal 
powers of the EP as compared with national parliaments and legislative theory. 
Ve have, in the process, become aware that there are several role 
differentiations between the EP and national parliaments. Ve have also been 
reminded of the problems of understanding the nature of the EP itself in the 
context of parliamentary democracy, and the problems of treating the BC as if
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parliamentary democracy were relevant to it. Rather the EP and its groups 
should be analysed in terms of the nature of the EC itself and the problems of 
understanding integration as a political process.
Xany scholars and political actors have devoted some attention to the extension 
of the powers of the European Parliament. These would consist, lor example, of 
more use of public hearings; extension of the conciliation procedure to all 
major areas of legislation; use of the motion of censure on the Commission; 
participation in EPC and in the composition and appointment of Commission and 
the appointment of a parliamentary Ombudsman. The development of legislative 
powers would involve more extensive use of own initiative reports; co-decision 
on the Community Budget; control over the Council in the failur*-to-act cases; 
increase of co-decision and cooperation in other policies and agreements (now 
in the SEA); power in the raising of revenue and the ratification of Treaties 
with third countries (the latter now in the SEA). In order to relate the 
integration process in the EP to member states, the establishment of formalised 
relations with national parliaments and parties and participation in the 
committees of national legislatures have been mooted. Furthermore, the 
elimination of the dual mandate while maintaining links with national parties; 
more influence for the party groups in candidate selection and the preparation 
of the electoral campaign, throughout the EC, and reform of the internal 
organisation of the Parliament have all been the foci of a desirs to further 
politicise the EP and to develop the role of ltsactors therein. This would 
develop the EP as an institution, place it more firmly within ths decision­
making process of European integration and provide a forum for the development 
of the party group system.
It has been stated that in the modern parliamentary system of the BC states, 
parliament still exists as the highest formal level for the settlement of 
conflicts, despite attempts as conflict resolution by interest groups in extra­
parliamentary settings and the recurrent crises of "parliamentary legitimation” 
(Von Beyme, 1975). This statement cannot stand alone without reference to the 
confllct-resolution capacities of political parties. Henig (1979, p. 4) aptly 
suumarised this point by stating that party systems are still a useful 
indicator of the degree of consensus which it has been possible to establish in 
society. Ve are aware that political groups operate in a fluid polity where 
they, and the party system, have not assumed the role their counterparts play 
in established polities. In order to understand the role that party groups 
actually play in the European Parliament, we must consider the question of who 
or what it is that the EF actually represents.
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Chapter Three
Elections Vihout Representation?
Representation in the European Parliament, 
the Political Actors and the Significance of Direct Elections

The real problem.... is to understand what sort of political system it Is 
to which the European Parliament belongs. If there is no central 
government, if the Community is the result essentially of international 
treaties designed mainly to set up a common market, and if there are no 
real political parties, then what is the purpose of electing a body called 
a parliament in such a system? (Coombes, 1979, p. 5)
This quotation raises the problem of whether the Community can, or should, be 
subjected to the principles of parliamentary and representative democracy. Ve 
are positioning the EP in the "fluid polity" system of the EC and we examine 
the Parliament's representative function, in particular in the wake of the direct 
elections. The EP Is the only institution of the European Community which 
directly represents the citizens of its twelve member states.
3.1 The concept of representation
The concept of representation is a complex one. Kost scholars acceptthat it is 
through the process of representation that legislatures are empowered to act 
for the body politic and are legitimised (Vahlke, 1962, p.257). The basic 
concept is the relationship between the representative and the represented. It 
could be seen as an idea «entire, of "coinciding in opinion with" (Bagehot,
1867). There can be political representation without election in liberal 
democracies. The direct elections to the European Parliament raised the 
question of whether we can have elections without representation. It is a 
hypothesis of this study that the EP and its members, the representatives, are
in fact largely alienated or marginalised from the voters, the represented.
There is little direct relationship, despite the "direct elections", between the 
electors and the XEPs.
This is attributable to such factors as the nature of the EC as a fluid polity, 
the nature of parliamentary democracy in that setting, and the special 
circumstances and environment of the EP, its constituencies, and the nature of 
the actual elections. Ve examine these factors in order to illustrate that 
there is no clear consensus on the nature of representation in the EP. The 
representatives' tasks are influenced and shaped by constitutional and 
organisational parameters, the expectations of the other participants and of the 
representative him/herself, the job to be done, and by the norms of the 
political culture.
Theories of representation have tended to concentrate on the notion of the 
representative as the representative of the constituency (involved in the 
redress of the grievances of that geographical district) or as the 
representative of the nation, the whole body politic (Involved in the debate of 
policy). As Pitkin (1967) paints out, these have normally been regarded as 
mutually exclusive, or with only minimal impact an each other. There have also 
been conflicting expectations of parliaments in this regard. Studies have been 
carried out on the role of the member of the legislature as the trustee or 
delegate of the geographical constituency, the messenger of the locality, who 
"goes about persecuting civil servants", or making representations, in the 
pursuit of the local interest or on behalf of a constituent (Chubb, 1966, Dexter,
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1963). That denotes a "deputy", involving patronage, clientelisa, regular 
contact with the voters, and, in some countries the holding of "clinics" or 
"surgeries" as often as several tiaes a week, in order to deal with the problems 
of the constituents. The constituency member could therefore hope to be re­
elected largely on the basis of his/her constituency work record, with the 
assistance of a group of party activists. The constituency representative 
catered for the individual and collective interests of the constituency, and the 
electoral connection was never forgotten in the representative's legislative 
behaviour. This member was entrusted to bring the interests of the electoral 
district to the attention of the executive and to protect those interests froa 
the encroachment of central power in specific areas.
The representative was understood to be "standing for" the voters, and the 
degree of autonomy conferred on the representatives varied according to the 
conceptions of whether they had role orientations as a delegate, following the 
instructions of the constituents with fervent regularity, or as a trustee, 
entrusted to act as they see fit, and to judge the means to carry out the 
mandate of representation on their own intuition, as free agents. This 
distinction might also be described as plenipotentiary versus ambassador ad 
referendum. The third major role orientation, which expresses orientations of 
both trustee and delegate, are referred to as politicos. These role orientations 
characterise representational style, i.e., how the representatives relate 
themselves to their decision-making behaviour (Vahlke et al, 1962, p.285). In 
many ways, the representative is conceived of as a delegate, as was apparent in 
the EUI study of HEPs, Question 1.1, which was phrased as follows:
Wben you were elected to the European Parliament you probably had quite a few 
expectations regarding your role as an MEP, the work of the Parliament, its 
development and so an. Could you please outline what your major expectations 
were?
The open-ended replies to Question 1.1 revealed that many MEPs, particularly 
neophytes, regarded themselves as "ambassadors to Europe", defenders of special, 
national or regional interests. Few held expectations that they would further 
European integration as a primary commitment. Perceptions were largely 
constituency-oriented. Expectations included the representation of the 
constituency or state against the EC's perceived encroachment on national 
policies; protection of special interests such as farmers, environmental groups 
and the workers. Others sought to improve policies on unemployment, prices, 
fisheries, agricultural surpluses, EC institutional reform, European defence, the 
increase of the EC's own resources and commitment to European Integration.
Table 3.1__5UT Survey: Ouastlcm 1.2:
Would you say that, on the whole, theae expectations have been fulfilled, 
partially fulfilled or not fulfilled?
Kcspondentg______________l ol respondents
Fulfilled 90 27.2
Partially fulfilled 180 54.4
Set fulfilled da 14.5
Refused 6 1.8
EJL-SA. not, ascertained___ Z,................. 2.1
Intrinsic to the constituency focus is the fact that the representative is 
linked to a defined geographical district, which implies residency and strong 
territorial ties. The representative links the constituency to the capital and 
central government. This is the case in the U.S., Great Britain and Ireland, for 
example. In all cases, re-election is taken to be the desired goal (if not 
necessarily the primary objective) of the actors involved and the re-election 
quest establishes the relationship of accountability with an electorate (Xayhew, 
1974).
Accountability Involves the fact that the election of parliamentary 
representatives is linked to the election prospects of the party. 
Representatives, according to Loewenberg and Patterson, act to affect their 
tenure of office and feel held accountable before the electors. 
Representativeness refers to how legislators show that they represent the 
constituency, and resemble it. Representatives are also communicators as they 
have the means to deliver their messages, attract publicity and go on record as 
representative of a specific interest. This aspect of the Job and the desire to 
keep that Job are Introduced as a pointer to the activities of the 
representative. This emphasis on re-election should not detract from the 
representatives' sense of duty, in the achievement of a desired result for the 
constituency.
Searing (1985b, p. 378) points out that the redress of grievance was 
Parliament's original function and that this function is still its most popular, 
as it allows ordinary citizens to have their problems dealt with by the HP's
mediation. Criticisms of this function have been made in literature concerning 
the political process in the U.S., southern Italy, Japan and Ireland, and by some 
political actors themselves. They have focussed on what they see as the 
primary role of the legislator being undermined by the concept of the 
representative as a type of "social worker” who concentrates on local interests. 
They see this as the creation of a detrimental dichotomy between the people and 
the administration as constituents seek assistance from their representative 
rather than administrative units. This raises the issue of representation of 
national interests, as distinct from constituency-based interests, and the 
dilemma faced by representatives In the perceived conflict of interests at the 
local level and those of the "commonweal".
Burke, in his famous speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774, was quite 
unequivocal that Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and 
hostile interests to be maintained by the representative in the role of agent 
and advocate. He stated that parliament is a deliberative assembly of one 
nation, with one Interest, that of the whole. In that assembly, the general 
good rather than local prejudice ought to guide. He concluded thus:
You choose a member indeed, but when you have chosen him, he is not a 
member of Bristol, but a member of Parliament....
Friedrich (1965) raised the issue of accurate representation of groups and 
cleavages in the electorate, in proportional representation to accurately reflect 
the various divisions of the electorate. Yet, he stated that an important part
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of representation was to represent the citizenry as a whole, and not just the 
divisions among them.
Given that conflict management and its resolution are functions of legislatures, 
then the legislature, through its representatives, legitimises the conflicts and 
cleavages in society. Such legitimation has also served to construct a nation­
state of such groups, as Lipset and Eokkan (1967) have illustrated. The 
representative parliament had the primary role of state-building, and, in some 
cases, in contributing to nation-building (Farrell, 1975). Cleavages were thus 
politicised in an acceptable parliamentary context rather than in extra­
parliamentary groups.
The representation of the "commonweal" has been a feature of political writings 
since Hobbes' Leviathan. Several national constitutions stipulate that members 
of the assembly act for the whole nation (Pitkin, 1967, p. 216). So, at least 
constitutionally, representatives are not bound by the voters' (or party's) 
mandate. The dual task, then, of agent of the locality and governor of the 
nation, is difficult, but not Impossible, to reconcile. In some cases, the 
constituency Is. the nation, as representatives are elected nation-wide. This 
poses a theoretical problem in the evaluation of the focus and mandate of 
representation in the case of the EP, since direct elections, as the conception 
of representation differ according to member state.
Although for Bagehot, "constituency government is the precise opposite of 
Parliamentary government", as the former is regarded as "immoderate",
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with other political actors, and, in most cases, within apolitical party. In the 
institutional setting, the political process of conflict resolution, management 
of agenda, is acted out and here the role of the representative become 
pertinent.
The term "constituency" has so far been referred to in geographical terms. The 
representative is also responsive to a a party constituency and in some cases 
to a "special interests" category. The notion of representation is dealt with 
primarily as political representation, i.e., the representation of political 
interests (or interests which have been politicised) in an institutionalised 
political context. The concept of representation has undergone change with the 
passage of time. The theoretical definition of representation has altered as 
parliaments themselves have altered and faced threats to their sovereignty, 
including the many debates concerning their decline.
The stages of development of parliaments and representation, which we will 
apply to the EP, might be briefly sketched as follows:
(I) The extension of the suffrage and in particular direct universal
suffrage and the rise of organised mass parties.
(II) The alleged decline of parliament and the rise of executive power.
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(Ill) Urbanisation, industrialisation, bureaucratisation, and the appearance 
of new challenges to party government; the rise of new interests 
(neocorporatism) and the use of direct access to the executive by economic 
and social interests.
(iv) The new styles of political leadership, Influenced by the media, with 
direct linkage between the leaders of government and the electorate, over 
the head of the parliament.
(v> The search for new levels of decision-making both above and below the 
nation-state, i.e., regionalism and the Influence of movements of the 
periphery, on the one hand, and of superaationalism and transnationalism 
on the other, in the realisation by party governments that they are faced 
with problems which cross national boundaries. The appearance of 
alternative parliamentary arenas was perceived by many observers as a 
threat to the sovereignty of the national parliaments.
Parliaments have thus been in a constant state of flux and evolution since the 
13th century, in terms of membership, relationship with the executive and 
perceived functions - in particular, the legislative and representative 
functions.
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For the representativa, aeabers of the legislature may also make policy as the 
executive coaes from their ranks. Xany legislatures elect the executive and 
participate actively in the process of governaent. In all these processes, 
"party" is the distinguishing label of the representative. This party 
identification is also true of the European Parliaaent, although the EP is 
subject to constraints as the process of governaent foraation is lacking, as is 
the power of legislation of policy, and the nature of party coapetition is 
distinctly different in the EP, both at the electoral and parliamentary levels.
3.2 Representation In tha European Parllai»a«t and Direct SI act loa« 
Representation In the EP
The ambiguities of the representative process in the EP emerge when we attempt 
to study the groups, as they consist of national party "delegations" who are 
also representatives of a transnational group, yet are directly accountable to a 
geographical constituency which has elected them primarily on Issues of 
domestic relevance. The European party group illustrates the tensions of 
loyalties in the political organisation which is the European Community.
Just as political parties in a parliament may politicise and legitimise 
conflicts in a nation-state, so too the parties in the Coaaunlty aay politicise 
conflicts. Fitzmaurice (1975) states that the parties in the EP served to 
politicise the Assembly. Since legislatures seek to manage conflict, the 
parties were also involved in conflicts in the EP, especially in the conflict of 
loyalties, and in the differing conceptions of political representation.
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Representatives in the EP may see themselves as the watchdogs of the EC 
institutions, but the public conception is of national or local representatives 
seeking objectives which would ultimately be advantageous to the pertinent 
member state. There persists a sense of double accountability in EP membership 
with the ties of national loyalties and transnational cooperation.
The dual representation referred to by Pitkin of constituency representation and 
representation of the whole (i.e. the nation) is complicated by the fact that, 
for the XEPs, the body politic as a whole is the EC and hence representation of 
the whole is not necessarily representation of the nation state. Ve can refer 
to representation in the European Parliament as "triple", with reference to the 
European Community, the nation and the constituency.
Conflict resolution and representation take place in a multi-level system, which 
encompasses national and European elections and party competition. In each of 
these levels, party competition is determined by different factors, given that 
at least theoretically the direct elections may be considered as "second-order" 
elections, as they do not feature competition for "first-order" governmental 
office or attain the primacy of a general election (Self, 1980).
Representation in the EP and its responsiveness to the expectations of the 
citizens may be defined according to the focus of responsiveness (the 
constituency), the propensity of the KEPs to respond (representative style), and 
the components of the responsiveness (the ways in which they respond). The
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focus of the constituency relates closely to style, as we have seen, for example 
in the case of the constituency, national or special interest representative.
The development of representation in national parliaments and challenges to 
legislatures have also had an impact on representation in the EP. The whole 
issue of European representation has been reopened by those who have questioned 
the need for a European-level parliament, when the usefulness of national 
parliaments and their "representativeness" are already the subject of critical 
scrutiny. Ve now move on to a brief examination of parallel developments in 
the EP.
(i) The extension-of-suffrage challenge, in the EC, was the provision for direct 
participation by voters in the election of the EP which came about in 1979, 
although it had been provided for in the EEC Treaty. The nature of 
representation thus altered with the extension of the suffrage at the EC level, 
replacing the method of appointing delegates from national parliaments.
(ii) The conflict between the parliament and executive power is also mirrored 
at the EC level of political decisions. In this case, the EP wields little 
power, as the Council remains supreme. The absence of a European government or 
single executive unit at the EC level of politics results in clear role 
differentiations between members of the EP and national parliaments. The role 
of the political party is also distinctly different in the EP, as the national 
party competes for governmental office and has direct linkage with the voters.
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In the EC the link between the party and the voters is often a tenuous one. 
Party groups in the EP do not compete for power or office in EC.
(iii) The EP is weak because decision making is 6lite-dominated, bureaucratic 
and non-democratic, according to Kichelman (1981). Its powers in the Treaty
are considerably weaker than those of the Council. Vith regard, to the by­
passing of the EP by functional interests, the Commission conducts consultation 
with national and European Interest groups on proposed legislation with little 
reference to the EP. Interest groups have not been immune to the development 
of the EC's functions in several policies, as the EC has deeply pervaded the 
business and commercial life of the member states. These interests have taken
cognizance of the fact the EC is veritably a common market, by establishing 
European offices in Brussels. Lobbies of trade unions (ETUC), industries 
(USICE), farmers (COPA), and others have made their presence felt in the EC and 
have attempted, often successfully, to influence EC legislation. Such bodies 
often by-pass the national parliaments in seeking to directly influence the 
actual EC decision-makers. The political vacuum in the EP remains and the 
"inertia of European political forces" is only now being awakened (Bonvicini, 
1971). Coombes (1982) emphasises the need for a parliamentary body at the EC 
level in order to aggregate and integrate special interests by-passing national 
parliaments into policies designed to serve the common interest. The DSICE 
(industry) and COPA (agriculture) groups now meet the EP Bureau members 
regularly and hold information meetings which are often given media attention.
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These interest groups actively lobby the EP aore now than when it was a 
delegated parliaaent. In the EUI Survey Question 35.1 asking MBPs how often 
they meet people froa certain European interest organisations, the results were 
that 27% aet US ICE (industry) often or on occasion, 26% aet COPA (agriculture), 
19% aet COCEE (chambers of commerce), 38% aet ETUC (trade unions) and 37% aet 
other interest groups representatives. Observers have pointed out that for many 
lobbies and businesses in the EC meaber states, their aajor source of 
information are the coaaittees of the EP, "the aost open - perhaps because it 
is the least powerful" of the EC's institutions (1).
Kirchner (1984, p.557) states that until the aid-1970s, the EP was not perceived 
as an iaportant channel of influence by most interest groups, but that with the 
granting of budgetary powers to the EP in 1975, the direct elections and the 
right to amend the Regional Fund since 1978 and "the EP taking up social, 
regional, environmental and small and medium sized business issues from 1975, 
the EP became increasingly seen as a target for interest group activities" on 
the EC level of decision making. Some coaaittees, party groups and individual 
members of the EP endeavour to meet with interest groups and do not 
necessarily await the lobbying of such groups. The directly-elected EP provided 
a forum to represent the interests of special groups in a new way after 1979, 
and such groups have not been slow in contacting and attempting to influence 
the MEPs, particularly when such contact could be made at constituency level, as 
well as in Brussels through the umbrella (EC) organisation. Representation of 
functional interests therefore takes place in the EP, in addition to the other 
»
concepts of representation. MEPs regularly receive visits of Interest groups as
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well as local party activists during its plenary sessions. These can range 
widely in scope. For instance, in December 1984, the President of the EP 
received Senator Dooge and the President of the French farmers organisation 
(the FÏSEÀ) (2). Those interest groups range from local to uabrella 
organisations of sectors of industry, social groups and trade or employer 
groups.
The EP's desire to promote contacts with interest groups is analysed by 
Kirchner (1984, pp .561-562) who suggests that the EP needs (a> to attain 
specialised information from groups in its "legislative" functions of preparing 
opinions or working on budgetary issues and (b) learn how such groupings 
lobbied the Commission and the Economic and Social Committee GESC) for its own 
bargaining portion and (c) develop links with the general public. Thus the EP 
could develop mutual consultation with interest groups, use public hearings 
effectively (one of the few tools available to the EP) and became involved in 
regional interests. Kirchner proposes a "more formalised link" (p.565) between 
the EP and the ESC although it must be kept in mind that the ESC is a largely 
advisory body whereas the EP possesses powers, particularly in the financial 
running of the Community, which the ESC could not aspire to possess.
Neither must it be forgotten that MEPs may have contact with trade unions 
through their political parties and this is true of almost all parties in the 
Socialist group, continental members of the Christian Democratic/European 
Peoples Party group, and of the Liberal group.
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In addition, MEPs may represent interest groups froa all their constituency 
(e.g. agriculture, business, producers' groups) and aay also belong to several 
extraparliamentary groups or interest islands which seek to influence EC policy 
(e.g., chambers of commerce, social groups, European movements, European 
federalist movements, businesses, movements for national sovereignty, 
organisations for the underprivileged or socially deprived). This is one of the 
threads of representation woven through the EP's structure and representational 
pattern.
In April 1985, a grouping of British Labour members launched an Initiative to 
have all XEPs and EP officials register their membership of secret 
organisations. The XEPs are obliged already, "if they have particular material 
interests of a personal kind in one of the Issues debated in Parliament, to 
admit so” (3). This declaration demanded that membership of organisations 
deemed to be secret (including freemasonry) should be Information open to the 
public in order to encourage openness in the EC institutions. The Code of 
Conduct of the EP's Rules of Procedure of 1987 oblige XEPs to disclose a direct 
financial interest in a subject when speaking on that issue. In addition, each 
XEP is required to make a detailed declaration of professional activities and 
other paid functions (4).
Vith regard to the bureaucratisation of political decisions, and the need to 
specialise, the EP possesses specialised committees which address themselves to 
the intricacies of the EC decision-making process. The Parliament has been 
criticised as being too specialised, in addressing itself to many, often very
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technical interests, and in failing to fallow some selected clear-cut approaches 
to the exercise of its powers in the Community, where it could have some 
influence on the results and the content of Community legislation, should it 
choose to be selective in its specialisation.
(iv) The Council has direct contact with the electors of the member states, 
while the EP is often associated in the public eye, and in the media, with the 
Brussels bureaucracy, rather than with representation of Europe and hence is 
marginalised from the EC process. There is no European media.
(v) Lastly, the EP is aware that some national parliaments, particularly in the 
UK and Denmark, are wary of the EP's strength and influence and any increase in 
its powers. The EP is attempting to establish and maintain regular contacts 
and exchange of information with the national parliaments, and their committees 
dealing with the EC, in order to promote cooperation through this process of 
mutual socialisation. Parties are aware of the EP as a new forum of political 
activity by means of electoral competition, particularly since the direct 
elections obliged the domestic parties to became more involved in European 
Integration.
3.2.2 The Direct Elections
An observer in the decade after the founding of the Community stated in 1964:
As qualified as their members are and as favourable as the supranational 
exchange of thought is, European parliamentary institutions will have
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little actual weight as they lack legitimation through direct elections and 
as long as they carry out only insignificant advisory functions (Bracher, 
1971).
One problem for the voters was to understand what sort of body they were 
electing in the first direct elections (Coombes, 1979, p.l). The election took 
place in unfamiliar and confusing circumstances. Reif and Schmitt (1980) 
suggested that the direct elections were second-order elections rather than 
primary elections like national elections. There was less at stake, with a 
lower level of voter participation, brighter prospects for small or new parties, 
a higher percentage of spoiled votes, and a mid-term verdict on government 
parties resulting in fewer votes to those parties.
A second feature was the specific arena circumstances in the political and 
institutional context. It was a new and unfamiliar arena for all concerned, 
whether voters or candidates. It transcended national boundaries in terms of 
the European institution to be elected, while linking first-order political 
systems. It was a European election where European party groups and 
federations were largely uninvolved in the electoral campaign.
A third feature was the electoral procedure, which differed according to member 
state, as did the number of constituencies. Lijphart and Grofman (1984, p.3) 
state that electoral laws are no longer regarded as unalterable facts and this 
is true of the laws governing the elections to the European Parliament in the 
different member states. A uniform electoral procedure for direct elections has
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not yet been established, and although there has been agreement on the part of 
member states and the Parliament that some form of proportional representation 
should be used, some member states have expressed a reluctance to bring this 
uniform system into effect.
Reif and Schmitt (1980) surmised that the more distinct the European electoral 
procedures from those used in national elections, the lower was the turnout.
The number of constituencies also varied according to member state. Vhile 
there were 3000 parliamentary seats in the EC national elections for soma 1500 
electoral units, direct elections in 1979 Involved 410 seats for 108 European 
constituencies, in accordance with the differing conceptions of the constituency 
among the different member states.
The issue of national representation was also accorded attention in the wake of 
the second enlargement of the Community. Morgan (1982, p.150) suggested that 
the representatives of the new member states in the EP would be likely to be 
under considerable pressure from their domestic constituencies to use the EP as 
a channel to promote national or regional Interests more strongly than the 
members from the other member states, and this would reinforce the "existing 
tendency to make the Parliament an arena for the presentation of national 
claims". This pressure from the national constituency is a feature of 
representation in the EP, as the MEPs are deemed by some governments to be 
representative of these constituencies through direct suffrage.
U!>
table 3.2__Humber of seats and constituenelas par m«abar stata In the 1979
direct elections to the European Parliament
Member state Seats lumbar of
------------------------------------------- conatitugnclfig
Belgium 15 3
Denmark 16 2
France 81 1
Germany 81 1-llt
Greece 24 1*
Ireland 15 4
Italy 81 5
Luxembourg 6 1
Hetherlands .........  25 .. 1
United Kingdom . ...... ftj______ 79#
Hates:
* One linked national constituency and/or 11 "land” constituencies.
* 78 single member constituencies in Great Britain and one thre*-member 
constituency in Northern Ireland. In Britain, the first-past-the-post system 
was used, and the proportional representation, single transferable vote system 
in Horthern Ireland.
* Greek MEPs elected in 1981.
Source: European Parliament (1982): Forjlng Ahead. Thirty Years of the European 
Parliament. Luxembourg.
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The nature of the electoral campaign also influenced EP representation. Many
parties and voters themselves were already suffering from a surfeit of 
elections and the European elections placed a burden on each element of the 
political process, from organisation and mobilisation of voters to the act of 
voting itself. In addition, in some member states, the European elections took 
place on the same day as elections to other assemblies or councils.
In the electoral campaign, the EP had no government-forming responsibility, so 
there were no interparty negotiations, or media and party and voter speculation, 
regarding the content of governmental coalitions or the election of the EP's 
President. There was little Interest in the party groups during the campaign.
EC issues and European party cooperation had little inpact as the elections 
were fought in the main as national or local campaigns. Vhile in some 
countries, like Britain and Denmark, the issue of EC membership was conflictual, 
there was little conflict or discussion in the campaign on this issue.
The election of the EP in 1979 constituted the first direct elections on an
International scale, held more or less concurrently, to a parliament which was 
to be a representative of some 250 million citizens. These elections are 
significant in many respects. They opened up renewed opportunities for 
transnational party cooperation, within the EP's party groups and in the 
extraparliamentary transnational federations. They also opened up new routes of 
entry to a political career, at the European level. This was also interpreted 
as a springboard from the EP to re-entry to national or regional politics, and 
so constituted a new route of entry to national politics.
IVS
In some cases, the elections also signified the emergence in domestic political 
parties of a "European column" which was engaged in the EC level of political 
activities who would act as the party's specialists on Europe. The direct 
elections established new terms for the distribution of power in the national 
party system. Vith regard to rperesentational roles, the decline of the dual 
mandate would place a strain and distance on the relations between party 
representatives in the EP and those in the national parliamentary party, leading 
to an estrangement and alienation of the XEPs from the national body politic. 
This can also be interpreted as the appearance of a distinctive and autonomous 
political class, or European party group system. The function of the XEP as 
national party representative was not clearly defined during the elections and 
was to be the subject of debate during the EP's first legislative period.
Furthermore, party representation in the EP no longer reflects representation in 
the national parliament, and while parties control candidate selection, the 
party is no longer in a position to select delegates from its national party 
ranks. It has been suggested that, with direct elections, we now have a 
political élite which is not based on national political institutions, but a 
"supranational élite" (Cotta, 1984, p. 126). While this is optimistic at this 
stage of the political development of the Community, the direct elections raised 
the theoretical consideration of a European party system as a new form of 
representation in a uniquely European context.
The European elections were seen by many observers as a means (a) to legitimise 
the EC institutions, (b) to rectify the democratic deficit in the EC's
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institutional structure, (c) to bring about a shift in tha power base of the 
Community from the other institutions to the Parliament and (d) to hail the 
conception of pan~European political parties. The EP, after direct elections, 
was also to provide the political dynamism to further European Integration. It 
was expected that the EP would fill the democratic deficit in a Community 
system where no single institution or body is unambiguously answerable for 
anything.
Moreover, the very act of holding direct elections does not automatically 
provide for democracy in the Community. It has been suggested that a uniform 
electoral procedure is necessary in order to take into account the full effects 
of being directly elected (Coombes, 1979, pp.3-4). The direct elections were to 
be the panacea for all ills in the Community, despite its obviously limited 
power and marginalisation from the EC decision-making process. On the other 
hand, the very holding of the direct elections is considered by Coombes to have 
endowed the EP with political authority and "this is precisely why it has been 
resisted". In 1988, the EP issued a declaration on the right of nationals of 
member states of the EC to stand for election to the EP in each and every 
member state (Declaration 12/88 of EP), thereby denoting a transnational flavour 
to European elections, which would not necessarily have national representatives 
for member states and would break the mould of party group membership being 
organised along the lines of domestic party delegations.
Whereas the EC Council was to continue to represent the interests of the member 
states, the EP was to represent those of the EC public, an amorphous mass of
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almost 300 million people in widely divergent geographical constituencies. One 
observer has suggested that the KBPs take it upon themselves to defend the 
interests of a given region and that in this regard the Assembly would resemble 
a general council where each defends his/her own canton (5).
The direct elections could be interpreted as conferring legitimacy on the 
actions (however limited in scope) of the EP. The Patijn and Tindemans Reports 
both envisaged that these elections would confer on the exercise of power by 
the Community a legitimacy which had hitherto been lacking. This "legitimacy'1 
has often been confused with authority and increased powers for the EP. Piet 
Dankert, on being elected President of the EP in January, 1962, stated that the 
EP's greatest asset was its legitimacy, "which we owe to the direct elections in 
1979 but which is not, in reality, a permanent quality". He set the debate on 
authority and representation of the electors on a sound footing in the same 
speech:
A Parliament can have no authority, unless, in the eyes of those for whom 
it speaks, it is the representative of the electors. It cannot be (their) 
representative unless it makes their problems its own, unless it seeks 
realistic solutions to those problems and uses the powers formally 
conferred upon It to transpose those solutions into laws. Ve have neither 
that authority nor that power" (6).
Considering these limitations, the EP possesses at best a "legitimacy" solely 
because of its direct mandate. This legitimacy must be linked to actual 
efficacy of the EP is as a representative assembly and power-wielding
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institution. Lodge (1982, p. 262) suggests that rather than pursuing 
"democratic legitimacy" directly through an increase in the BP'spowers, the MBPs 
have concentrated on their expressive and representative functions, and not on 
their legislative ones, in their attempts to carry out a publicity and educative 
function with the voters and in attempting to put Its own house in order by 
means of the improvement of its Rules of Procedure (see, for example, the Ford 
Report).
3.2.3 The MEP as representative and party a m b t r
In the present system of electoral procedures for direct elections to the BP, it 
is very difficult to compare rather disparate procedures, methods and norms. A 
representative of several million voters cannot be expected to perceive of 
his/her role in the same way as a representative of a province or region of 
some half a million people. Thus the linkage mechanism with the constituency 
is complicated by the electoral laws. The communication function between the 
MEP and the electors is placed under considerable environmental constraints. 
Sartori (1976, p.lx) argues that parties are the central intermediate and 
intermediary structure between society and government. It is not possible to 
view the relationship between the EP's political groups and member states as 
such a structure.
There are few structures for linkage between the MBPs and national or local 
party organisation in most member states, although efforts to improve relations 
and cooperation are being made by the EP and the national political parties
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(Ionescu a ad Xorgan, 1988). The HEP is not a "national parliamentarian" and so 
is not privy to party and national parliamentary rights and privileges. These 
include the right oi access to the national parliament, its resources, facilities 
and information and yet the KEP does not relate to or have a direct linkage 
with an EC structure either. XEPs in some member states do however have 
access to their national parliaments. In Belgium, for instance, XEPs art full 
members of their national parliament's European Affairs Committees.
The MEP is subjected to a double accountability or divided loyalties in the EP, 
as national and EC politics are so often seen as being conflictual, and yet the 
KEP is not directly linked to the power nucleus of either decision-making 
process. Loyalty to the party group, the equivalent of Sartori's Intermediary 
structure, is not dependent on participation in a government party, and so party 
loyalty is not necessarily primary.
The eight party groups in the EP are the parliamentary groupings or alliances 
□f party representatives of different nationalities along the lines of a 
perceived alignment or common traditions. The study of parties assumes the 
existence of a polity, whether it came about at the same time as parties, who 
then played an integrative function in state-building, or whether the polity 
evolved and took shape before parties formally appeared. The problem then is 
to analyse the party groups within a structure of power which does not fully 
constitute a political community. Can one assert, for example, that only when 
(or if) European parties emerge at the EC level of politics can we really talk
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of the European Community as a polity, or does this place too high a value on 
the importance of political parties in the polity?
While parties have often played a major, if not decisive, part in the 
establishment of political communities, this is not yet the case with the party 
groups in the EC. Lipset and Kokkan point to the pertinence of parties in the 
building of the legitimation of the state, its conflicts and cleavages. Will the 
European Community then only become truly legitimate when it possesses its own 
political parties? How much political power must exist at the European level 
before the marginalised political forces of the Community could be Europeanised 
and institutionalised? These questions will be kept in mind in the study of 
the MEP in the party group, while it is realised that these problems will 
continue to tease political scientists for some time, given the fluid state of 
the EC as a "polity".
As HEPs do not sit in national delegations, party (group) representation is the 
characteristic which is most evident in the EP, at first sight. XEPs Join 
committees on the basis of their own interests, but such placements are 
allocated according to group in a political allocation of resources, decided by 
group representatives in the Bureau, who run the EP's political organisation 
according to strict rules which are developed in order to favour the groups.
The relationship with the voters also merits attention. The responsiveness of 
the legislatures to the political expectations of the citizens is pertinent in 
this context, and the understanding which the KEPs may have of these
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expectations and their role orientation in this regard. Linkage and 
responsiveness in the EP are undergoing analysis at present as the EP remains 
alienated from those functions to a large extent.
The EP is constitutionally representative of "the peoples of the Community", and 
jet the direct elections constituted an election without (direct) representation 
as the EP is one step removed from the national party and political systems 
and from the linkage (communication between XEPs and constituents) mechanisms 
for effecting representation of the voters. The XEP cannot link the 
constituency to the capital when there Is no EC or EP capital. Representation 
of the constituency is in accordance with national Interests, and, for those 
XEPs representing regions, regional as well as national interests come to the 
fore.
As we have come to understand the environment of the EP, its functions, powers, 
nature of representation, and passible future development, we are in a position 
to state that the EP is not completely alienated from decision making at the 
national and Community levels, although it is estranged from direct Influence in 
either arena. This is due to the fact that the EP consists of parties whose 
national leaders are often ministers in the Council of Xinisters, or in 
opposition in the national parliament, and so they are not totally divorced from 
EC decision making. They are however estranged from this system in that they 
are not directly involved In the EC as political actors. The debates in the EP 
often mirror, at a different level, the issues which may be before the Council 
for decision and the Parliament gives these issues a public airing in an
atmosphere of less political intensity, as there is less at stake in terms of 
governmental office and security of tenure. In this aspect, it resembles the 
Upper House of some national systems.
The thesis addresses Itself to the nature of representation and whether the 
party groups provide for the representation of the KEP within the groups. The 
focus of representation is also analysed, as it is represented through the group 
structure. Ve shall therefore attempt to examine the variables relating to party 
representation in the next chapters. Representative roles are examined in 
relation to the styles and foci of representation, and a consideration of the 
loyalties and conflicts of interests regarding the ties of the party group, the 
national party, geographical constituency and special interests. These will be 
examined by party group, in order to understand the representation of the 
nation, group and other interests and the prospects for cohesive party-like 
groups which attempt to direct the EP towards a deeper involvement in the 
European Community and its political decision-making process.
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Chapter Four
The Study of the Party Groups in the European Parliament - 
Origins and Development
lilt

The creation of ties between menbers of different nationalities on the 
basis of related political opinions was only to be expected (Kapteyn, I960, 
p. 247).
This thesis explores the representativeness, cohesion and expression of 
interests in the party group and whether it can speak with one voice in the BP. 
The following chapters will therefore explore the origins of each of the groups 
in the EP - the organisation, distinguishing features and changes over tine.
The political groups are described in the following chapters on the basis of 
historical accounts of and literature on the groups' formation and developnent, 
and of group documents. In addition, unstructured interviews were held with the 
members of the group secretariats and the Secretaries General of most groups 
over time, from 1980 to 1986. The full interview schedule is outlined in 
Appendix A. Each of approximately 40 respondents were interviewed on an 
average of three occasions.
4.1.1 Approaches tn the study of groups
There is a general lack of a comprehensive theoretical approach to the study of 
the HP's groups over time. While some analysts have concentrated on the 
attitudes of national parties in the national arena of politics to the European 
Community, others have chosen to investigate the transnational links of party 
organisations in the extraparliamentary federations (e.g., leidermayer, 1981)
and within the party groups (e.g. Pridham and Pridham, 1981), in particular in 
recounting the activities of the groups in Parliament. There is no general 
consensus, whether among academic observers or the political actors themselves, 
as to the status of the groups as political entities.
The literature on the party groups in the European Parliament has so far tended 
to concentrate on three broad approaches. The first is to relate and explain 
the parliamentary activities of the transnational groups in the EP and to 
attempt to draw some hypotheses from them, with reference to the future of a 
European party system, for example Fltzmaurlce, 1975, Pridhaa and Prldham, 1979, 
1981. The Jouve (1984) study of party groups provides little further 
information as it confines itself to a description of the groups on the basis 
of their documents rather than their activities.
The second treatment of European transnational party cooperation consists of an 
examination of the position adopted by various national parties towards the EC 
and attitudes to European policy in general. This has generally been analysed 
in the context of the national political system, and of the influence of the 
party's "external relations" policy in that arena, e.g. Lodge on the SPD (1980) 
and Brown on the Irish Labour Party (1981). The focus of the third approach 
has been the elaboration of the transnational links and programmes between 
parties of similar ideology in extraparliamentary federations or confederations 
at the European level GTeidermayer, 1981 and 1986, Menke, 1980).
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In these treatments of the international cooperation of political parties, the 
national party remains the nucleus of the analysis. In the HP before direct 
elections, parties were represented on the basis of results of national 
elections. All XBPs held a dual mandate on the basis of party strength and 
were part-time delegates to a part-time parliament.
The three broad lines of study highlight the lacuna in the theoretical approach 
to the study of our subjects, the directly-elected members of the party groups. 
The cooperative approach to the study of political parties leaves much to be 
desired for the analyst of the EP, as the groups are not parties in themselves, 
but rather are an amalgam or coalition of interests, which are for the most 
part delegations of parties.
Much of the literature on the EP groups over the last decade examined 
enthusiastically the possible evolution of the groups as proto-parties. Such 
approaches were more optimistic than has been borne out in the development of 
the groups. Early writers in the first phase of the literature, such as Van 
Oudenhove (1962) and Fitzmaurice (1975), suggested that party groups were in 
the ascendant. In the late 1970s, a more negative approach was evident in the 
literature and it is postulated by this writer that groups are now in a steady 
state of development.
While Pridham*s writings on the EP suggested that the discontinuity of the 
groups from parliamentary groupings to real parties was being bridged over, 
this does not appear to be the case, and evidence suggests that the
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confederations have no real role to play as extraparliamentary wings of the 
proto-European parties. Even the federations' role of paymaster has been 
negated in the wake of the Kay 1986 Court case concerning the financial 
allocations for the 1984 electoral campaigns.
The rich body of literature on the study of parties provides us with some 
models for the understandings of "parties" in the EP, while ultimately the 
groups may be viewed as new phenomena, perhaps as party federations in the 
sense used in the U.S. before the Civil War, that is, as loose amalgams or 
coalitions of interests, influences, ambitions and pressures. The groups 
constitute "combinations" of such Interests, as parliamentary "groupenents" for 
voting and other Instrumental purposes, rather than as European-wide parties in 
a European party system.
The party groups resemble the U.S. style electoral parties which form cartels in 
order to campaign for elections. They are not in a position in the EC to act 
as a political party. Between European elections, the group is cut off from its 
electors and from the source of its electoral support. Despite the fact that 
direct elections have now taken place, the domestic party at first took even 
less Interest In the EP's activities than during the phase of the dual mandate 
and it perception of the EC is different (Ionescu and Xorgan, 1988). Each 
category of deputy, national and European, has its own life and lifespan and 
there are relatively few meetings between and overlap of the two. Rather, the 
representational styles of the two have become more disparate, despite the
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®xlstence transnational electoral federations, the European confederations of 
parties with electoral common programmes for direct elections.
This rather pessimistic configuration does not suggest that the groups and 
their members have no function in the European Community. Rather it suggests 
that the EP may not be the forum for the simple transplanting of national party 
politics and cleavages from the national arena to the arena of the European 
Community. There is no matching relationship between the political families at 
the national level and the European party groupings. Groups, of allegedly the 
same Ideology in the EP, have component parties which are often very different 
at home.
The EP may prove to be the forum for parliamentary groupings (not parties) 
which choose to represent interests rather than nationalities. The EP manifests 
elements of a "lobby parliament”, with a conception of representation which 
encompasses European-wide as well as regional interests and constituencies (and 
not necessarily national interests, which are already evident in the Council and 
European Council). The EP may thus evolve, not as Splnelli's "constituent 
assembly”, but rather as an assembly which develops its own expertise, and its 
own European initiatives, which need not be Treaty-based. The EP already 
possesses its own powers of control In the Budget, and it has also gone beyond 
the Treaty and its formal powers to the elaboration of a critical role, as 
evidenced by its reports on defence and security. On technology a similar 
pattern is emerging. The conclusion to be drawn is that the classical role of 
parliaments and of political parties has limited relevance to the EP and its
party groups, and hence a new notion of the representation of Interests and 
proaotion of policies Is emerging in the EP. It lies with the groups to become 
more disciplined and cohesive in order to advance their policies and interests 
in the EC.
In the literature on parties, a comparison may usefully be made across 
ideologies and national boundaries. The groups may be compared with each 
other, for example, with regard to such common problems as the maintenance of 
cohesion, leadership struggles and voting patterns in plenary. The groups 
constitute a form of political organisation, which varies according to group, in 
which members cooperate in order to serve political or personal interests, 
whether as cohesive units, or whether they focus on such cooperation as a means 
to serve the individual ends of the members. The study of political parties Is 
itself a discipline of disparate strands, not least with regard to the 
description of the party itself. The debate as to the "partyness" of party 
government has served to clarify some of the terms, approaches and functions of 
parties in Vestern societies (Castles and Vildenmann, eds., 1986), while on the 
other hand the actual criteria for what constitutes a party remain problematic. 
Analyses and definitions of parties, party typologies, coalition theories, lists 
of criteria based on ideological lines, electoral strength and type of party 
system (the "number of parties" debate) have all contributed to the study of 
party systems. In this chapter we describe what is known about the groups in 
the EP and their origins.
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A study of a political party Involves the study of the party's origins, its 
organisation (e.g. Kichels) and of its membership. It traces the origins, the 
internal structure and the motivations and behaviour of the actors, the ways 
in which the functions of leadership recruitment and issue-formulation are 
carried out and the ideological content of the programmes and pronouncements of 
the party.
In addition, it examines the interaction between these parties and the political 
systems in which they function (Lawson, 1980, p.20). Vhile Riggs <1968) sees 
party as "any party which nominates candidates for election to a legislature", 
Schlesinger sees it as "the political organisation which actively and 
effectively engages in the competition for elective office”. Lawson puts 
forward the following definition:
A political party is an organisation of individuals that seeks continuing 
electoral and non-electoral authorisation from the public (or a portion 
thereof) for specified representatives of that organisation to exercise the 
political power of particular government offices, claiming that such power 
will be exercised on behalf of that public.
She continues by saying that only political parties fit the terms of this 
definition (Lawson, 1976, pp.3-4>. However, political parties or parts thereof, 
in the European Parliament, do not compete for governmental offices. Sartori 
refers to Barnes' definition of party as "the communication network that 
functionally specialises in the aggregation of political communications....for a 
party" (Barnes, 1967).
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It is not useful to speak of parties in a political structure which is not a 
polity. The assertion that we may have parties on the European level - a 
Common Market of parties - is dependent on whether one sees Europe as a would- 
be polity. In this fluid polity, the party group system has not as yet assumed 
the role which it occupies in established polities (Sartori, 1976, p.255).
There are several approaches to the study of parties. There is the historical 
approach which places emphasis on the origins of the parties, and on their 
growth. Vhile Epstein <1967) emphasised the importance of parliaments as the 
focus "of party organisational efforts", the extraparliamentary origins also 
deserve investigation. La Palombara and Weiner (1966) develop the approach by 
studying the party system. The structural approach looks at the formal 
organisation of political parties and the role relationships among the party 
members. Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels (1912) were the pioneering spirits in 
their studies of power and leadership. A third general approach, a behavioural 
one, poses the question - what do people do in and about political parties?
The focus is on three types of behaviour related to a party - leadership, 
activism and voting. Emphasis is placed on the effectiveness of party leaders, 
on the behaviour and background of party activists, and the characteristics and 
roles of the voter.
A fourth approach has been labelled the functional-systemic approach. The 
literature inquires into the relationship between the subject and its 
environment, for the effect one has upon the other (Lawson, 1976, p. 11). The 
salient question is:
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Vhat, if any, function does this party perform in making the political 
system operate as it does (e.g., persevere, change, self-regulate, perish)?
A development of this, taking the substructure as the dependent variable, is the 
exploration of the function of a democratic constitutional system, in producing 
and maintaining competitive political parties. Parties are presented as 
intermediary agents or brokers, or the performers of interest aggregation, 
especially in the role of giving structure to political conflict. This takes us 
on to the concept of national integration and the role parties play in building 
a sense of nationhood, in three distinct ways - expressing, directing, or 
absorbing public opinion. Some observers hold the view that parties may have a 
negative effect or no role to play in integrating a nation (Grodzin, 1960), or 
that parties may have a limited role to play in Vestern democracies (King, 
1969). This is relevant in our assessment of the limited role played by the 
parties in Europe in the early phases of European Integration (Haas, 1966).
A fifth approach is the ideological approach. Here, the party's ideology is the 
main concern of the researcher, who asks what the party "stands for" and 
examines the tenacity of that stand and the goals set to achieve it. Those who 
represent this approach examine the ideology, party programmes, and goals of 
parties, centring attention on the issue orientation of parties, and the 
intensity of the ideological commitment, often compared with its legitimate 
voting record.
For the purposes of the present study, certain characteristics are assumed to 
be more important than others, given the sui generis nature of the subject under 
investigation. The political groups are not parties, although they may in some 
respects resemble parties. Definitions of parties do not advance the study of 
party groups in the European Parliament. Rather, one should accept 
Schlesinger's (1985, p.1152) advice with regard to the new American political 
party, that one should use a theory that accepts party groups for what they 
are, rather than imposing on them impossible norms which are implicit in so 
many models of party.
The difficult task of comparing party systems in the national political arena 
with the EP is complicated by the lack of adequate measurement of the variables 
to determine the major features of the two systems (i.e. national and European). 
The 12 member states are not directly comparable to the supranational level of 
the sui generis EC. Generalisations from one political system to another are 
hence difficult and may not be relevant as existing comparative studies are of 
limited use in explaining the EC. However, Harmel and Janda (1982) emphasise 
that a democratic political party is a creature of its environment, and they 
introduce two categories of factors involved in the development of the party. 
These are:
UJ__The structure of political opportunities.
Careers (Schlesinger, 1966), the offices, the rules for attaining them, the 
general pattern of the behaviour surrounding their attainment.
<22__The party system.
The relationship between parties, particularly the relative chances that each 
party has of winning various elective offices. The control variable of the 
level of competetitiveness for each party office differs among the offices and 
over time. In the EP, the elective offices are controlled by the party group.
Sartori (1976) focuses on party sub-units, the major and most significant 
breakdown below the party level, on the basis that a party is an aggregate of 
Individuals forming constellations of rival group«. The party is a system 
whose parts are sub-units, which may be national blocs, or individual voting 
blocs, e.g. pro or anti EC blocs. Some BP groups, such as the Socialists or 
Communists, possess readily identifiable factions, while others speak with one 
voice on many issues, but have fractionalised voting on others. The group is a 
combination of sub-units which emanate from the national polity and which then 
operate in a fluid polity.
4.1.2.__ Party cohesion.
Party cohesion has been the subject of a number of studies in recent years, as 
it is a salient feature of political parties. The assumption has been that 
parties, in order to constitute parties, must appear to be coherent in some way 
which distinguishes them from a non-party. On the other hand, the actual 
dynamics of internal cohesion and discipline remain unknown variables in 
political studies. Daalder reminds us that internal party processes remain very 
much a blank spot in comparative analysis (1984, p. 3).
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The party groups are now faced with the problems of reconciling the alms of 
cohesion with the fact that they constitute combinations, many of which are 1 
arge and unwieldy. They now confront a problem of how to aggregate interests 
and diverse styles of representation within the group. The political scientist 
must come to terms with different modes of political and organisational 
behaviour in the study of the EP.
The groups are legally recognised in the EP's own organisation and procedure. 
The main benefits of group membership Include the opportunity to realise one's 
party programme or individual goals through the group. Xembers could avail of 
group acquaintances in order to influence group partners' stand on and 
knowledge of specific Issues. Increased parliamentary resources, votes, 
secretariat, research and development resources, financial aid and speaking 
times were available in greater amounts than to individual party delegations or 
to smaller groups. Funds are allocated to groups as a basic amount far each 
group, with a pro-rata amount for each group member plus (since 1973) a 
percentage increase in pro-rata amount according to the number of working 
languages used in the groups. Expenditure control procedures require that each 
group submit a periodic report to the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary 
Control on the use of the appropriations.
4.1.3. The groups as agents of Integration
The groups' representative function is not clear. They are combinations of 
representative functions and pressures. The groups have been seen by some
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observers as agents of integration, and as such they would integrate the 
cleavages of the EC in a legitimate, politicised manner in the EP. In this way, 
they resemble articulation parties rather than governing parties and their role 
as channels of information is relevant in the performance of their 
representative functions. They articulate the needs and Interests of those whoa 
they represent. It is essential to seek to understand the relationship of the 
HEPs to the political groups and the significance of that relationship for 
national, group, party and other allegiances.
Since the origins of the ECSC, various analysts Including Haas (1959) and 
Bonvicini (1971) have studied the relevance of the party groups as agents of 
Integration in a quasi-federal European Community. Haas saw the Assembly's 
parliamentarians as crucial actors in the process of integration for two 
reasons. Firstly, they seek to create a federal Europe in their parliamentary 
activity, or they choose to negate such a federation. Secondly, such 
parliamentarians could enhance the practice and code of behaviour which would 
be typical of federations. Haas did not regard the groups as parties, but 
rather as actors involved in international diplomatic relations roughly 
equivalent to trade unions. As such they function as centres of communication, 
of contacts and value-sharing.
For Haas, a federation-wide party is made up of "strongly autonomous, if not 
independent" state and local units, with no direct contact with the citizens.
Such parties would have internal cohesion, with solidarity in the election of 
federal officials. The principle of binding party voting would not be accepted.
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In order to merit the label of " federal”, the party would need to be supported 
by and identified with groups which enjoy federation-wide membership and 
interests. In the present EP, some groups have affiliations with trade unions 
at the national and Community level, as well as business and consumer groups. 
The party groups are not, and have never been, autonomous of state units, 
although the distance between them and the nation state grew afterdirect 
elections. The principle of binding voting behaviour is not a norm, but it is a 
feature of voting behaviour of the groups in some cases, and an explanation of 
vote is normally requested when members vote against the group line, 
particularly in issues related to the Parliament's control of the Budget. Haas 
also stipulates that in a federal parliament, federal law would determine the 
means whereby the XEPs are elected. He pointed out that the Assembly of the 
ECSC fell short of that criterion, and the EP still does In the latel980s, as no 
single electoral law has been agreed by Community law (see Sasse et al, 1981).
Vith regard to representation at the Community level, Haas (1958, p.408) ponders 
whether the Assembly of the ECSC represented the totality of the Community, or 
are the parliamentarians spokesmen of their nation states. That problem is as 
relevant in the wake of the direct elections as it was in the first decade of 
the Assembly. There is also an awareness of a Community position qua 
Community in foreign policy, unemployment and economic policy, for example, and 
many MEPs are critical of the EC when it appears to fall short of its tasks of 
combatting major transnational problems. The EP has Institutionalised sessions, 
regular committee and plenary meetings, and is less dependent on national 
events than before 1979. With regard to national influence on representation in
the EP, Haas*8 statement still holds true that: "in case of ambivalence between 
national and supranational assignments, national pressure carries the day, since 
it is here that re-election is obtained, and not on the basis of anything said, 
done or voted in Luxembourg or Strasbourg" (p. 409) on the basis of the 
interviews held with HP officials.
Ve must ask whether the groups constitute party-like entities and whether the 
term "party" can be applied to them, or only, for example, to those groups which 
maintain extraparliamentary transnational party links in an institutionalised 
structure such as the party federations. At the time of the first direct 
elections, there were expectations that somehow the parties in the EP would fill 
a political vacuum at the EC level, attain political power, and eventually became 
European political parties. Ve question what form of political organisations 
the groups are and what distinguishes them from parties which operate solely in 
the national arena. Compared to national parties, we ask to what extent they 
consist of factions or "tendences", or are their cleavages of a nature which is 
mostly pertinent to the arena of EC politics?
4.2 The origins of the party groups: the development of transnational party 
Hnks
Vhen the precursor to the present EP, the Assembly of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) first met in 1952, party groups were not envisaged in 
the Treaty of Paris, nevertheless, early observers of the Community process 
saw the creation of such groups as inevitable. Boisson <1959, p.Sl), for
example, suggests that it seemed "natural" for parties to corn« together in 
ideological groupings with their counterparts because they were dealing in 
common with European affairs. Kapteyn (1962, p.84) saw groups aa foreseeable 
due to the prior existence of international party activity in the shape of 
Internationals. The Christian Democrats and Liberals had formed such 
transnational organisations in the 1940s, in the shape of the CDs' Vouvelles 
Equipes Internationales (IEI) (1947) and the "Liberal International" (1947).
The Socialist International had by this stage a long and chequered history of 
party cooperation.
The original political families were set up in the ECSC in 1952 along the lines 
of established political and party traditions - Christian Democrat, Socialist 
and Liberal - in the six founding member states. Duverger (1966, p.25) 
suggested that, despite the disparity of national origins and developments of 
the political parties in the Assembly, European political parties were part of a 
"grand movement" throughout Europe, while Houdbine simply saw the Assembly's 
groupings as a new political opportunity to be grasped by the parties in the 
new Community. The formation of the groups was a historically-based 
phenomenon in the post-war period. It was an alternative to the seating of 
national delegates in national groupings, which did not appear to fit in with 
the mood of the time - a near abhorrence of the nationalism of the era - and 
with the emergence of a federalist movement in a war-scarred Europe. It was 
the party groups who were responsible for the organisation and operation of the 
new parliament, acting as the "politicising1* agent of the EP (Fitzmaurice, 1978).
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The continued existence and growth of the groups is attributable to their 
internationalist leanings, particularly the Socialists and CDs, which was also 
evident in the Council of Europe. In addition, the self-perpetuating mechanisms 
of the groups' institutional structure and benefits to members became 
institutionalised in a structure which, once established, was difficult to 
dismantle, particularly in view of its permanent staff. This, unlike the 
parliamentary membership of the EP, did not alter with changes of national 
governments. Benefits of group membership were soon grasped by the members 
(and were to be more fully explored with direct elections) although they were 
also to place limits on the freedom of legislative action of some XEPs within 
the group structure.
By 1947, earlier transnational contacts had been established within each of the 
three major European tendencies of Socialism, Christian Democracy and 
Liberalism. There was little Communist transnationalism on a purely European 
level. Each tendency contributed to the Community structure, through its 
involvement in the ECSC Assembly. The ECSC parliamentarians attributed the 
ease of creating party groups partly to the communication channels opened by 
early contacts as well as to the habit of inter-party consultation in the 
Council of Europe's Assembly since 1949 (Haas, 1959).
While the Socialists were perceived as the most international of the tendencies 
and as the founders of the political groups in the Assembly, the Christian 
Democrats stressed the fact that the great founding fathers of the European 
Community were numbered among its ranks (Claeys and Loeb-Xayer, 1979, p.462).
irregular, with little organisation on the part of those parties who were 
distinguished by their characteristics as individualistic parties of notables 
rather than as mass parties. These transnational links of three of the major 
tendencies in the Communities provided centres for exchange of perspectives, 
but did not constitute foci of support for a united Europe. They served to 
provide a reference point for cooperation across national frontiers and for an 
awareness of common political positions. The other major tenedency, Communism, 
was not accorded representation in the Assembly by the national governments 
during and just after the Cold War period.
A .2.1 Institutionalisation of the party groups
There is no evidence to suggest that, once the incentive to form groups, along 
the lines of shared common beliefs, was taken, any other alternative political 
organisation was discussed in detail as a feasible means of action. The option 
of national delegations was rejected within a year of the creation of the BCSC 
Assembly. The group structure quickly gained recognition, particularly with the 
unprecedented allocation of generous financial resources, is addition to 
secretarial and research staff, thereby greatly facilitating the organisation of 
the group network. The politicisation of the party groups began in the 1950s, 
with their initiatives regarding the European Defence Community, as the Ad Hoc 
Assembly, and with their debates on the politically sensitive aspects of the 
European Coal and Steel Community.
The Institutionalisation of the group system thus came about with the early 
politicisation of the Assembly itself, when it debated the EDC and the European
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Political Community in 1953-55, and set up a Working Group for the promotion of 
intensified efforts at European Integration (Haas, 1959, p.400). The Assembly 
in 1953 established permanent committees, with fixed national quotas and 
recognition of equitable party representation, and undertook committee 
investigations. It was during this period that it sanctioned the legal 
establishment of the political groups with Community funding.
Table 4 JL Composition of political groups of the EP: 1953-1979 
__CE_____ SQ£_____ LIB SPD____ ED_____ co* tc_____ UL
1953 38 23 11 5
1958 37 22 17 2
1963 65 _ 35 26 15
1965 62 35 26 17
1970 62 35 26 . . 17.
1975 51 49 25 17 20 15 6
1979(Jan) 53 66 23 17 18 18
1379 tfuaL 1QÔ . 112.___.. 10. 22 . 64 U _ . . il a_
CD Christian Democrats
soc Socialist
LIB Liberal
EPD European Progressive Democrats
ED European Democrats (Conservatives)
COX Communists and Allies
TC Technical Coordination of Independents
ÏA Ion-affiliated
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Unlike the Assembly of the Council of Europe, where the status of party groups 
never replaced the primary importance of national delegations, the establishment 
by the EP of a definitive group structure yielded practical results fairly soon. 
The first benefit was financial. In 1953, a block grant of 500,000 Belgian 
Francs plus allocations for each group member was made to the group. Members 
were to form the groups according to political persuasion and no person could 
be a member of more than one group. The minimum number necessary to form a 
group was nine, in order to afford representation on each committee (Rule 34, 
Rules of Procedure, 1953). In addition, the following features which served to 
increase the influence of the group in the Assembly were introduced:
(1) The seating arrangement was changed from alphabetical order to 
seating based on group affiliation, ranging from the Left to the Right of 
the political spectrum.
(2) Groups began to express a common group position, usually through a 
party delegation leader, in debates of the House.
(3) Speaking time was allocated mainly according to the sise of the 
group, resulting in an apparent "increased incisiveness on the part of the 
speakers" (Lindsay, 1960, p.21). Ion-membership of a group implied the 
allocation of a very small ratio of speaking time. The HP's present Rules 
of Procedure (Rule 65.1.2) provide for allocation of speaking time after 
consultation with the chairpersons of the political groups.
(4) Increasing importance was attached to resolutions and amendments by 
groups as distinct from individual motions, and this was to be 
institutionalised in the Rules of Procedure with the requirement that
motions for resolutions be signed by a stipulated number of XEPs or by a 
group.
(5) The introduction of the representation of group opinion at the 
enlarged Bureau's agenda-setting meetings. The enlarged Bureau consisted 
of the Bureau (President and Vice-Presidents) and group Presidents.
(6) Group affiliation rather than national representation came to be the 
determinant of the allocation of positions in the Assembly (committee 
positions and chairmanship and rapporteurship) in accordance with the 
d'Hondt system of proportional representation, with points allocated to 
each group and a value of certain points to each report to be drafted in 
committee.
In the present Parliament, under the Rules of Procedure, members may organise 
themselves into groupings according to political affinities (Rule 26.1), and a 
member may not belong to more than one political group (Rule 26.4). The Rule 
concerning the minimum membership of groups encourages the formation of 
transnational groups from the very beginning. Under this rule (26.5), a 
minimum number of 23 members is required to form a political group if all the 
members come from the same member state, or 18 if they come from two member 
states, and 12 if they come from three or more (EP Rules of Procedure, 1987).
Finally, the financial support ensured the establishment of group secretariats 
for research and documentation, allowances for group meetings and for group 
preparation for debates. Lindsay (1960) adds that the party groups gave
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members a new bond with their own parties in other such assemblies throughout 
Europe. He remarks of the Council of Europe's Assembly:
"There is less need for political groups, because the work is not of such 
a nature that it demands continuous cooperation by a steady majority, as 
in national governments, where parliament legislates and maintains a 
government." (I960, p.65).
He further suggests that the emergence of political groups and their official 
recognition was the strongest single element in changing the character of the 
ECSC Assembly (p. 23).
The Assembly of the ECSC was far from being a legislating parliament, however, 
although its powers were enhanced somewhat by the scope of the new Treaties in 
1957. The Assembly primarily constituted a forum of political debate. Its 
members were dual mandate KEPs, who represented their party in the EP on a 
part-time basis and whose term of office was determined by national elections. 
Hational considerations determined their EP legislative term.
The Influence of the national polity on the EP was counter-balanced by the 
commitment to a federalist assembly and a certain amount of legislative 
socialisation and inter-party cooperation among the KEPs, which amounts to a 
"Europeanisation" of views and attitudes, as Illustrated by Kerr in 1973. 
Socialisation took place primarily within the group structure. The real costs 
of not being a member of a group were evident as benefits weighted in favour of 
the group, once the institutional structure was established.
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Lindsay informs us that some Council of Europe Assembly members deplored the 
creation of ideological allegiances as "artificial allegiances superimposed on 
existing individual and national divisions" but it was precisely these divisions 
which were to provide the essence of political conflict throughout much of the 
EP's existence. It became apparent in the 1950s that pro-European aspirations 
had been dashed to a large extent in the Council of Europe, or at least were to 
be expressed in terms of cultural and social cooperation, and so it was to the 
European Assembly that federalists turned for political cooperation and 
enhanced integration.
It was this Assembly (1953-55) which, in its role as an Ad Hoc Assembly on the 
European Political Community, framed a draft statute intended to serve as the 
basis for such a political community. This proposal, the first major political 
achievement of the Assembly, indicates the level of political initiative and 
sophistication in a very new Assembly which was not paralleled in the other 
"internationalist" assemblies of the day and has perhaps only been equalled by 
the EP's own-initiative Draft Treaty on European Union in 1984.
The Assembly in the ECSC period worked closely with the High Authority, 
precursor to the Commission, although there were factions for and against the 
High Authority which was at the time being considered as a proto-European 
Government, at least up to the mid-1960s. This role was to be reassessed by 
the early 1970s as a form of "European Secretariat" (leunreither, 1972, p. 235). 
The Christian Democratic Group, in particular after 1956, became so closely 
identified with the High Authority as to be dubbed the "government party".
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The CD group remained in favour of European Union from the origins of the ECSC 
to the present day and unlike the Socialists, has never had KBPs who opposed 
the actual existence of the Community. Haas suggests that parties in the 
Common Assembly had drifted into "normal federal legislative positions" in the 
evolution of the "government” and "opposition" parties, which formed part of the 
integrative behaviour of the actors in the Assembly (Haas, 1956, p.432).
The Assembly envisaged a wider role for itself in the Community, in its 
European Political Community proposals and the exercise of pressure in favour 
of direct elections. One measure of the Assembly's political success in the 
ECSC phase was the willingness of the founders of the EEC and Euratoa to 
designate the Assembly as the Common Assembly of the three European 
Communities, although Its powers were not greatly enhanced. This new Assembly 
differed both quantitatively and qualitatively from its predecessor. Its 
membership of 142 now ranged from committed federalists or foreign policy 
specialists to members representing a broader base from their national 
parliaments (Lindsay, 1962, p.43). Vider scope was also afforded by the 
enlarged agenda of EP debates, brought about by its representation of the three 
distinct Communities, with issues now ranging from agricultural policy, the 
Common Xarket, the elimination of trade barriers, competition policy and 
customs tariffs to the free movement of persons, services and capital.
The creation of the Common Assembly altered the orientation of its members, as 
some MEPs were less federalist and a new group was formed in the 1960s.
However, the first enlargement of the Community in 1973 was to be the major 
challenge to the political composition of the Assembly and its groups. This 
came about some years after the admittance of the Communists to the Assembly, 
thereby reflecting more accurately the political composition of the national 
legislatures of the Six.
The first enlargement, when Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark Joined the 
Community, placed considerable strain on group homogeneity, especially in the 
Socialist group, and led to the creation of three new political groups and to a 
reorganisation of the procedural mechanisms of the HP with the introduction of 
new norms and the increased use of the parliamentary question. The enlargement 
also coincided with a new spirit of criticism within the HP of the Uuropean 
Community which questioned not only the direction of the Community but also the 
existence of the EC and the HP. The majority of the British Labour members and 
most Danish KEPs pronounced themselves as anti-marketeers, and a new cleavage, 
which had relevance to the Community and not simply to the national arena, was 
now expressed in debates on the distinctly European issue. This undermined the 
cohesion and unity of the Socialist group, as it had to make allowances for two 
distinct voices within that group on many EC issues.
The voting consensus of the Socialists was thus diminished and the notion of 
representation was redefined, de facto, as the British Labour KEPs claimed to
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represent anti-EC sentiment, and hence transnational party cooperation was 
placed under considerable strain.
The party groups were also challenged by the Westminster model of 
parliamentary behaviour, as experienced by the British and Irish MEPs. Irving 
(1978, p.247) suggests that the EP became a more active body in the 1970s "not 
least since the British Conservatives, especially under Peter Kirk, tried to 
exploit its powers to the full". He suggests that the groups then became more 
active, and cites the CD group, which held 80 meetings In 1974-75 compared with 
60 meetings in 1972-73.
Vhen the British Labour Party joined the EP in 1975 (they had abstained until 
after the British referendum on Community membership), the Socialists, for the 
first time in over twenty years, replaced the Christian Democrats (51 seats)as 
the largest group in the EP, with almost one-third (68) of the seats. But this 
increase In numbers was at the price of tension and cleavages within the group. 
Palmer (1980, p.73) suggests that before the 1973 enlargement, the Socialist 
group was the best whipped and most consistently united of the groups, with 
respect to both voting and the expression of political attitudes. The degree of 
unity achieved by the group had also reflected the common ideology and economic 
policies shared by Socialists in the six original states of the Community. The 
British did not share their colleagues' faith in a mixed economy, unlike their 
continental social democrat peers. The group was further weakened by the 
different political stance normally adopted by the French Socialists. The 
dominant national party delegation in the group was the German SPD. Palmer
sees this dominance as the reflection of the major role played by Germany in 
the Community as a whole. The group ideology ranged from Marxist to reformist, 
although it tended to be dominated by the moderate tone of the SPD. The 
numerical dominance of the British Labour Party in the Socialist group was not 
reflected in comparable influence on group policy, as Labour was divided among 
pro- and anti-marketeers.
The traditional groups were also challenged by the creation of three new group 
alignments, mainly created to avail of group status and its benefits. This 
introduced a new type of political group which differed from the early groups 
in terms of ideological affinity. Vhile these groups were less "ideological" in 
overt terms than the three original groups, their component political parties 
possessed distinct ideologies of their own. The Gaullists had broken away from 
the Liberals in 1963 and had founded the UDE, the Union Démocratlque Européen, 
In 1965. In the wake of their poor national electoral results in 1973, they 
formed an alliance, the European Progressive Democrats, with the Irish Fianna 
Fail party, which had also found Itself without a natural niche in the group 
structure while its main electoral competitor, Fine Gall, had Joined the CDs.
The Italian Communists were admitted into the EP in late 1969, due to a 
national government decision rather than to any EP action, that party having 
"accepted and endorsed the principle of European political and economic 
collaboration" (Leich, 1971, p.271>. As the only communist party in the EP at 
the time, it claimed to represent all European communists and working class 
interests until the arrival of the French Communists in the EP in 1972. The
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two parties then formed the first Communist group which was also divided by 
the pro/anti EC cleavage, with the French expressing an anti-supranational 
approach compared with the more conciliatory and pragmatic attitude of the PCI. 
The Communist participation in the work of the EP constituted a change in the 
EP's climate of debate, which hitherto had been predominantly centrist. In the 
late 1960s, Zellentin (1967,p.420> had regarded the Parliament as "representing 
the government and moderate opposition parties". The early 1970s therefore saw 
the arrival of some left-wing extremism, in addition to features of bl-national 
groups and parliamentary criticism of the European Community.
A third bi-national group was founded in 1973. This was the European 
Democratic Group of British and Danish Conservatives. The group chose not to 
align itself with other right-wing or centrist groups in the Parliament, and 
Coombes (1973) suggests that this was to constitute a blow to the spirit of 
supranationalism in the EP. The ED Group, headed by Peter Kirk, expressed 
dismay at what they and some other EP neophytes saw as the pro-European and 
uncritical stance of the Parliament as an institution, unlike national 
legislatures. The 1973 enlargement served as a catalyst to alter the procedural 
style of the EP itself, which was a continental model, by the introduction of 
such Vestminster-style procedures as Question Time, especially with Oral PQs, 
which enabled members to question members of the Council and Commission 
directly on all aspects of Community policies. Scalingi <1980, p. 125) describes 
this aspect of the Parliament's institutionalisation as follows:
"The new British members along with the Irish delegates were outspokenly 
critical of the low-key style of the debates, the stress on unanimity for
adopting resolutions, and the Parliament's willingness to support the 
Commission in order to present the Community's critics with a united 
front."
The political roles of the groups also developed in the debate on the future of 
the Community, in particular as it became mare politicised in the 1970s, with 
European Political Cooperation, Defence and European Monetary Union appearing on 
the Community (and newly-formed European Council) agenda, as in the 1980s, with 
the Single European Act and growing momentum for a common internal market by 
1992. A feature of the political development of the groups since the 1950s was 
the evolution and development of a new role by one group, to be followed or 
imitated by other groups. During the 1950s, the Socialists acted as the main 
proponents of more advanced European integration, within the EP, and it was 
this group which had first instigated clearcut policy proposals in the form of 
group programmes in the Assembly. Furthermore, it consistently criticised the 
High Authority for its alleged failure to prompt further integration and 
progress in the field of social policy.
The Socialist Group went so far as to threaten the use of the Parliament's 
ultimate weapon of the motion of censure on the High Authority, concerning the 
effective implementation of the latter's role. Although this policy of 
commitment to European integration was to be shaken in the 1970s, for two 
decades the Socialist Group served as an Impetus to the other political groups 
to clarify their own positions on issues of Community policy and development. 
Thus Fitzmaurice (1975, p.36) concluded that only the Socialists, by the
dissolution of the ECSC Assembly in 1958 "had gone any way towards the 
formulation of clear-cut ideological positions at the European level, and that 
this alone had been the catalyst to the politicisation of the Assembly".
In a similar manner, Kirk's Conservative group sought to utilise all the 
procedural tools and opportunities for lively debate to a greater extent than 
did their predecessors of the Six, with the result of increased parliamentary 
activity. This trend was a form of stimulus-response mechanism which served 
to further institutionalise the party groups in the EP.
Finally, the national parties In the member states began to take an interest in 
the activities of their delegates in the EP, in the mid-1970s. Such embryonic 
interest was centred on the party federations and was hastened by the pending 
direct elections, which prompted parties into some form of electoral activity, 
and often into adopting a position on the European Community.
Study groups had been set up within the EP since the 1950s in order to promote 
and prepare for direct elections, and the Socialist group had produced a 
"Common Programme” with these elections in mind as early as 1962.
Transnational links in the shape of party federations were not finally 
established until the 1970s, and then mostly in response to the decision to 
hold popular elections to the Parliament.
Claeys and Loeb-Xayer (1979b, p.116) suggest that the prospect of European 
elections acted as a stimulant to the party groupings, despite the uncertainty
I b h
as to whether such elections would result in increased powers for the directly- 
elected Parliament. There were also other factors involved in the foundation of 
the federations, which were organisations set up by national parties on an 
international basis and having certain connections with EP political groups, 
especially for purposes of direct elections. One such factor is the opportunity 
to discuss European problems beyond the simple consultation process previously 
in operation in the international organisations, and the federations' role was 
to elaborate political programmes and to prepare for the electoral campaign. 
Their general task was policy coordination.
Prldham and Pridham (1979, p.64) see these federations as significant because, 
unlike the traditional Internationals, they were confined to parties in the BC 
member states and they required some binding (albeit minimal) commitment to 
political activity, especially for the forthcoming direct elections. It is 
evident that these federations acted os mobilising forces for the parties only 
on an informative level, however, and they had little long-term significance as 
political actors.
Although meetings of the leaders of the federations and party groups have taken 
place since direct elections, they have been little bore than an exchange of 
views. Such meetings are irregular and lack the organisational and 
institutional support which the political groups possess. The federations are 
loose formations, whereas the party groups are small bodies of practising 
politicians who work closely on a regular basis on problems which are debated
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regularly in the EP plenary and in committee, and which demand the formulation 
of a definitive group position.
The first federation was founded by the Socialists as a means of vivifying the 
existing transnational structures. Vhile it was confined to EC parties, it was 
established within the framework of the Socialist International. It was founded 
on 5 April 1974 and consisted of nine parties from eight countries, excluding 
the British Labour Party which joined in early 1976. It was founded before the 
direct elections were announced at the European Council summit of December,
1974. Unlike the other foundations, the Confederation of Socialist parties of 
the EC had possessed an institutionalised machinery since the 1960s. It held 
regular meetings, and until 1976, when the British Labour delegates first 
attended, was fairly united in its alms and pronouncements.
The Liberal parties founded the European Liberal and Democratic (ELD)
Federation on 26 March 1976, at the first meeting of the International Liberal 
Conference since 1972. It elaborated an electoral programme which was viewed 
as perhaps the most federalist of the three major federations, in its 
commitment to European integration. These federations may include member 
parties from non-EC states and may not necessarily directly reflect 
representation in the EP.
European Union was also the theme of the Christian Democrats' European People's 
Party (EPP) which was founded in April 1976 under the leadership of the major 
proponent of European Union, Mr. Leo Tindemans. Ideals of freedom, justice, the
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interdependence of nations, commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, the CSCE, 
further EC enlargement and European Monetary Union formed part of the EPP 
programme, entitled "Towards a Europe of Free People". This detailed programme 
contrasts with the Socialists' more muted Political Declaration and Appeal to 
the Electorate.
In April 1978, the British Conservatives, German CDU/CSU, Danish Conservatives 
and Centre Democrats, French Gaullists and Giscardiens (the latter as 
observers) formed the European Democratic Union (EDU) and declared their 
common political lineage and purpose to "fight the Communist threat". This 
placed considerable strains on the EPP. The EDU, unlike other federations, did 
not establish an institutional framework or secretariat and constituted an 
informal alliance which met irregularly.
During the first three decades of their existence, the groups in the EP have 
consistently reflected societal changes. The 1950s can be characterised as a 
period of post-war cooperation, with a movement away from nationalism. The 
1960s saw a revival of nationalism and the successful implementation of the 
first European policy (CAP) side by side with the Empty Chair Crisis, the 
Luxembourg Agreement and French opposition to British entry to the EC. The 
1970s saw the politicisation of the EC and its party groups in reaction to the 
□11 Crisis, the Middle East crisis and the entry of Great Britain, Denmark and 
Ireland to the EC. These developments were reflected in the groups' debates, 
structure and membership, and the groups were to be further challenged by the 
first direct elections to a supernational assembly.

Chapter Five
Party Groups after the Direct Elections
I'M

5J--Direct elect Iona and change« i n political fnrres In the BP
In the midst of the contemporary debate on the "decline” of parliaments and 
problems facing party governments and of the asserted supplanting of parties 
by public administration and interests groups, parties in Western Europe have 
become aware since the 1970s of a new forum for political action which is open 
to them through electoral competition at a national level (1). In the Buropean 
Parliament, party representatives take part in a transnational exchange of 
*
views, coordinate policies and determine priorities. The EP is seen by some 
domestic parties as a forum which cannot very well be ignored. For optimists, 
it conjures up ideals of a European party system which would be distinctly 
separate from the national one. Levi and Plstone (1980, p.67), for example, 
suggest that direct elections gave the Community the status of a state with a 
new political order.
The direct elections in 1979 and 1984 also highlighted the need for a uniform 
electoral procedure in order to help make the elections a European event rather 
than a series of national polls (Millar, 1986, p.49). Millar rightly juxtaposes 
the lack of a European electoral procedure with "the notable absence of 
commitment by national parties to the European campaign of 1984 which resulted 
in the predominance of national issues, the weakness of Community themes and 
the...low turnout".
The elections brought about a major alteration in the balance of left and right 
in the European Parliament and there was no overall majority of one group in
I to
the EP. The six major groups in the first directly-elected EP war* the 
Socialists, Christian Democrats, European. Democrats, Communists and Allies, 
Liberals and European Progressive Democrats. The allocation of seats is set out 
in Table 5.1. Electoral turnout was lower in 1984 than in 1979, with eighty 
million abstentions (Table 5.2).
Table 5.1 BP groups* strength after first direct elections. 1Q7Q
GROUP SEATS In July, 1979, the "Group for Technical
Coordination and Defence of Independent 
SOC 113 Group« and Members (TC/DI) was rscognised
EPP 107 as a group. This was formed by previously
ED 64 non-aligned parliamentarians to avail of such
COM 44 benefits of group membership as financial
LIB 40 assistance and positions on committees.
EPD 22
Others 20
TOTAL__________ A U L
Tabla 5.2 Turnout at direct alertions to the European Parliament 
(in million voters and in %)
Member Slat«______ Registered Turnout__ Registered Turnout Htmtaer
_________________ voters 1984 1984.____ voters 1979 1979_____ of seats
BelgiuaU?_________ __________ 32*2______ iLfifl______ 91.4 24
Denmark_________________¡Lfifi_________5Z2________ ZLZ2________47.8 16
Germany____________iAA5______ 5fi.fi______42JS_____ SZJL_____ SI
Greece (1)___________^22______ 1Z2______ 6.8Q* 78.6* 24
France_____________2fi^ 3______ SfiJZ_____ 35J.fi_______60.7 81
Ireland____________ 2JU________IUl. . 2.18______ 63.6 is
Italy______________ j±Ai______ £LS_____ 42^ fi_______85.5 81
Luxembourg (1)_______ (L2J______ fiZJJ______JL21______ fiflu2_______ S.
The lather lands 10.70______ 50.5 9.81______ 58.1 25
United Kingdom_____ 41.92______ 32A _____ ISL52_______32.6 81
TOTAL_____________ 199.52______ 60 190.18______ S2_____ 4M.
(1) Voting compulsory
# Elections of 18 October 1981
Source: Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 6, 1984.
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Table 5.3 Holders of dual mandate In the EP elections
lation Dual mandate Dual mandats
1964 1979
Belgium 0 ' 18
Denmark 1 6
France 6 22
Germany 1 28
Greece 5
Ireland 8 12
Italy 16 21
Luxembourg 5 6
letherlands 0 2
U.K. 7 9
Total 49 125
I.B. Many MEPs resigned after election and were immediately replaced by 
substitutes.
The next major phase in the development of the party groups was the phase of 
direct elections which resulted in the alteration of the nature of 
representation at the European level, as the KEPs were no longer obliged to be 
members of the national parliament.
The dual mandate had ensured the maintenance of close links with the national 
parliamentary party and its leadership, and with the constituency organisation 
or selection body for candidates for election. It had also ensured close 
contacts with the national government or opposition in the national legislature, 
and links with the essence of national political conflict.
The groups in the EF after the 1979 elections functioned in a forum of 410 
members, with a fall in the average age of members and a marked decline in the 
dual mandate to less than one-third of the members. The single mandate 
resulted in a more active role for the groups and their members, and XEPs were 
now linked to a specific constituency to represent, although the differing 
national notions of representation results in widely different constituencies.
Transnational party cooperation in groups may alienate the XEP from the 
domestic political party, unless provisions are made to maintain contacts with 
the party on a regular basis. Should the national party choose to ignore its 
representatives in the EP, the Assembly and the groups may find themselves 
involved in politics in a vacuum, or else may take it upon themselves to pursue 
their own group or individual goals in the EP. Should this occur, a European 
group system divorced from the national system may evolve, but, without an 
adequate basis of sustained contact with the electorate it represents, its 
success would be limited.
The direct elections altered the conception of representation in the EF, as the 
XEPs were no longer delegates but elected trustees or plenipotentiaries,
11U
accountable to a constituency, political party, group and region. As 
representatives of public opinion, their accountability is Halted, as public 
opinion remains largely uninformed as to their activities and there is no 
European media. The second direct elections further altered the representation 
of political forces in the EP along with Community enlargement.
Table 5.4__EP groups and nationality: 1982
SDQ_______ E P F EP _______COM LIB 5PD CPI 1A TOTAL
Belgium 7. 10 4 2 ....1 24
Denmark 4 1 2 1 3 1 4 16
Germany 35 42 4 81
France 22 9 19 16 15 . 81
Greece 10 8 4 2 24
Ireland 4___ 4 1 5 1 15
Italy 14 30 24 5 4 4 81
Luxembourg 1 3 2 6
Netherlands 9 10 4 2 25
United ff'dom 18 61 ... 1 1 81
Total . . 124 1 1 Z ... 6 3 . .. 22. .... 11 , 1,(L - ,434
Source: EP: On the right Road, a report on the first legislative period 1979-84, 
Luxembourg.
1L2___Tha Party G ram « ««  Pr.H+^-1 rv-yan •!««+< or,«
B.2.1 Tbo timctiMML »wrf »imm at *hm group
In the HP it is the groups which wield influence, through their leaders, through 
their position on committees and delegations, and through the procurement of 
rapporteurships. The groups also nominate and elect the President and twelve 
Vice-Presidents (who together form the Bureau) in a highly politicised election 
twice per legislative term. Coombes (1979, pp. 30-31) points out that the 
President, unlike the Speaker in the British Parliament, actually exercises 
functions of political leadership of the HP and "plays a crucial part in 
decisions about organisation and procedure which in Britain are the preserve of 
the government of the day".
The structure of political opportunities (the offices and rules for attaining 
them), ensures that group influence is exerted through the enlarged Bureau which 
ensures Group supervision of administration, selection of committee members and 
the drawing up of the Parliament's agenda. The fair representation of political 
affinities on committees and the rule that it is obligatory for those oral 
qurstlons which are tabled by political groups to be debated illustrate the 
group's influence on Parliament's working (Forsyth, 1964, p.278).
Pridham and Pridham (1979b, p.248) elaborate two aims of the groups. While the 
ultimate aim is to influence Community legislation emanating from the Council 
and Commission, the main aim within the Parliament itself is to present a
I U
common political view on all matters arising in the committee and Parliament. 
Palmer (1981, p.68) adds a third, significant goal - to act as a projection of 
the philosophies and policies, both national and European, of the domestic 
political parties from which the groups are constituted. Palmer thereby 
acknowledges the influence of the national polity on the discussion of 
Community policy in the Parliament, while recognising the anomaly which has 
been evident since ECSC Treaty, namely that of the KEF in the role of Community 
representative and national delegate.
Steed (1976, p. 138) regarded the groups as a "minor success story" because they 
had helped accustom members to certain party linkages, and a handful of party 
politicians in the skills of cross-national political activity. He also 
attributed their success to the fact that they had pushed the "less 
supranationally Inclined parties into accepting the logic of European 
parliamentary groups”. However, I would suggest that the point of such "logic" 
is not necessarily to attain supranationality, given that groups are not 
necessarily formed for transnational Ideological cooperation. Rather, it is 
evident that many parties formed groups in the 1970s and 1980s in order to 
cooperate only on specific issues as well as to avail themselves of the 
considerable advantages of financial benefits, speaking time and committee 
membership.
The chairpersons of the group take part in the agenda setting meetings of the 
Parliament and directly influence the work of the committees, the delegations, 
and plenary sessions. Peter Kirk supported this assessment:
"One of the things I have discovered...is that this place is virtually run
by five men....the leaders of the five main political groups" (Pridhaa,
1979, p.5>.
In debates on EC legislation, it is notable that the European Parliaaent is 
characterised by a continental style of shifting majorities. The 
confrontational gladiatorial style of British or Irish politics is not a feature 
nor is a government/majority versus opposition position. The Socialists are 
participationist rather than confrontational and their attitude to their 
political role can at times appear ambivalent. The Socialists can be in a 
voting majority only as a combined Left (with some Communist and Rainbow MEPs) 
but never as the Socialist group alone. The building of majorities in the EP 
varies according to issue and the notion of a majority normally denotes an 
opposition, yet few parties in the EP are willing to define themselves as 
opposition.
While the centre-right has presented a fairly consistent voting coalition in the 
EP since 1979, the Socialists (although the largest group) have often found 
themselves in a position of opposition to the centre-right majority of the EP, 
while the CDs are at the centre of political gravity in the Assembly.
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5.2.2 The organisational network: method of analysis
In this analysis of the organisation and functions of each of the groups in the 
EP following direct elections, the groups are described according to the 
following indicators.
1. Transnational ity. This denotes membership, number of parties and 
nationalities, and conflict of cohesion and transnationality (liedermayer and 
Jouve).
2. Internal organisation. This refers to rules, structure and members. Each 
group possesses its own formal or informal rules concerning membership and 
allegiance. It also Involves the group's resources, traditions, customs and 
culture. The frequency of formal and informal meetings and the allocation of 
positions are also pertinent.
3. Cohesion. This refers to norms for conformity, discipline and means for 
attainment and maintenance of cohesion in the group, and of group agreement. 
There is a measure in most groups to deal with disagreement with group policies 
and stands, which is a great deal less drastic than expulsion. This is the 
"conscience clause", whereby those members who are unable to support the group 
position due to national or other specific reasons may explain their position in 
advance of the vote in plenary, and this is usually accepted by the group. This 
use of the conscience clause must be declared at the group meeting in advance.
In the case of the EPP (European Peoples Party/Christian Democrats) the members
are also afforded an opportunity to state their reasons for non-conformity with 
the group position before the plenary (EPP Rules of Procedure). Bonvicini 
(1971) sees the variables affecting cohesion as the number of national parties; 
internal discipline; informal contacts between nationalities in the group; and 
the political program with regard to the EC.
A free vote is allowed for all members in the Socialist, Christian Democrat and 
European Progressive Democrat groups on Issues which would show up a great 
deal of division in the political group. For the Liberals, the free vote is in 
practice the norm, and this is seen to be in keeping with the spirit of 
liberalism and free expression of political views (2). The Communists do not 
have a unified group voting position in general, although the major individual 
parties, Italian and French, are well-whipped internally as delegations.
The European Democrats maintain a tight discipline and a strongly cohesive 
approach to voting in plenary and in committee. Indeed they ¿sure said to 
possess lists of attendance of all members at all plenary sessions and 
meetings, and the attendance of substitutes is well coordinated so that full 
European Democrat attendance is ensured at all committees at the time of 
voting. As, until 1986, the vast majority of the group's members were British 
and came from the same party, cohesion was easy to maintain.
By contrast, free voting had been the norm in the Technical Coordination group 
(group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independents). This group
no
had little agreement on any policy subject and consisted of such disparate 
elements as the federalist Italian Radicals and the Danish anti-marketeers.
4. (a) Policy conflict and cleavages.
(b) Representation of interests In the group. This refers to 
representativeness, relationships with the electorate and conflict of loyalties 
of the representative.
5. Group leadership and conformity. This concerns the role of leaders, 
Secretary General, and relations with group members as well as attendance at 
group and plenary meetings. A recurrent problem in the EP has been the 
irregular attendance of XEPs at plenary sessions, group sessions and committee 
meetings. This affects some groups more than others and is dependent on 
leadership styles and relationships with the domestic party. The EP Itself has 
made an attempt to forestall non-attendance by Issuing, on behalf of the 
Quaestors, a statement that attendance of XEPs at less than 50% of the plenary 
and other sessions would result in the sanction of payment of only half of the 
members' secretarial allowance. This was to be calculated on a six-monthly 
basis (3>.
The groups have at their disposal the means to admonish members who fail to 
vote according to the group line in committee or plenary sessions of the 
Parliament. Sanctions in these cases include the withdrawal of rapporteurshlp 
(draftmanship) in committee or of shadow rapporteurshlp (i.e., the close
n \
following of a report In committee by a member of a political group when the 
report has been assigned to a member of a different group). This can also 
apply to the group spokesmanshlps which can be withdrawn if the member 
responsible fails to appear at the appropriate meetings. S/he is simply 
replaced. Other sanctions include the non-allocation of new rapporteurships or 
spokesmanshlps, thereby alienating the member in his or her group or committee. 
In addition, oral questions to the Commission or Council tabled by a 
"recalcitrant” member fail to receive the support of the group, and other 
questions receive prominence from the group instead. This also applies to 
motions for a resolution. Group support for XEPs1 motions and questions 
ensures that more attention is paid to such proposals than to a motion or 
question individually tabled.
Vhile attendance and sanctions are relevant to the groups, it is political 
discipline which remains central for the political groups. Sanctions are 
applied not for "laziness" but rather to dissidents from the group line and 
hence for failure to turn up in order to vote in accordance with the group line. 
The fact of attendance is a necessary but not sufficient condition in order to 
be nominated as rapporteur for politically important reports.
6. The extraparliamentary links of the group.
(a) This refers to relations with national parties and parliaments, 
including autonomy from parent party.
Since the 1979 direct elections, there has been a marked absence of a liaison 
structure between the EP political groups and the national party, and the 
decline of the dual mandate has further undermined communications, as XEPs are 
now no longer automatically members of the national legislature. Time and 
travel constraints make regular contact by XEPs with the parent party difficult.
The party group could develop a life of its own where ties with national 
parties are weak and so become less dependent on the party at home, and so 
evolve into a "new" political structure, with the recognition of a European 
constituency and a different mandate from the national one, although this 
speculation also depends on the role (paramount, at present) of the national 
party in the selection of candidates for the elections.
Many parties have set up national committees on European affairs, particularly 
since the second direct elections. XEPs sit on these committees, which meet a 
few times per year, and this serves to alleviate the marginalisation of the 
single-mandate XEP in the national party. The political groups represent a 
geographical constituency which is decided at the national level, and there are 
few direct links between the groups on the one hand and the regional or local 
party organisations on the other.
In the member states, arrangements vary as to the participation by XEPs in the 
meetings of their national parliamentary party. In Belgium, XEPs may attend 
parliamentary party meetings by invitation and the main parties have Introduced 
an XEP onto their Bureau. In Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands,
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KEPs may participate in their parliamentary party meetings, and J^iis is also 
the norm in the U.K., where participation is by invitation. In France, there is 
no objection to such participation, and in Germany, XEPs regularly participate 
in Bundestag party meetings. In Italy, there is no provision for formal 
participation by XEPs, although the the CDs have Joint KP/XEP study sessions.
In all these cases, XEPs participate as party, as distinct from group, members. 
There is no network of the coordination of policy by groups with the parent 
parties, apart from occasional meetings of groups and parent parties in the 
transnational party federations. The importance of interparliamentary links 
through political parties was stressed by the British Labour delegation leader 
in 1979, when he stated that the XEP's political party should ensure that he 
attend meetings on the same platform with members of the House of Commons and 
of local authorities and that he is knit into the real political life of the 
country <4).
Informal contacts between the party members and Council members vary greatly 
according to member state. As the EP consists of parties whose national 
parliamentary leaders are ministers sitting in the Council or in opposition in 
the national parliament, the parties are not entirely divorced frca the EC 
decision making at the national level. There is also communication between 
ministers and their party colleagues in the European Parliament, cn a formal 
level at Question Time in the Plenary Session of the Parliament and in written 
parliamentary questions to the Council of Kinisters.
A network of group-parent party liaison is not always desirable as both 
national deputies and XEPs are under severe time constraints. It has been 
suggested that the coordination of the national group delegation with the parent 
party can lead to differences between the delegation and national party on EC 
Issues (5). Each unit, group and parent party has its own competence in 
different areas. This constitutes a system of concurrent competences of these 
units. This could act as a counterbalance to the influence of domestic political 
parties on the EP. In 1972, Coombes suggested, concerning British membership 
of the EP: "British delegations of all parties can be expected to retain close 
ties with national parties and to act in accordance with national party 
decisions" (1972, p.141). The direct elections have altered such relationships 
and reinforced the system of concurrent competences.
Satlonal parliament
Several member states have in recent years established committees of national 
deputies and XEPs on European affairs. Vhile Belgium has a European affairs 
committee of 10 national deputies and 10 XEPs, Denmark has no specific EC 
committee, although its Xarket Committee's attention is directed almost 
exclusively to the scrutiny of European Community legislation and policy-making. 
Germany established a Europe Committee in the Bundestag in October 19Ô3, 
consisting of 10 Bundestag deputies and 11 XEPs. Vhile Franc« has no EC 
committee consisting of both national and European representatives, both the 
Assembly and the Senate each have internal committees entitled " delegations 
pour les Communautés Européenes" which consist of national parliamentarians.
|T5>
Although these committees meet XEPs on occasion, such links remain informal.
The Netherlands has a special committe which consists of KEPs and the lower 
house has an External Relations committee which meets two to three times per 
year. Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK have no such committee. Ireland has 
a Joint Committee on Secondary Legislation of the European Community, 
consisting of members of the lower and upper Houses, and XEPs are often invited 
to attend.
There are few links between the EP's groups and the national parliaments. The 
EP is at present attempting to increase cooperation with the national 
parliaments. Kembers of EP committees have met national parliamentary 
committees and between 1981 and 1984, 24 meetings were held between committees 
of the EP, or its delegations, with committees of national parliaments (EP,
1984c, p.47).
The EP in 1985 in a resolution (Doc. A 2-16/85), of 17/4/1985 on European 
Union, has pointed out that in such a matter, "the widest possible contact 
between national parliaments and itself is necessary" and the EP's Committee 
on Institutional Affairs has taken steps to increase contacts with national 
parliaments on European Union. In early 1985, for example, delegations from the 
Institutional Committee visited all the capitals of the member states with the 
object of explaining the EP's draft Treaty on European Union to the national 
governments and parliaments, and of seeking their opinions and reactions.
l i t .
6. (b) Relations with Interest groups nr unions
6. (c) Extraparliamentary transnational cQQpiratlQn In ladflratlopg
Although in most groups there is no institutionalised network for the 
coordination of groups with the national (parent) parties on an individual 
level, the party federations of the Socialists, Christian Democrats and Liberals 
provide some limited opportunities for an exchange of views on a European level 
at annual conferences and occasional study days.
6. (d) Informal power structures in the EP. which cut across the group system. 
These include such Intragroup structures as the Crocodile Club and the 
Federalist Intergroup.
7. Effectiveness of the groups in solving problem« and reaching decisions?
This refers to the influence of the group in the EP.
m
SL3__The European Parliament aa an organisation for the advancement of groups:
the structure of political opportunities
The party groups operate within a structure of limited political opportunities, 
limited scope for the attainment of political power and influence, and in the 
knowledge that their policy positions, decisions and bargaining may well result 
in little attention from the Commission and Council, and, possibly, a cursory 
reference to their actions in the national media. The party groups attempt to 
combat alienation on the level of organisation, internal cohesion, leadership 
and the utilisation of the opportunities for the wielding of power in a concrete 
sense, such as it exists, in the use of the political opportunities afforded by 
the institutional structure of the EP and its Rules of Procedure.
Ve also study the XEP in the party group and the EP, given this context of 
frustration with the limited role of the EP, as we are aware of the parameters 
set by the EC institutional structure for the representation of constituencies, 
however these constituencies may be perceived by the representatives.
The groups are examined within the dynamics of an evolving Community, where 
they are attempting to find a role as political entitles. These are loose 
political units in terms of cohesion, organisational structure and voting in the 
plenary. The groups are the instruments of political debate in the Parliament. 
Their function is that of a "screener" of the political process, rather than a 
major actor in terms of political results in the development of the Community. 
They perform a "filter function" In political decision-making at one remove from
m
the basis of national or regional power, and at one remove from the centre of 
Community decisions. The groups also attempt to represent their constituencies.
The functions of the groups are analogous throughout aost of the groups and are 
generally governed by normal conformity, i.e. majority decision. Ho national 
delegation (unless it constitutes the majority of members) can block a majority 
decision (Laprat, 1985, p.82). The Communist group is an exception to this 
rule.
The groups perform useful functions of communication of policy and ideology to 
and from the national and the Community arena of politics. This aspect of the 
filter function is fundamental to the maintenance of group organisational 
structure. The groups provide a forum for deputies of different nationalities 
of similar political or ideological persuasion.
This serves to combat the sense of alienation to a large extent, as it provides 
a sense of belonging to a political entity. This is illustrated in the replies
to question 3 of the EUI HEP Survey (see Table 5.5), where over 70% of the 331
respondents from all political groups favour cooperation in a political group or
even closer links in a European party.
m
Table 5.5 European Party Cooperation
Question Ho. 13 - EUI Survey:
Some people believe that the cooperation between political parties of the 
European Community countries should be intensified. Vhich of the 
following alternatives seems closest to your own views?
(a) The various parties should be independent within the European Parliament
(b) Closely related parties should have a common Parliamentary group within the 
European Parliament
<c> Closely related parties should have a common group within the European
Parliament and organise their collaboration outside the EP
(d) Closely related parties should form consolidated European parties
__________________________________gespoadeats____ Relative frequency (X)
(b) Close in EP 53 16
(c) Close in/outside EP 146 44.1
(d) European parties 79 23.9
Ce) Refused 21 6.3
Cf) I.A. don't know ..... .. 12.... 3.6
Valid cases 298 
Missing cases 33 
Total 331.
ISO
In Table 5.6, a cross-tabulation of the cooperation variable by party group, 94% 
of the Socialists favoured party cooperation and 74% favoured cooperation with 
collaboration outside the EP or in consolidated parties. This trend is also 
evident in the EPP which has a 75% membership in favour of cooperation within 
and outside the EP or as European parties. The EDs favour this to a lesser 
degree (55%), while the Communists had 49% in favour of such intensive 
cooperation. 63% of the Liberals favoured close cooperation in contrast to the 
EPDs which had a high percentage (37.5%) in favour of the status quo.
Ve examine the groups' attempts to carve out a niche for themselves in the EP 
and in the EC, and stave off potential alienation as groups. The potentially 
dynamic role of the EP's party groups is explored within the parameters of a 
parliament with limited, albeit developing, powers and spheres of influence. The 
groups are acting in concert against alienation. They constitute a new form of 
representation in a supranational setting and act as agents of integration in 
their relations with the EC and in their development of policies, irrespective 
of the positions of member states with regard to that Community.
Chapter Six and Seven explore the organisation, distinguishing features and 
functions and changes over time of the groups of the Left, Centre and Sight in 
the European Parliament. Ve do not attempt to describe the groups on a left- 
right scale. The EUI Survey revealed how the groups identify themselves in 
left-right terms according to self-perceptions (see Table 5.7). The political 
environment of alienation from national politics and the EC provides the
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Table 5.7 Self-placement: Left-Right scale by party group
EUI Question S.l.
In a number of studies, people have been asked to place themselves on a left- 
right scale indicating their overall pollitical position. For purposes of 
comparison, would you mind telling me where you would place yourself on this 
scale.
■ ' Soc EPP ET> -- .... •tir
1 Left 4 - - 14 - - 1 1 -
2 21 1 - 6 - - - 1 -
3 30 3 - 8 - - 1 - -
4 15 7 - 2 5 1 3 2 3
5 6 18 - - 6 5 - - 1
6 1 29 3 1 6 4 - - -
7 - 10 15 - 3 1 - - -
8 - 8 9 - 2 - - 2 2
9 - - 3 - - 1 - - -
10 Right - - 2 - - - - 2 -
In the middle - - 2 - - - - - -
Does not apply 17 10 10 1 3 4 - 1 1
DK, NA, not asctd 2 2 5 - 3 - - - 1
Total 96 88 49 32 28 16 5 9 8
20 
29 
42 
38 
36 
44 
29 
23 
4 
4 
2 
47 
13
 5=331
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backdrop to this analysis and to the attempts by the groups to develop a 
working system within the confines of limited powers.
For the purposes of clarity, it is useful to provide a brief summary of the 
roles of the major actors in the EP. The EP's Rules of Procedure state that 
members of the EP possess an "independent Community mandate" carrying on the 
tradition of the Treaty of Rome as representatives of the people (6). Members 
are directly elected, and shall vote on an individual and personal basis, and 
are not bound by any Instructions and shall not receive a binding mandate (Rule
2, subsections 1 and 2, my emphasis).
Speaking time in plenary and part-sessions is allocated, largely according to 
the size of the group, by the President, after consultation with the presidents 
of the groups (Rule 65). dominations for committee membership are made in the 
EP's Bureau. The Bureau's proposals are designed to ensure "fair representation 
of member states and of political views" (Rule 92,1). The political groups 
appoint permanent substitutes for all committees (Rule 93,1).
Members join parliamentary committees according to their specialisation or 
interest in promoting a specific direction in the development of Community 
policies. A member remains on the committee for a period of two and a half 
years, half the legislature's life. Decisions in committees are taken by 
majority vote. Members are usually full members of one committee and alternate, 
or substitute, members of one or two other committees. In addition, members
lit
may attend committees on behalf of absent colleagues, resulting in full 
attendance in cases of vital relevance to the group.
Voting is organised under the rules of procedure, and voting is normally by 
show of hands, counted by the committee secretariat. In the case of a tie, the 
President or chairperson of the committee, who has already exercised the right 
to vote, does not have a casting vote, and the amendment or proposal is deemed 
defeated.
Each political group possesses its own decision-making body, the Bureau, which 
is responsible for implementation of group policy and controls the group's 
resources. The group coordinator acts as the equivalent to a "whip", and is 
assigned to the group members of each committee. The coordinator places 
pressure on members to have amendments and proposals submitted within the time 
limits set down by the committee rules. The group coordinator chairs the 
meeting of the group when the voting position of the group is being debated. 
Vhile the principal role of the coordinator is that of management of group 
personnel and administration in the committee, it also incorporates leadership 
qualities and a crucial political function. The group coordinators meet 
regularly in order to allocate reports in accordance with a points system, 
whereby each report is valued at a certain number of points and each group in 
committee is allocated a number of paints.
The rapporteur (draftsperson and spokesperson on a specific report under debate 
in committee) is the voting leader for the group members in the committee.
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This does not imply, however, that the Rapporteur maintains a strict party or 
group view as s/he must produce a report which is based on the majority opinion 
of the members of the parliamentary committee, and so must adapt to the climate 
of opinion within the committee. The rapporteur may include several amendments 
in the report to be submitted to plenary from the other committee members of 
entirely different political allegiances or from those who possess varying 
conceptions of the representation of Interests, constituencies or party 
positions. The rapporteur acts as voting leader for the entire committeee, 
given that, as each amendment is voted upon, the rapporteur is first called upon 
to state whether s/he is in favour or not and normally gives reasons for the 
position adapted.
Vithin the EP's structure of political opportunities, the president of the group 
acts to a large extent as the intermediary between the Presidency of the EP and 
the NEPs of the group (Laprat, 1985, p.89). The Secretary-General acts as an 
intermediary between the EP's administration and the XEPs of the group, 
although the role and range of functions of the Secretary General vary 
according to the group.
The group controls the presentation in plenary of urgency motions. It is the 
group which determines the input of XEPs on compromise texts on the basis of 
several motions. The Rules of Procedure discriminate in favour of motions put 
forward by large groupings. Control of the decisions regarding committee 
membership, allocation of rapporteurship6 and places on interparliamentary
delegations is also in the hands of the groups. The group possesses the 
financial means and personnel which weigh in favour of membership.
Finally, no single group controls the voting majority in the plenary, although 
the political forces are aligned on the centre right and this has prevailed 
since the EP was directly elected. The second direct election had resulted in 
the alteration of the configuration of political forces with the election of 
fifty members representing extremist or reglonalist groupings.
The groups overall do not constitute a polarisation of left and right in the 
assembly and the left and right do not act as voting blocs in emergency 
motions. There are no composite motions of the left and centre-right. There is 
some cooperation in debates on committee reports, for example with a centre- 
right majority. The lack of regular voting coalitions has been criticised as a 
serious failing of the groups in the only task they could successfully carry out 
within the EP. The groups nevertheless possess distinctive structures of 
organisation and patterns of decision making which are analysed in the next two 
chapters.
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Chapter Six
The Party Groups of the Left in the European Parliament

Parliament
Europe can only be stabilised on the basis of something approaching a 
common policy by the left. Social democracy and democratic socialism can 
only be achieved today as European concepts (Glotz, 1985, p. 30).
The left-wing political trends of the member states are represented in three 
political groupings in the second directly elected EP, Socialists, Communists 
and Rainbow. Since direct elections, new political groupings were formed, the 
Group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independents and the 
Rainbow (Arc en Clel) group. The latter brought together KEPs representing 
ecological, regionalist and anti-Community groups in 1984.
The European Right (the French Fational Front, the Italian Social Movement and 
the Greek National Political Union) formed a new group in the 1984 Parliament, 
and thus the extreme tendencies of both ends of the political spectrum are 
represented in groups in the EP. The directly elected EP also saw a more 
clearly defined allocation of titles to the groups in an attempt to define and 
reflect the component elements within their ranks and to reach compromise 
among the many member parties.
SJ,— The political forces of the left In the directly elected Surapaan
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Table 6.1 Composition of political groups in the European Parlia-rant. 1984
uroup
Socialists
March 1*04 
124
. jsiy lag*
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European People's Party . . 117 110
European Democrats (1) 63 50
Communists and Allies 48 41
Liberal and Democratic 38 31
European Democratic Alliance , 22 ....... . 29.___
«¡formerly European
Progressive Democrats) (2)
Technical Coordination (3)______________ 12.
Rainbow (4 ) 20
European Right (5) 16 .
Son-attached 10 7
434 .. 434
(1) British and Danish Conservatives
(2) Fianna Fail (Irl) and the Onion of the Republic <.Fr)
(3) Danish People's Movement against membership of the Community, Italian 
Radical Party and Italian Social Movement
(4) Federation of the Green-Alternative European Link, Agalev-Ecclo, the Danish 
People's Movement and the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament
(5) national Front (Fr), Italian Social Movement, Hational Political Union 5PU 
(GR).
I 4 \
Sov 1. 1^88.
B DK D ESPt F Hi IRL I L ÏL PORT» UK TOTAL
soc Ô 3 33 20 10 12 2 9 7 33 165
EDP 6 1 41 l 7 B 6 27 3 a 4 112
ED. 4 17 45 66
COM 2 3 10 4 26 3 48
LIB 5 2 2 14 1 6 1 5 10 46
ERD 20 1 8 1 30
ARC 4 4 7 1 2 2
ER 9 l 5 1 16
MA 1 a 1 3 1 1 15
TOTAL 24 16 .. 31 SO &1 24 15 SI S 25 24. SI 518
Source: Les Echos du Parlement Européen, no. 34. 3 ffov. IMS..
* Joined EC on 1 January 1986. Members appointed by government pending 
organisation of direct elections. Direct elections in Spain (one constituency) 
held on 10 June 1987.
Maier (1982, p.231> suggests that international cooperation of socialist and 
social democrat parties has developed at a slow pace due to four factors, which 
are in fact equally applicable to other parties in the EP. These factors are, 
firstly, that closer cooperation at a supranational level involves a loss of 
power of the existing party elites; secondly, larger socialist parties hav« to
accept considerable limitations on their freedom of action, and, thirdly, that 
basic differences between the Individual parties have not been overcome.
Finally, considerable regional differences in political attitudes and activities 
exist, with a broad spectrum of programmes and aims, thereby rendering it 
impossible "to establish a clear political line by means of majority decisions 
in the common European party body of Socialists".
Despite these difficulties, common objectives of "European Socialists" are in 
evidence, such as aims of social equality, support for development programmes, 
the objective of full employment, the elimination of regional disparities, equal 
opportunity in education, environmental policies, and "the démocratisation of the 
European economy and the development of uniform and socially balanced policies" 
(Kaier, 1982, p. 231-232).
The political forces of the left in Europe are in a position of having well- 
developed policies, with certain ideologies and belief systems held in common 
and with some individualistic and nationally-based traits. These latter render 
co-operation in the EP feasible although not to be taken for granted in all 
cases.
6.2 The Socialist Group
"European socialists in their transnational interactions are, in respect of 
issues, highly coherent; in respect of behaviour, largely undistinguished;
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in the machinery with which they equip themselves, still uncommitted"
(May, 1975).
Since the British Labour members took their seats in 1975, the Socialist group 
has been the largest group in the European Parliament. It now >>»« 165 members 
in the 518-member assembly and has never attained a majority of members in the 
Parliament. The group has been referred to as a "mammoth with feet of clay" 
because of its difficulty in achieving united action on the part of all its 
members (1). In order to ensure that its policies are passed in the plenary, it 
engages in a voting coalition with the other left-wing parties or groups, or 
with centre groups like the Christian Democrats and this latter trend has 
increased in the latter years of the second legislature. The Socialists, 
although the largest grouping, are obliged, as in the past, to rely on 
cooperation of like-minded XEPs of other parties in order to ensure the safe 
passage of their proposals, often with substantial modifications as a result of 
this trade-off of concessions. This issue of forming coalitions has itself been 
a cause of dispute in the group, as to whether it should pursue an independent 
line or act with the Christian Democrats. The German, Italian and Belgian 
members would experience little difficulty in working with the EPP, for example, 
due to their coalition experience at national or regional levels of conflict- 
resolutlon. The group is "participationist" rather than clearly opposed to the 
centre-right majority and seeks committee chairmanship and active involvement 
in committees and policy decisions.
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The group possesses a sizeable membership from all member states of the 
Community, apart from the Irish Labour Party, which did not succeed in winning 
any seats in the 1984 direct elections. Vith the arrival of the Spanish and 
Portuguese members, observers had predicted a shift of the political balance in 
the Parliament to the left, and indeed the left gained 45 KEPs, but the 
predominant voting majority of right and centre-right was maintained (2).
Some observers had regarded the Influx of the Iberians as placing the left-wing 
parties in a closer position to a majority in the Chamber, and some pointed out 
that "the new complexion of the Strasbourg chamber still leaves the left some 
20 votes short of an outright majority" (3). This assessment, however, omits to 
mention that the party groups of the left do not co-operate as a matter of 
course, as Socialists and Communists experience difficulties in presenting a 
united front together in the assembly, although political orientations do accord 
on many ideological matters. It is pointed out that the ability of the 
Parliament's left to "challenge the centre-right will depend on greater voting 
discipline within the socialist group. Discipline has often been lax in the 
past, with left-wing deputies not bothering to vote (4) ".
The Iberians' arrival contributed to a more equitable distribution of political 
orientations between left and right in the European Parliament, which reflects 
the political configuration of the member states of the Community. Given the 
new equilibrium within the Parliament, effective organisation and party 
discipline are now essential, and this may well be accompanied by the 
strengthening of the groups as the organisers of the European Parliament. The
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arrival of the Iberians thus obliged the Socialists to re-examine the workings 
of their largely unwieldy group, and the Spanish KEPs in particular reform of 
the internal organisation of the group. They urged stronger discipline, greater 
policy coordination and a move towards greater cohesion in the group.
The name and symbols of the Socialistgroup are easily recognisable throughout 
the Community, and the group has long been associated with the Socialist 
International and the Confederation of Socialist Parties since 1974 (5>. The 
socialists, like the communists, possess a common vocabulary, and it is in the 
nature of socialism to be opposed to nationalism and to be active in the 
promotion of transnational party cooperation. The tradition of international 
and transnational cooperation among the member parties had its Community 
origins when the EC was founded, as illustrated by the Vredeling initiative far 
a European Socialist Party (Vredeling, 1971).
Transnational!^
The group, founded on 23 June 1953 with 23 members, consists in late 1988 of 
165 members and 12 political parties, and 11 nationalities (see Tables 6.3 and 
6.4). Membership is open to parties affiliated to the Confederation of the 
Socialist Parties of the European Community, at their request, and applications 
of other parties are examined by the group Bureau and then submitted to the 
group for decision (6). Such parties could join as allies, and one such example 
is the French Radicaux de la Gauche.
Table 6.3 1984 Election Results: The Socialist Group's membership bv
nationality and party
Denmark (S) 4
France (MSG/PS) 20
Greece (PASOK) 10
Italy (PS/PSD I/PS I) 12
Luxembourg (POSL) 2
Netherlands (Pvd A) 9
Germany (SPD) 33
United Kingdom (Lab. SLDP) 33
total _ ___ ___ 12 Q
U 7
Table 6.4 Membership Of the Socialist Group After Enlargement. IQflfi
Belgium
Denmark
.. 7
4
France 20
Greece 10
Italy 12
Luxembourg 2
Netherlands 9
Germanv 33
United Kingdom 33
Spain 36
Portugal 6
Total-- 172
Organisation nf the group
The Socialist group possesses a set of Rules of Procedure, electoral procedure, 
and standing orders (7). The Bureau consists of not less than 12 members,
"each member state being represented by at least one member" (rule 10). The 
Bureau is charged with the co-ordination of the activities of the group's 
organs, decisions regarding the group's secretariat's working methods, and the 
maintenance of contact with the Confederation, the organs of the Socialist 
International and the Socialist members of the EC's Council and Commission. In 
addition, it is responsible for the drawing up and implementation of the group's
annual budget. It deals with all matters referred to it by the group, and 
appoints group representatives for conferences "where such appointments are not 
made by the Chairman (rule 11)".
Table 6.5 Membership of the Socialist Group by nationality - 1 gov 1988
Denmark 3
France 20
Greece 10
Italv 12
Luxembourg 2
Netherlands 9
Germany 33
United Kingdom . 33
Spain . . . 28
Portugal 7
TOTAL ..... . 165
The Socialist group meets formally at least once a month during the week 
preceding the plenary session of the Parliament. It is during these meetings 
that group positions are elaborated, and voting intentions are prepared for 
debate and voting in the plenary. Spokesmanships on behalf of the group are
allocated to members and the speaking time is divided among the members. The 
group has study groups on issues which it considers of particular relevance.
Such working parties are set up by the group at the group Bureau's suggestion 
and are responsible for preparing the group's opinions (rule 12). These study 
groups meet regularly and also organise group study days on social issues such 
as unemployment, the environment and industrial policy, which are its Id in the 
various member countries of the Community.
The group possesses a political staff of some 70 officials, headed by the 
Secretary General and several deputy Secretaries General, who are responsible 
for the day-to-day running of the Group, the administration and co-ordination 
of policies of the group, and the preparation of common group policy documents. 
The secretariat's tasks include:
"(a> assisting members of the group in the performance of duties arising 
from active participation in the work of the European Parliament or its 
committees;
(b) drawing the group's attention to problems affecting the European 
Communities and preparing studies thereon." (8)
Although policy coordination is in theory the responsibility of the Union of 
Socialist parties of the European Community, which is the Socialist 
confederation, this is the work of the Secretariat o£ the Socialist group, which
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has a large staff, as distinct from the Union, with its staff of six. As a 
large multinational group, its problems of coordination are practical ones of 
size and language, as well as ideological ones.
\
Another feature which is not as evident in smaller groups of fewer 
nationalities or in most national party systems is the fact that nuances are 
lost in the language of politics in unilingual discussions or in translation.
And so the leaders of all groups are obliged to have a deep understanding of 
the national political systems of their members and of the constraints placed 
on these members by such systems and backgrounds.
Cohesion of the Socialist Group
The Socialist group has often been criticised for being disorganised and one 
official has suggested that it is too disorganised to align Itself with the PCI 
and less extreme elements of the Rainbow group in order to form a voting 
coalition in the plenary. In addition, Socialists have been criticised for their 
absenteeism problems and for the dificulties arising from their disparate 
membership. The group's dynamics are greatly influenced by national rivalries. 
In the past, the Germans and British have competed for group positions and the 
President has been obliged to make concessions when Labour threatened to leave 
the group.
For almost a decade, the public informed perception of the Socialist group has 
been as an inefficient grouping of relatively autonomous factions or tendances,
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which was divided on most issues under debate in the plenary sessions of the 
EP. However, in the group's report of activities in 1980 (9), it was reported 
that the group had reached agreement of 80% of the policies discussed by the 
group and voted upon in plenary. This agreement is arrived at by a system of 
majority voting, and agreement by unanimity is not a feature of the group's 
working methods. The system of majority voting is considered by the group as 
being as democratic as the decision-making in the national parties and 
parliaments (10).
In the group's Rules of Procedure, the use of the conscience clause is accorded 
importance, and has in the past been utilised mostly by the British members, 
and its format and working are comparable to the clause used by the British 
Labour party. The members, having explained to the group why they are not in a 
position to vote with the group, then abstain from voting in plenary, but they 
are obliged to explain their actions in the group meeting, as an explanation of 
their dissent from the group.
In the event that the member is unable to present an explanation, in advance, of 
the reason for dissent from the group line, the member may be subject to 
sanctions. Such sanctions may include the withdrawal of speaking time, on 
behalf of the group, for three months, for example, as spokesperson or as group 
member. This primary right of the HEP to speak as group member is taken away, 
and thus is an indication of group influence over its members, although the HEP 
is still able to avail of the individual right to speak in the 90 seconds of the 
explanation of vote in the chamber.
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Majority voting in the group is the norm (Rule 7) and the Rules of Procedure 
elaborate the conscience clause as follows:
"A member of the group, who, before the vote is taken, brings forward 
weighty political decisions which may cause him to dissent from a 
particular majority decision shall not be bound by that decision."
There has been fractionalised voting in well over half of the cases which come 
before the plenary (11). In such cases, the conscience clause is utilised, with 
reference to the primacy of the local, regional or national interests which the 
XEP may represent. The group aims at the achievement of a balance of 
loyalties, at the group and national levels, and constituency interests are 
overtly recognised within the group. The group states that it emphasises the 
need to respect those interests which the KEP may represent (12).
Unanimity is an exception at meetings. If a member votes against the group in 
committee, this is not taken as seriously as in the plenary, as it is considered 
that the XEP may later choose to alter his/her position and vote with the group 
in the plenary session. There have also been situations whereby the group in 
plenary may choose to vote against the position adopted by the Socialists in 
committee, should the group decide, at the group meeting in the week preceding 
the plenary, to adopt an alternative proposal based on a compromise solution.
1 O S
Maintenance of cohesion In the Snrlallst gT-n,.p
The Socialist group Is often described as a "laborious" one, torn by conflicts 
of personalities within its ranks. The split on the issue of membership of the 
EC has highlighted differing attitudes to European Integration. One participant 
has referred to the attitude of anti-EC members of the British Labour Party as 
"parliamentary terrorism". (13)
The group coordinator may, in the maintenance of group cohesion in the 
committee, recommend the appointment or non-appointment of a member on the 
basis of that member's record as a contributing deputy within the group and 
committee structure. If a member is absent on a regular basis, s/he is not 
nominated to group offices, spokespersonships, presidency of committees or to 
study groups. Such members constitute a small number and are considered to be 
Socialists in name only. Absenteeism continues to be a cause for concern among 
the group leadership.
Graup agreement
The group has a history of majority agreement on agricultural prices, and the 
use of the conscience clause for "dissenters" is the norm on the issue of 
agriculture. There is, according to a group official interviewed before the
1984 elections, unanimous agreement on issues such as social policy, transport, 
energy, human rights, cultural policy, development cooperation, and the rights of 
minorities and minority languages. These latter policies do not however 
constitute the kind of "money" politics which best illustrate the conflict 
within the group, concerning the allocation of the Community's resources. Here
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the conflicts of national, constituency and group representation, as well as 
special interests, are most apparent.
The group first developed a Common European Programme in 1962, and it has 
consistently attempted to promote the démocratisation of the EC and an increase 
in the EC's powers. It has been critical of the CAP and in favour of increased
social and regional policy and funds, and social cohesion.
The issue of the EC budget in December 1979 was an example of cohesive and
effective organisation of the Socialist group by the rapporteur on the budget,
Xr. Piet Dankert (Netherlands), who persuaded almost all the Socialist members 
to vote to defeat the 1980 budget in December 1979. Effective whipping 
resulted In concerted action by the group except for the Irish and five of the 
French members and this led to the first ever rejection by Parliament of the 
budget for the European Community. This is not however typical of the Socialist 
group.
The group holds conferences on issues of policy most relevant to its 
programmes. One such example is the European conferences on steel policy which 
took place in Sarrebruck in December 1983 and in Luxembourg In Xay 1985, 
attended by politicians, workers, representatives and experts from the EC 
member states as well as MEPs (14). It is clear that the representation of 
issues depends on contact with the relevant actors outside the EP.
The Socialist group initiated a new stage in the interpretation of its political 
role when its delegation visited Moscow in December 1985. It was the first 
delegation from the EP received by the USSR. After the visit, Mr. Arndt (the 
group president) suggested that the visit be followed by similar visits of 
other political groups and later the creation of formal ties between the EP and 
the Supreme Soviet.
Further politicisation of the EP and its groups was in evidence in September 
1988 when the Socialist group invited Hr. Yasser Arafat of the PLO to the 
Parliament (15). This led to an Intense reaction on the part of several party 
groups and divisions in the Socialist group itself, especially among the French 
who were at the time Involved in cantonal elections at home and who came under 
considerable criticism from Jewish groups and from those who considered the 
timing as well as the principle to be wrong (Le Konde, 11-12 Sep. 1988). The 
PSF sought to underline the fact that the Arafat visit was not an official one 
and emphasised its relations with Israel and the need for a Just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East.
The Liberals, Christian Democrats and British Conservatives also expressed 
their opposition to the visit, while the Communists, the Rainbow group and most 
Socialists were in favour. Lord Plumb, the President of the EP, chose to 
receive Hr. Arafat although he was not obliged to do so, as did the 
representative of the Greek Council Presidency, Mr. Papoulios, while Hr. Dumas, 
the French Foreign minister, travelled to Strasbourg to meet Hr. Arafat. The 
political and distinctly polemical role of the EP in this matter was illustrated
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by the protests of European Jewish movements and some opponents to what was 
regarded as Palestinian terrorism. The Socialist group president's reaction to 
this was that a century's struggle for peace, liberty and democracy has taught 
them that such meetings are necessary (Le Monde, 11-12 Sep. 1988).
Policy conflict and cleavages
The group consists of a heterogeneous gathering of ideological trends, with a 
membership which spans almost the entire Community in geographical terms and 
which reflects the contemporary problems of European socialism, rather as the 
Communist group reflects the issues facing contemporary communism in Europe. 
Three tendances may be identified within the Socialist group, although the 
dividing lines may on occasion be obfuscated by national considerations or 
cross-cutting cleavages. The first tendance consists of those who are in 
favour of European integration and the active promotion of European union, and 
encompasses the German SPD, the Dutch, the Belgians and some Italian PSI 
members. This tendance wishes the Socialist group to pursue a more active role 
in the EP and thus to avoid alienation from EC decision-making Institutions and 
the consistently minority position in the EP arising from the cleavage over 
European Integration. These members are also the most flexible with regard to 
voting coalitions with the Christian Democrats.
The second tendance consists of those who are pragmatically in favour of 
European integration (some British members, PSF, some PSI, some Greek PASOK, 
some Danes) and the third is composed of deputies who actively oppose the 
European Community (some British, some PASOK, some Danes). The major
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difficulties with the issue of the role of the BC institutions include the 
nature of the EP, the issue of the Common Agricultural Policy and economic 
policies.
In addition, the Socialist group is often isolated with regard to the other 
groups on ideological grounds, given the more conservative or centrist 
orientations of the Parliament. The group had expected a majority position in 
the first directly-elected Parliament, and hence a different alignment of 
political forces in the EP from the existing one.
Given that the group does not usually cooperate in voting with the Communists, 
it is unable to push most of its policies through in Parliament without the 
agreement of the EPP. The group consists of Social Democrat, Socialist/Xarxist, 
Labour and other elements, and its voting record is not markedly cohesive.
There had even been speculation that after the second direct elections In 1984 
the group would split into two smaller groups, one broadly socialist and the 
other social democrat (16).
Lack of Ideological coherence is the group's principal weakness. There is a 
consistent left-right tension within the group and within some party 
delegations, such as the British Labour Party and the SPD. The PSF has in the 
past been divided along rocardien and pro-communist lines, and has adopted a 
consistently nationalistic line in the group, particularly on the issue of the 
CAP, and is less likely to favour voting coalitions outside the group. The
2 o S
Italians are represented by two socialist parties, the PSI and the PSDI, and the 
Danes also have several socialist parties.
The policies of the socialist parties and of the group concerning the Buropean 
Community and the development of support for European Integration are described 
by Featherstone who suggests:
"Perhaps the most notable long-term trend discernible....... is of the
gradual increase in support among socialist parties for the principle of 
supra-national integration within the European community1 (1983, p.3>.
Most socialist parties have now adopted the practice of calling for a "Europe of 
the Workers", with employment policies, job retraining programmes and better 
working conditions as well as institutional reform and the redressing of 
regional and social imbalances which this entails. This commitment to Europe 
is not based on supranatlonallst tendencies per se, however, as the attitudes 
adopted towards the EC, and membership thereof, are based in many cases on 
"nationalist" responses to the issue, and so to speak of a "European Socialism" 
in contemporary Europe is thus misleading (Featherstone, 1983, p.16).
Agreement on the principle of supranational integration within the EC had come 
to a stage in 1983 where only the Labour Party in Britain was committed to 
withdrawal from the EC (Featherstone, 1980, p. 243). Vhile the Belgian, 
Luxembourg and Dutch members have been in favour of European unity since the 
ECSC, other parties have evolved positions from total opposition to Europe 
tcwards ambiguity or support for the EC. Thus the French PS, which has been
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divided on the issue of a European Defence Community <EDC), has been in favour 
of the EC ever since, although the CERES tendency has been opposed to the 
Community as a hindrance to the development of socialism in France. The 
German SPD was cautious at first with regard to the ECSC and the EDC, but since 
1957 has become more pro-European. In Italy, the PSI were against the ECSC and 
EDC, and later pro-EC, while the Social Democrats were in favour of the ECSC 
and the EDC. The position of the Danish Socialists has evolved from opposition 
to the ECSC and the EDC to a more positive attitude since 1961. The Irish 
Labour Party has been opposed to EC membership until after the Irish referendum 
on membership In 1972, which resulted in Ireland's joining the EC in 1973.
The British Labour Party's opposition has not been total throughout its 
membership but its policy remains critical although British Labour XEPs are 
divided on the issue of the EC within the Socialist group in the EP. The Greek 
PASOK government had wanted renegotiation of the terms of Greek membership in 
1983, but since then, its position has evolved to acceptance of the Community 
and its benefits, while demanding reform of the EC's institutions. Both the 
Spanish and Portuguese Socialist Parties are in favour of European unity and 
have been active proponents of the EC since they Joined the Socialist group in 
1986 (Featherstone, 1986, p. 244). The Spanish and Portuguese members also 
tilted the balance of policy interests within the group in favour of 
Mediterranean policies.
British Labour decided to accept the "deathly embrace of Europe" on 6 October 
1988 when its annual conference adopted a resolution "formally recognising
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Britain's political and economic integration in the Buropean Community" (17) 
which most of the party accepted. Labour called for a "social Europe" 
characterised by high standards of working conditions and workers' rights. 
Increased expenditure in social and regional funds would serve to counteract the 
EC's "inevitable pull of wealth, production and jobs towards the centre". The 
Conference also called for radical reform of the CAP and environmental 
protection and reiterated its commitment (like the Conservatives) to ensure that 
control over national and European decision making rests with (Westminster) 
parliament. This approach is a reflection of British attitudes to the EC 
despite the pro-European sentiments of Kr. Kinnock's speech at that conference. 
Pragmatic reasons for the policy change were in evidence, such as fear of 
Insularity in economic terms, the need to compete in European markets 
effectively and the need to improve social conditions with an implicit 
assumption that this would entail a harmonisation upwards for the British work­
force.
Group leadership and conformity
In the period of the first term of the directly elected EP, leadership of the 
group was considered not so much a question of power as one of diplomacy, 
compromise and a mutual understanding of the positions being adopted by the 
various members. After the second direct elections, the group's chairman, Ernst 
Glinne, was replaced by Rudi Arndt, and this changeover from the style of 
"chairman" to "chief" resulted in division and opposition to the latter's style 
of leadership, which has been regarded as being quite peremptory and decisive
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at times. Hr. Glinne had been characterised as a patient, competent, but 
uncharismatic, group leader who was skilful in producing compromises (18).
Hr. Arndt commenced his presidency by stating that his group’s first priority 
would be to fight unemployment and to promote the establishment of a programme 
for youth employment. He also urged the full use of the EP's powers, including 
the censure of the European Commission should the latter fail in its task (19). 
In September 1984, he expressed the group's commitment to enlargement when he 
informed Parliament that his group would use all means possible including 
holding up the 1985 EC Budget to put pressure on the Council to guarantee the 
entry into the Community of Spain and Portugal.
The Secretary General is an elected official and has been described by Group 
officials as the equivalent to a parliamentary secretary (in national systems 
these are deputy- or under-ministers who assist their chiefs in their 
parliamentary duties) who works closely with the President of the group. His 
function is both an administrative and a political one, and he is the primary 
advisor to the HEPs and the head of the group administration, attempting to 
maintain a balance of views. The Secretary General is present at all meetings 
of the group's Bureau.
The extra-parliamentary links af the Socialist groan
The Socialist group, like others, has held meetings with individual Council 
members, particularly when their political persuasion is similar. One such
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meeting took place "en marge" of a Council meeting with the BP, in February 
1980 (Agence Europe, 20 Feb. 1985).
(a) Relations with national parliaments
Under the Socialist group's Rules of Procedure (Rule lie), the group's Bureau 
shall "establish and maintain contact with socialist groups in the parliaments 
of the member states”. The Socialist group has initiated meetings with 
delegates from national parliaments, for example on the issue of Turkey. It has 
also organised hearings with national parliamentarians and visits with 
socialist members of national parties. Such contacts are strengthened by the 
cooperation which takes place in the Socialist International and the meetings of 
the Confederation. This cooperation with national deputies, part of a tradition 
of close links with domestic socialist parties, serves to redress the 
marginalisation of the MEPs from national parliamentary life, which was an 
effect of the direct elections. One example of such cooperation with parties in 
national parliaments was in October 1985, when the Socialist group organised an 
International conference in association with the SPD group of the Bundestag and 
the Georg von Vollmar academy on the fight against unemployment in Europe (20).
The dual mandate is ruled out. by the Dutch, Italian, Luxembourg, French, Danish 
and Belgian socialist, parties. MEPs may participate at meetings of their 
socialist parliamentary party in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands and the UK (by invitation). In France, this is a matter for 
internal party decision.
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(b) The Confederation: the Union of Socialist Parties of tha Furnpain r.nmmunlty 
The Confederation consists of the Socialist, Social Democratic and Labour 
Parties of the member states of the EC and included parties from Spain and 
Portugal before their accession to the Community.
In theory, the Confederation is charged with the coordination of the policies of 
the member parties, although in practice this is not a realistic task, as the 
Confederation's staff is too small compared to that of the group. The 
Confederation is also responsible for the management of the elections, and is 
allocated some group funds in order to carry out this task.
The Socialist group's Rules of Procedure provide that the Bureau of the group 
maintain contact with the Confederation, although the nature or frequency of 
such contact are not specified. However, the Confederation fr«« few contacts 
with the group and meets informally, possessing little power and few functions. 
The group documents on policy reveal a more concrete form of policy agreement, 
the result of negotiation and socialisation on a regular basis, than do the 
Confederation's statements. There is some overlapping of personnel between the 
group and the Confederation. The group President is a member of the Union, and 
KEPs may attend the Congresses of the Union, which meet every two or three 
years. Such attendance is not obligatory for XEPs.
The 14th meeting of the Confederation took place in Madrid in April 1985, while 
the Socialist International met a week later in Brussels. Participants included 
the Chairman of the group, Mr. Rudi Arndt, and leaders of the Socialist parties
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of the member states and the president of the EC Commission, Mr. Delors, as 
well as some Commissioners (21). Mr. Delors stressed that the future of ths 
Community depended on the willingness of government to commit itself to a 
solution to the EC's institutional problems and he called for an extension of 
the powers of the European Parliament.
The presence of Mr. Delors at the "Socialist Federation" illustrates the sense of 
alliance felt by individual Commissioners with the parties to which they 
belonged. MEPs retain frequent contact with the Commissioners of sister 
parties on many issues. In December 1984, for example, the future President of 
the EC Commission, Mr. Jacques Delors, and two future Socialist Commisssionsrs, 
Mr. Ripe di Meane and Mr. Clinton Davis, attended a meeting of the Bureau at the 
Confederation of Socialist parties of the EC on 6 December 1984 (22).
This Conference of the Socialist Confederation set out five guidelines in the 
fight against unemployment. These guidelines are not binding as policy on the 
party members but they do serve to indicate the orientations of the Socialist 
parties in Europe. They Include the setting up of a large internal market and 
abolition of frontier controls by 1995, a restructuring of economic policies, 
the launching of public investment programmes for energy, communications, 
transport, urban renewal and environmental protection, and the adoption of new 
EC-level initiatives in the area of Industry, research and development and a 
redistribution of work with the goal of a 35-hour working week (23).
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In addition, a reinforced EXS, free trade, an end to worker discrimination, 
reform of the CAP and Increased powers for the SP, were among the 
recommendations adopted at the Congress. They did not however constitute 
decisions on policy. This Congress is useful to the analyst of policy cleavages 
among European socialist parties as it brings to light some of the differences 
of national positions of these parties. For example, the different stance 
adopted by the French Socialist Party with regard to the CAP became apparent 
when the French representative disagreed with the line adopted by colleagues in 
proposing an "adaptation” of the CAP which did not call its basic principles 
into question (24).
On the issue of the strengthening of the EC institutions, the British Labour - 
Party was the only party to abstain from voting is favour of such proposals, 
while the intergovernmental nature of the coordination of Socialist policies was 
upheld by Labour. This contrasts with most of the other parties, the most 
vocally pro-European of which was in favour of advancement to greater European 
integration (25).
The attitude adopted towards Star Vars (SDI) rejected dependence on the US and 
sought to create an independent European profile. This approach was 
enthusiastically proposed by the Dutch members in particular and it reflected 
differences between Socialists in power (like the Italians) and the more radical 
parties who condemned the SDI and entertained ideas of a Europe independent of 
the U.S.
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On a general level, the high aspirations on the part of many observers that the 
Confederation would form a proto-party on a European scale have remained 
unrealised. The Confederation finds itself in a state of crisis at present, as 
its main raison d'etre is the preparation of the five-yearly election campaign. 
This election campaign is fought out In the national polities, however, by 
national prospective KEPs, and here the involvement of the Confederation is 
minimal. It is in many ways a "periodic" federation, which meets on an 
irregular basis and is attended by different national representatives at each 
meeting, thereby undermining the continuity of its work over time.
The Socialist group, on the other hand, meets regularly, and the XEPs are 
obliged to be present. It is accustomed to reaching policy decisions on a 
regular basis and there is a continuity which is lacking in the Union. The 
group Itself constitutes the more effective machine of European politics and 
cooperation, in its ability to work towards creating documents or a policy line 
acceptable to a majority of its members.
Effectiveness.
Finally, we refer to the seventh indicator of group organisation, the 
effectiveness of the group in solving problems and reaching decisions.
Research indicates that the group has adopted a modus vivendi with regard to 
internal organisational structure, leadership and voting which undergoes review 
on occasion. It has adapted to the challenges of new membership while at the 
same time maintaining the ideal and tradition of transnational cooperation.
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6.3 The Group of Communists and Allies 
Transnational! tv
The group, founded on 16 October 1973 with 14 members, consists of 48 members 
and six nationalities, with the largest delegation being the Italian with 26 
members (see Table 6.6). The HEP for the Italian PDUP, Hr« Castellina, became 
affiliated to the Communist group when the PDUP became affiliated to the PCI in
1985 (26).
Table S.fi__Kembership of Communist group by nationality. 1 lov 1988
Spain (PCE) 3
France (PCF) 10
Greece (KKE) 4
Italy (PCI) 26
Portugal (PCE) 3
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Organisation
Recent accounts of the activities of the Communist group point to its "tradition 
of solidarity" between the member parties and within the group, and in its 
actions on Third World issues, liberation movements, and anti-apartheid 
movements. Laprat (1985, p.83) points to the tradition of the primacy of the
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party in the parliamentary group and informs us that national delegations apply 
decisions which have been taken by their party at the national level. Some 
autonomy on the part of the individual XEP is acceptable. Group decisions, qua 
group, the ideal of the Socialists, are not acceptable as a aodus viveadi in the 
Communist group. The parties, for Laprat, who is the Secretary General of the 
Communist group, form the unit of any analysis of the group, and it is they who 
are the principal actors.
Cohesion and leadership
The Communist group has elaborated two working principles. These are, firstly, 
the independence of the components of the groups in decision making, guaranteed 
by the financial and material means of the national delegations, and, secondly, 
the refusal to take decisions by majority and the insistence on agreement by 
all parties in the group. The most important feature of the group, therefore, 
is the principle of autonomy of the national delegations (27). The national 
positions of the national delegations must be preserved at all times, and each 
is considered as a delegation of the national party at home, and never as an 
autonomous or semi-autonoaous body from the domestic party. The latter issues 
orders and instructions on policy positions and voting in the EP to its 
delegations on a consistent and regular basis. Each party therefore votes 
according to nationality. For example, in the 1979-64 Parliament, there was 
division along national lines on the issue of enlargement of the Ten to the 
Twelve (PCI in favour, PCF against) and the institutional reform of the 
Community (PCF against, PCI in favour).
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The component parties of the groups of Communists and Allies have adopted very 
distinctive attitudes to the European Community and international relations in 
general. Daniels (1957, p.140) points to the attempt by the PCI to find a new 
role for itself in the international arena, which was marked by the PCI's entry 
into the European Parliament and its official acceptance of Italy's membership 
of NATO. The PCI has been tempted by the prospects of the development of a 
more cohesive left (Eurosinistra) and the party leader described the PCI as "an 
Integral part of the European left" at the party's 17th Congress. Daniels 
suggests that the PCI would see the EC and the institutional base in the 
European Parliament as "the forum for the convergence of forces of the left, a 
more cohesive European left" (p.141). The evidence of voting behaviour and 
attitudinal indications as revealed in the EUI Survey and research carried out 
by this researcher reveals that the pro-EC and "pro-democratic" stances of the 
PCI often coincide with those of the Socialist group. Participants have 
informed this researcher that the PCI is trusted by their groups to reveal a 
consistent and pro-European line in debates and committee and are seen as 
participants in the EP consensus formation. It is interesting that Daniels 
suggests that the PCI's "overriding fear of political marginalisation" has 
provided an "almost frantic search for political allies" by that party. The PCI 
has managed to alleviate signs of such a marginalisation by a constructive 
approach to political debate and participation in the Parliament.
With regard to "greater convergence of Euroleft forces", it has been suggested 
that the most likely institutional base for such convergence would be the EP, 
but "this body remains weak and even here the SPD and PCI belong to different
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political groupings (Daniels, 1987, p.141). With regard to SPD-PCI relations,i
however, intraparty and intragroup cooperation takes place frequently in the BP 
framework, as instanced by a visit of Lombardian PCI delegates to the SP 
which led to discussions of relations between the PCI and other parties in the 
EP. One PCI delegate, Xr. Cervetti, pointed to a good affinity with the SPD 
while there were great differences between the PCI and the French Socialists 
and Communists (28).
Left-wing alliances of the majority of the Socialist group with the PCI have 
worked well in voting in plenary, especially since direct elections, although 
there is not prior agreement to cooperate in general but rather on specific 
issues. The PCI tends to put forward moderate motions which are in favour of 
European integration and are of a centre-left perspective. The tasks facing 
parties of the left in the EC member states are seen as the development of a 
socialist political programme and the building of an electoral basis which 
encompasses new social movements as well as traditional working-class 
constituencies. The building of such programmes and bases is being initiated 
to some extent within the EP and its left-wing political groupings.
As its members attend regularly, sanctions on this issue are not considered 
necessary in this group. All XEPs attend the national delegation or group 
meetings in advance of the plenary although there is not full attendance at the 
plenary itself. A feature of this group which is not shared by others is the 
fact that it includes "allies", i.e., XEPs who appeared on the PCI lists but had 
not been PCI members. A well-known example is the Italian novelist, Xoravla,
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who Joined the PCI electoral list in May 1984 (29). Moravia stated that he 
joined the list in order to proaote peace and development and combat hunger in 
the world. Altiero Spinelli also featured on the PCI list. There are no rules 
of procedure in the group as these are not deemed necessary as each nationality 
retains its own independence.
Policy agreement
With regard to policy agreement, the group members share a common approach to 
some aspects of foreign policy, such as the Middle East, South Africa, Turkey 
and the problems of peace and disarmament in general. Development policy and 
food aid are actively promoted by the group, as is the programae for workers' 
rights. In addition, socialisation has played its part in teaching the members 
to work together on common themes (Laprat, 1985). There is, however, a 
fundamental difference of policy regarding the very existence of the European 
Community. The PCF has been traditionally opposed to the EC as a 
©supranantional capitalist structure, while the PCI and PCS support European 
integration and its benefits to their member states. The PCI electoral campaign 
in 1984 had concentrated on promoting an autonomous Europe in a framework of 
peace and social and economic development (30).
The Danish People's Socialist Party and Greek Communist Party are traditionally 
opposed to EC membership although the latter has softened its position 
somewhat while the PCI and the Greek KKE-E wish to strengthen the EC's 
institutions in the progress to European Union. The PCF wishes to participate 
in the EC institutions but with very specific (often national-oriented or USSR-
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oriented) objectives. Diversity in composition and diversrsy o£ opinions form 
the hall-marks of this group (Laprat, 1985). Diversity h*« been apparent on the 
very issue of EC membership, of enlargement of the EC to twelve, of the role of 
the EP, on the CAP and on foreign policy, including nuclear and military policy 
(see Tables 5.9 and 5.10). In most of these parties, with the exception at 
times of the PCI, nationalism and pragmatism are in evidenc* in policy 
formation, with adherence to national representation and representation of 
geographical constituencies.
The group of the Communists and Allies holds study days on specialised subjects 
regularly. One such day was held in Rome in November 1984 on the issue of the 
relationship between employment and technical innovation, aad was attended by 
all parties of the group as well as trade union leaders, academics and leaders 
of major European technological industries (31).
Vhlle there is some consultation between the PCF and the PCI on an irregular 
basis, they remain autonomous components in the group. They do not have 
common spokesmen, but favour national ones. There is some agreement on world 
peace, policies towards the Third Vorld, and some aspects cf social policy, such 
as the 35-hour working week. Disagreement on national linos concerns 
enlargement and the institutional reform of the European Community, with the 
French opposed to each of these Issues and the PCI in favoia\
Pollev conflict and e1»*vagas
The major cleavage In the Communist group is the issue of European Integration. 
The Italian members are in favour of the European Community and hava made 
known their willingness to work within the EP, whereas the French Communists 
are opposed to European Integration and do not take part in the work of the 
Parliament to the same extent and so are less involved and more isolated from 
the work of the EP than other party delegations.
The extraparliamentary links of the Communist group
There is no established linkage among the Communist parties of the 3C member 
states outside of the EP. Each national delegation at the EP maintains close 
links with the domestic party. In the 1970s, there was academic and political 
interest in the supposed threat of Eurocommunism but in fact the Communist 
parties of the member states did not cooperate on policy issues, particularly 
with regard to the Soviet Union. Some meetings of the party leaders took place 
in 1977 but national and Ideological differences remained pertinent.
It is only in the European Parliament that the Communist parties of Europe come 
together as a political group and share resources and secretariat as well as 
some common policy stances. Daniels (1987, p.141) states that the PCI has 
moved beyond the Eurocommunist phase as the French, Spanish and Portuguese 
parties no longer make any pretence to adhere to a common line. Courtois 
(1988) goes so far as to suggest that throughout Europe, communism, the agent
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for the modernisation of society for several decades, is at present obsolete <Ls 
Xonde, 11-12 Sep. 1988).
Table 6.7— Positions adopted by the member parties of the group of Communists
and Allies
Membership 
of EC Pro Moderate Anti Anti Pro
Strengthen Eur­ Pro Anti Anti Pro
opean Union
Strengthen EC Pro Anti* - Anti Pro
Institutions
Enlargement Pro Anti Anti Anti Pro
Reform of Anti Pro Anti
CAP
EC foreign Pro Anti - Anti -
policy
More regional Pro+ Moderate# Pro+ - -
policy
Notes
» = Moderate regarding the EP
+ = Emphasis on IMPs (Integrated Mediterranean Programmes) 
# * Common Agricultural Policy is more important
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lahlfi.,-SJ3— Comparison of policy positions of PCI and PCF
EC Community reinforces 
Italian independence
EC threat to 
sovereignty
U.S. Dependence an U.S. Independence of U.S.
Huclear power Pro, adapts EC line Anti BC involvement. 
French self-defence,
own nuclear power
FnrnT»»n Union Pro Do o m  Renort anti-Do o m  Rerart
6.4 Group far the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independents (TC
group 2.
During the lifetime of the Group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of 
Independents, in the 1979-1984 EP, there was no attempt to reach common 
positions, although a majority of the group was committed to support for human 
rights and opposition to world hunger and to nuclear energy. World hunger was 
energetically pushed by Xr. Pannella onto the EP agenda. Unlike most other 
groups, this group did not claim a common philosophy or ideology, apart from 
adhering to democracy and a left-wing tendency, and it was formed to avail of 
the advantages of group membership, such as the right to put forward 
amendments, allocated speaking time and positions in committees. A point of 
common Interest was the defence of minorities and minority languages. For
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example, the group held study days on 8-10 January 1983 in Brussels on "Peoples 
without a state: Regionalism, Autonomy and Self-Government in Europe". Unlike 
the Communist group, the group had no common President, but a rotating 
presidency which changed every four months among Jens-Peter Bende, leil Blaney 
and Xarco Pannella. The Secretary General post also rotated.
As the group (some observers Insist that it is not a group at all) consisted of 
seven parties, it appeared that there would be seven cleavages, although three 
subgroupings had been identified - the Danes, the Italians, and the "others", in 
numerical terms. "The Economist" suggested in 1981 that the groups' biggest 
victory has been to avoid being strangled at birth (32).
Rainbow Group
The Rainbow group (Arc en del), formed after the second direct elections, 
resembles the TC group in that it is a gathering of disparate elements from 
throughout the Community. It is an essentially left-wing grouping of twenty 
XEPs who were elected mostly as single-issue candidates or in order to promote 
very specific policies. The tone Is distinctly "Rainbow Green" in the
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continental sense (i.e. ecological Issues) and they represent "alternatives" to 
the common political moulds in the member state. Rudig (1985, p. 70) described 
such parties as follows: "the rainbow-type Green Party attempts to represent a 
broad alliance of ecological, youth, feminist, peace, minority and lew Left 
groups". Such activity is also extra-parliamentary. Differences between purist 
Green and Rainbow,Green have arisen in many member states and there were many 
difficulties encountered at the level of European co-ordination. Rudig adds
227
tbat the Belgian, Dutch and German Green MEPs were unable to agree on forming a 
common parliamentary group after the 1964 direct elections, mostly due to 
German and Dutch unease at dependency on the numerically stronger Belgians.
The result, Rainbow, was a larger group involving "small parties of 
radical/soclalist/regionalist persuasion" (Rudlg, p. 71).
Transnatlonallty
The group includes left-socialist Italian XEPs, the Danish movement against the 
EEC and three regionalist XEPs known as the European Free Alliance - 2 from 
Flanders (Volksunie) and one from Sardinia (Partlto d'Azlone Sardo), as well as 
one Basque and one Belgian former ECOLO member. In addition, GRAEL (Green 
Alternative European Link) forms part of the Rainbow group and includes seven 
members from the German Greens, 2 from the Dutch Greens (GPA), one member from 
the Belgian AGALEV and one member from the Italian Democrazia Proletaria. The 
Italian Radical Party, which had been active in the TC group in the 1979-84 
Parliament, did not take part in the Rainbow group and Rudig explains this "as 
a result of widespread disillusion with the erratic leadership of Xarco 
Pannella".
The German Greens have adopted a rotation system among 18 "XEPs" who wish to 
avoid "becoming professional politicians" as they say that this can lead to 
alienation from the general public. The GRAEL has described itself as an 
association of parties united in their opposition to the EC as it exists today 
and with its present priorities.
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Policy agreement
The Rainbow group frequently acts with the Socialist group on environmental 
issues. One recent example is when the two groups sought to have motions on 
the Cattenom Nuclear Power Station debated urgently in October 1988 (Docs. B 2- 
806/88 and B 2-828/88). The roll call vote, called for by the Rainbow group, 
resulted in 113 voting for, 124 against, with 6 abstentions (33). The Rainbow 
group's Green Party KEPs may find that as environmental issues are adopted by 
other established parties in the member states, their impact and electoral 
influence may lessen.
The group has outlined a list of interests which it wishes to promote and these 
Include: the protection of the environment; peace and disarmament; human rights; 
immigration; the Third World; improved social policy (Including the aim of a 
25-hour week by the year 2000 to be paid for by a tax on new technology) and a 
basic minimum income for all.
Internal organisation
The organisational structure of the group is minimal. Given that it includes 
Dutch and German Greens, Danish anti-marketeers, left-wing parties, Basque and 
Sardinian left-wing nationalists and Belgian Ecolo (ecologist) groupings and 
Volksunie, there is a problem at times with finding a common language and use 
of translators even for such a small group. The group meets regularly like the 
other groups to discuss the work of the plenary and administration and policy 
positions on major political issues, in the week before Plenary. In addition, it 
possesses working groups who work on the content of policy such as
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agricultural and economic and social issues. These working groups have 
autonomy. The structure is essentially decentralised to reflect the group 
membership. The initial socialisation process within the group has now led to 
a knowledge of each others' policies and approaches. The Group a staff of 
eighteen and it emphasises that no staff is employed to do auxiliary work such 
as photocopying, typing and similar services, since GRAEL's policy is not to 
separate manual and intellectual work (Rainbow, 1988).
Cohesion
Cohesion is not a goal for the Rainbow group and it is considered that cohesion 
is not necessary.
Policy agreement
The group members have few policy areas in common, and agreement is reached on 
Green or alternative political positions. The group claims that it has 
differences in tactics rather than Ideology. It is opposed to the EC in its 
present form and places priority on small-scale farming and alternative energy 
forms. In the Paris declaration before the second direct elections, the GRAEL 
stated that its common commitment was to a new, neutral, decentralised Europe 
made up of self-administering regions, each maintaining its own cultural 
individuality (Rainbow, 1988). It opposes the deployment of nuclear missiles in 
Eastern and Western Europe, promotes a no-compromise policy on the environment 
so as to protect the ecological balance, promotes equal rights for women in all 
areas of society, demands action on unemployment and social security cuts and 
is in favour of the free exercise of fundamental civil rights and an ecological
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fora of agriculture. In addition it calls for a policy towards the Third Vorld 
based on equality.
Representation of Interests
The group is representative of interest groups and an official has suggested 
that it is representative of movements rather than of constituencies. 
Constituency-oriented parliamentary questions are rare. The systea of evolving 
representation applies to the Geraan Greens and in the present EP the Geraan 
members (with 3 exceptions) were replaced by their alternative while the foraer 
members continue to work with the group as "elder statespersons". This systea 
of rotation is justified by that party's desire to avoid professional
politicians. One Dutch GPA member also rotated after the first half of the
legislative period (Rainbow,1988, p.5).
Conformity/attendance
Given the relatively small size of the group, one KEP only is allocated to each 
committee and hence regular attendance is considered essential. The group 
eaphasises the need to vote, attend the plenary and coaaittee sessions and play 
the game according to the parliaaentary rules.
Extraparliamentary links nf t.ha ffnlnbow group
The group has a great deal of contact with extraparliamentary movements and 
small groupings outside the EP and has been known to hold meetings with such 
groups with the use of the EP's facilities. Issues discussed have Included Vest 
#
European security (meetings with left-wing groupings), the European judicial
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area, youth and racism (meetings with youth groups), reproductive technology, 
alternative workers' production and guaranteed minimum income. The group 
members experience at times a conflict in terms of time management in the 
commitments to parliamentary duties (as distinct from extraparliamentary 
duties), as the latter include contact with several different movements and 
speaking at rallies and demonstrations.
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Chapter Seven
The Party Groups of the Centre and Right in the European Parliament

ZA--Introduction; The Centre-right and European IntayratHrm.
Chapter Seven examines the organisation, distinguishing features and functions 
and changes over time of the political groups of the centre and right. It is 
not the intention of this chapter to place these groupings in a definitive left- 
right scale, or to point out the nuancing of the definition of centre to right 
and vice versa. Rather we analyse the organisation, programmes and performance 
of the groups in the EP, in the period after direct elections.
The party groups of the centre and right in the EP (apart from the 
Conservatives) have traditionally been in the forefront of the movement for 
European Integration and in that capacity have provided some of the leadership 
in the drive towards the unification of Europe along with the Socialists. The 
common ideology of the Christian Democrats, in particular, provided a base for 
the promotion of European reconstruction and the ideal of a united Europe, while 
the Liberals also consistently favoured a United States of Europe.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the CDs were at the height of their influence in Europe 
and were major partners in most of the governments in the member states of the 
ECSC and, later, the EC. The ECSC Treaty was signed by five CD Prime Ministers 
(de Gasper 1, Schuman, Adenauer, van Zeeland, Bech) and one Liberal Prime 
Minister (Beyen). The CD's role in the shaping of the Community's structure 
has decreased as the parties involved have become less dominant and their 
leadership less commmitted to European unification. Henig (I960) sees this 
contribution of the CDs as historically time-based as he points out that 
Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe was a concentration of
elites and opinion-fanners which placed parties in a passive role in consensus 
pronotion and Interest aggregation.
Nevertheless that Committee served a purpose in uniting parties and trade 
unions representatives in a political forum which dared to contemplate a united 
Europe and this legacy remains alive today among many of the centre and right 
parties of the European Parliament, as much as with the Socialists who were the 
Inheritors of the Socialist Movement of a United States of Europe. However, 
European Integration is not an issue which is associated more with one part of 
the political spectrum than another. It cannot be seen solely as the creature 
of the right or the left. Nevertheless, in the formative decades, the CDs and 
Liberals have been vociferous in their support for the European Community and 
its further political development.
The avowed goal of the EPP group and its federation is a united Europe and the 
EPP states: "we are firmly committed to the final political objective of 
European unification, the transformation of the European Union into a unique 
European federation". Its slogan is "together towards a Europe for free 
peoples" (1).
The 1960s saw the arrival of fewer pro-European MEPs and a less federalist 
approach which reverberated in the centre and right groups. The enlargement of 
1973 which placed strains on the homogeneity of some groups had less impact on 
the centre-right than on the left, however. The 1973 Enlargement substantially 
altered the political balance of the EP as the Socialists, for the first time,
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of representation Is therefore apparent. At the same time the structure of 
political opportunities remains such that the career advancement of offices 
within the European Parliament remains group-oriented and the groups more than 
ever appear to be combinations of different representative functions and 
pressures.
The centre and right-wing political trends of the member-states are represented 
In five political groupings in the second directly elected BP. Since 1984, a 
new political grouping has appeared, the group of the European Right, and the 
1986 enlargement of the Community saw the arrival of the Spanish and 
Portuguese members. These changes affected the composition and even the titles 
of several groups. The problem of the aggregation of interests in the HP's 
political groups of twelve member states became more complex with the arrival 
of the Spanish and Portuguese members.
The alterations of the groups over time and in reaction to political 
developments are also reflected in the voting behaviour and use of the informal 
rules of the game of the EP. Chiti-Batelli points out that what is Important to 
know is not so much the rules of the EP in toto, but rather the internal rules 
and the relative praxis and customs of each group (1982, p.162). Same of the 
groups possess minimal Rules of Procedure, but the role of leadership and the 
use of facilities and resources which are made available to each group reveal 
the attitude to the role of the XEP, the EP and the nature of the EC itself.
Table 7.1 The party groups of the Centra and Right ln thm EP. 1988
Group
EPP European People's Party (CD)
Jo. of members.
112
ED European Democratic Group (Con) 66
LDR Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group 46
ERD 30
ES Group of the European. Right--- . ,  .1£l
The centre and right do not present a voting bloc within the Parliament, even 
on issues of the institutional development of the Community, although discipline 
in the EPP on key issues may result in a centre-right majority or a substantial 
minority which then reaches a coalition of interests with specific 
representatives. As the national and party delegation compositions differ 
according to group or issue, cooperation is not always ensured on a centre- 
right platform, and it is not unusual for the CDs to form a voting bloc with 
the majority of the Socialist group members on issues of common Interest. It 
is notable that as the EP nears the end of its second term, a pattern of 
EPP/Soclalist cooperation on voting is evident, characterised by the names of 
the group Presidents as the Elepsch-Arndt axis.
Hurwitz (1983) carried out a study of voting patterns in the first directly 
elected EP, and he points to the IVC, the Index of Voting Cohesion, in the 
groups and gives the highest IVC to the three right-wing groups, i.e. the
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European Democrats, the EPO and EPP, followed by the Communists, Liberals and 
Socialists.
L2__The European Peoples Party.
IransaatiQnality.
The group of the European Peoples Party, founded as the Christian Democratic 
group on 23 June 1953 with 38 members, consists of 112 members and eleven 
political parties, with eleven nationalities (Table 7.3). The British are the 
only nationality which is not represented within the Group. Membership is open 
to Christian Democrat and similar parties who subscribe to the positions and 
political actions of the group (Jouve, 1984).
Like the EPP federation (the European extra-parliamentary umbrella organisation 
of CD parties), the group claims to be the European party for Christian 
Democratic movements and states that its statutes make it possible for further 
parties of the centre to Join if they are ready to subscribe to Christian 
Democratic values (Catholic or Protestant).
The group hence allows for the representation of llkeminded parties from 
member-states which lack a tradition of Christian Democracy (2). Observers 
view the EPP group as traditionally being run by certain dominant nationalities, 
such as the Germans and the Italians, with a few Iberians among thea, at both 
the level of political leadership and secretariat.
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Table 7.2 Membership of the BPP group by nationality - 1 gov 1988
Denmark (CD) l
Germany (CDU/CSU) 41
Spain 1
France (TJFE) 7
Greece (ID) a
Ireland (FG) 6
Italy (DC/SVP) 27
Luxembourg (PCS) 3
letherlands (CDA) 8
Portugal 4
TOTAL 112
Organisation af the group.
In general, Internal organisation is regarded as being efficient and cohesive la 
secretariat and management. The group organises regular study days and keeps 
members up to date on the activities of the group and its national leaders in 
the monthly magazine and its annual reports on activities.
There are four main working groupings within the EPP group, which meet 
regularly when the entire group assembles during the week before the plenary 
session. There is a full group day (a meeting of the entire group) In order to
Cohesion:
The EPP group Is regarded as the best disciplined of the party groups in the 
EP. This is evident in general voting records. The level of consensus or 
dissent on specific issues is difficult for the observer to assess, as the 
group's political disagreements tend to be shrouded in silence, for the most 
part.
An official of the group suggested in the 1980s that the group is highly 
cohesive for two main reasons (3). The first is that the group does not 
include an anti-EC faction or grouping, unlike the Socialist group or the 
European Progressive Democrats. The group asserts that its dedication to the 
promotion of European Integration contributes to group unity. The CD group 
regards itself as the most "European" of the groups in the Assembly and often 
refers back to the Involvement of the Christian Democrats in the formation of 
the ECSC and the EC. It remains cognisant of the fact that this involvement 
was an engagement of an elite movement, and, in referring to attempts to form a 
constituent assembly of a European Political Community, states "This attempt at 
a 'revolution from above' was carried out almost exclusively by the European 
Christian Democrats" (4). It does not tend to acknowledge the contribution of 
socialist and liberal parties to the process of European Integration.
discuss policy when spokesmanships on issues in plenary and the EPP's speaking
tine are allocated among the many applicants to represent the group line.
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Cohesion:
The EPP group is regarded as the best disciplined of the party groups in the 
EP. This is evident in general voting records. The level of consensus or 
dissent on specific issues is difficult for the observer to assess, as the 
group's political disagreements tend to be shrouded in silence, for the most 
part.
An official of the group suggested in the 1960s that the group is highly 
cohesive for two main reasons (3). The first is that the group does not 
include an anti-EC faction or grouping, unlike the Socialist group or the 
European Progressive Democrats. The group asserts that its dedication to the 
promotion of European Integration contributes to group unity. The CD group 
regards itself as the most "European" of the groups in the Assembly and often 
refers back to the involvement of the Christian Democrats in the formation of 
the ECSC and the EC. It remains cognisant of the fact that this involvement 
was an engagement of an elite movement, and, in referring to attempts to form a 
constituent assembly of a European Political Community, states "This attempt at 
a 'revolution from above1 was carried out almost exclusively by the European 
Christian Democrats" (4). It does not tend to acknowledge the contribution of 
socialist and liberal parties to the process of European Integration.
discuss policy when spokesmanships on issues in plenary and the EPP's speaking
tine are allocated among the many applicants to represent the group line.
The second reason for alleged cohesion is that there has long been agreement of 
basic principles and tenets, such as Christianity, and on mainly Catholic 
values, which are held in common by the group members since the group's 
formation. There is general agreement on the need for peace, human rights, the 
freedom of the individual, the fight against poverty, and the promotion of 
social progress in a pluralistic community of free individuals within an 
essentially Christian framework. The group asserts that the Christian 
Democratic ethos goes hand in hand with European unification. It elaborates 
that the ideas of reconciliation, neighbourly love and a desire for peace are a 
biblical heritage, and concludes "the basic ideas of federalism can be traced 
back to Thomas Aquinas"! (5).
Group agreement
The EPP members can be roughly divided on social questions according to their 
membership of a trade union. The Belgian and Dutch members are more 
progressive on social issues such as unemployment, retraining schemes and job 
creation, than their more conservative colleagues who would represent the 
employer side of industry. Some Italian DC and German CDU members, however, 
are also active in trade unions and quite progressive on social issues. It has 
been suggested that the CD group expresses agreement only on the issues of 
European Union and Christianity, with little or no agreement on economic and 
social issues (6). There is a left-wing divergence on social issues and here 
the Dutch members play a central role in achieving compromises between right 
and left.
2 ^
Despite the outward claim to cohesion, the EPP has been distinguished by some 
personality conflicts, particularly with regard to the leadership of the group 
after direct elections in 1979. This group also lacks the presence of British 
members, although it does include representatives from three of the "Big Four" 
member states - Italy, Germany, France. There was some cooperation between the 
CDU/CSTJ and the British Conservatives in the period before the direct elections, 
with the formation of a European Democratic Union, an "anti-marxist" meeting of 
right-wing parties. This cooperation caused some problems for the EPP group's 
cohesion, as its liberal members did not consider the Conservatives as their 
natural bedfellows. This caused some division in the EPP superstructure, the 
EPP federation, although less so in the group itself.
The EPP political programme reflects the agreement reached on policy, and it 
places emphasis on a pluralist Europe with its own identity and its own self- 
determination, which is open to the rest of the world and especially its 
problems of hunger, poverty and violence. The dignity of man and his 
dependence on the community, especially on the family, "which is the mainstay of 
our society", are given priority, as is the safeguarding of human rights and 
basic individual freedom in political democracy, with the aim of the 
decentralisation of political power (7). Policy has evolved from support for 
the High Authority in the 1950s to the promotion of maximum functional 
integration in the Community in the 1960s with a strengthened EP and 
Commission. There was then a progression from support for an enlarged 
Community in the 1970s to enthusiastic support for European union in the 1980s.
The group faces problems of a disciplinary nature - problems which have 
political implications in terms of the achievement of its goals within the 
plenary. These problems include the irregular attendance of members at the 
Group and plenary sessions and the fact that it is accepted that national 
politics may take up a great deal of time, as XEPs are also members of the 
national arena of political conflict and are often involved in national or 
regional campaigns at home (8). This is the case even for single mandate 
politicians, although it is hoped that increased European socialization will 
contribute to increased commitment to attendance at the requisite number of 
sessions and committee and group meetings. The fact that some XEPs throughout 
the political groups are not financially dependent on the daily attendance 
allowance at plenary is a disincentive to attend. There have been attempts 
since the early 1980s to enforce cohesion in attendance at the voting sessions 
in plenary, in order to vote as a cohesive bloc, and vote as appropriate in 
cooperation with the Socialists in order to ensure the successful passage of a 
motion or initiative.
Policy conflict and cleavages.
The cleavage most in evidence within the EPP group occurs on the issue of 
agriculture, due to the differences of priorities between the members of the 
northern parts of Europe and the Mediterranean members, and due also to the 
differing conceptions of representation at the EP. In general, a free vote may 
be permitted on the basis of some minimal compromise, rather than insistence on 
the adoption of a definitive group position.
Zlr~<
Vith regard to the preparation of policy positions, it may be noted that 
agreement of policy is not reached by the group en bloc, but rather by a small 
grouping of HEP specialists who put a motion together and sign it, with the 
agreement of the Group President, in the name of the group, and this document 
normally constitutes the basic text on the policy attitude although it may be 
later modified (but rarely radically altered).
The group represents centre-right interests including trade unions in 
continental Europe, and like other groups has been lobbied by interest groups 
regarding input into and influence on forthcoming EC legislative inltiatlvee.
In these matters, the differing notions of representation become apparent, as in 
the case of a Belgian EPP HEP who tabled amendments to a report of the EP 
which were allegedly identical to IBM positions. A Socialist HEP criticised the 
HEP of "behaviour (as) incompatible with his position as a member of the 
Parliament, and dubbed the HEP as "IBH's messenger-boy" (9). The group 
traditionally represents management, business and agricultural Interests. 
Conflicts had arisen in the 1950s and 1960s concerning attitudes to the 
Socialists and Communists as some nationalities, particularly the Germans (for 
national reasons), were opposed to these ideologies, whereas the Italians, Dutch 
and Belgians were accustomed to co-operation with the left. The Dutch have 
traditionally been antl-CAP, a factor which has caused problems for the rest of 
the group.
Leadership.
The leader of the group is regarded as being more than "primus inter pares“. 
Given that the group is a large one, with international elements and a large 
array of problems as a consequence, a good strong presidential-style leader has 
been regarded as necessary (10). The present German President, Mr. Klepsch and 
the Italian Secretary-General Guccioni contribute to the present reputation of 
the group as strong and cohesive, combining a balance of Influence of both 
leaders.
The role of the Secretary-General depends to a large extent on the personal 
relationship and level of efficiency maintained between the President and 
Secretary-General. In the EPP, the role of the latter is generally more a 
political rather than a purely administrative one. The political role 
encompasses decisions on the distribution of rapporteurships within the group, 
of the offices, benefits and "spoils” in general, and on the formation of group 
and parliamentary delegations. In the cases of the distribution of offices, the 
MEP's channel of communication is normally to approach the Secretary-General 
first, and then, if necesssary the President, in order to be considered for a 
specific office within the group.
The extraparliamentary links of the EPP group.
(a) Relations with national parliaments and parties.
There are very few formalised contacts with the national arena, although the 
group invites national leaders to its group meetings and conferences and 
publishes speeches made on such occasions. Speeches and articles by national 
leaders also figure prominently in the group's magazines.
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The EPP group met with representatives of Christian Democrat groups froa 
national parliaments on 10 April 1986 at The Hague and launched an Initiative 
that, during the ratification of the SEA by the national parliaaents, these 
parliaments "adopt resolutions clearly indicating the need to go even further 
than the Luxembourg package of reforms" (11).
The EPP group, on March 1987, at the celebration of 30 years of the signing of 
the Treaty of Rome setting up the EEC and Euratom, called for closer relations 
between the EC institutions, particularly the EP and national parliaments, in 
the realisation of European Union. Group vice-president, Mr. Gravazzi 
emphasised that the EP and national parliaments needed to know each other 
better, and former MEP, MR. Pfennig, suggested that national parliaaents should 
"intervene more actively and effectively in the European process" and strengthen 
their contact with the EPP (12).
In July 1987, the EPP group and the federation further called for progress 
towards European integration and to this end set up a European Union working 
group. It has proposed a "programme for increasing awareness and mobilising 
the member parties of the EPP", with the goal of reinforcing European political 
action of the CDs within their respective parliaments and governments. The 
working group has called for the EPP and other European political forces to 
speed up the process towards European Union and its representative role becaae 
apparent in its emphasis on the need "to make the European actions more popular 
with the people" and to provide solutions to economic, social, security and
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defence problems, all in the framework of the People's Europe, which is a
primary objective of the BPP group <13).
Vith regard to the EPP's other extra-parliamentary links, the EPP and the 
Konrad Adenauer foundation, at a joint conference in July 1987, stressed the 
role of local representatives and local government in the European Community's 
policies. Particular reference was made to the provisions for assistance to 
less favoured regions under the SEA (14).
ihl__The Confederation;__The European Peoples Party.
The confederation meets regularly and congresses are well-attended by both 
national leaders and KEPs. The confederation, which also maintains links with 
CDs in non-Communlty states, within the Vorld Federation of Christian 
Democratic parties (the Vorld Christian Democratic Union), claims to be the 
only "European party" on the European level of politics, although its actual role
resembles that of the Socialist Confederation, in the preparation of the
electoral campaigns and of basic electoral programmes. It has three organs, 
Congress, the Political Bureau and the Executive Committee, as well as an 
electoral programme committee. It was founded as a federation of the CD parties 
of the member states of the Community in Luxembourg in April 1976 as a 
successor to the Political Committee of the Christian Democrat parties in the 
Community which had been set up in 1972.
1 A___The European Doanrrats__(Conservatives)
The European Democratic group has until recently been less effective than its 
numerical strength and bargaining potential might suggest. It consisted of 
essentially one nationality and was not accustomed to making compromises and 
attaining working majorities within the EP. It was never obliged to bargain for
a majority within a group as it always constituted the majority. Its public
image in the media has been as the defender of national interests in a position 
of splendid isolation, as a quasi-uninational group. The group was on occasion 
also Involved in heated exchanges within the Bureau of the Parliament, as the 
Presidents of other groups expressed anger at the "nationalist" line taken by 
the Conservatives' President, who often referred to the need for honesty and
reform as if to suggest that his group had a monopoly on that matter (15). In
addition, the party which represents the largest political force in Britain is 
not reflective, as a political elite, of political and social forces, interests, 
differences and cleavages in modern British society. Nevertheless, a 
combination of legislative socialisation and a growing awareness of the need 
for contact with other groups and nationalities have altered this view of the 
group. Like the KEPs who do not belong to a group, who loses out on the 
availability of information, expertise and international contacts, so too the 
groups with few national delegations experienced a certain alienation from the 
workings of the Parliament and relations with the EC institutions and foci of 
political debate.
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The European Democratic Group of the EP, founded on 16 January 1973 with 20 
members, consists of 66 members of three nationalities, 45 British 
Conservatives, four Danes (KP> and seventeen Spanish members. The only Ulster 
Unionist member, Mr. John Taylor had resigned due to his opposition to the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, signed by the British Conservative government and Irish 
government. The group greatly benefited from the fact that the Spanish 
Allianza Popular Joined it on the enlargement of the EC to twelve member states 
in 1986, as at last it shed its image of a narrowly bi-oational grouping with a 
strong identification with Toryism and only a handful of Danish members. It is 
now a more broadly-based group. It is also now perceived as less British- 
dominated and the Danes benefit from the presence of a new nationality and 
hence some more equilibrium with the inclusion of their Spanish colleagues. In 
addition, the very fact that the group now includes a new nationality greatly 
increases its share of the "spoils" of the EP system. This is possible as the 
EP controls its own budget and its financial allocations and management of 
parliamentary resources.
Vhile the group is, in general, committed to membership of the European 
Community, it is more pro-European than its co-evals in the parent party, and a 
minority of its MEPs. In the past, other parties were reluctant to Join a group 
where they would perhaps be dominated by the 61 British conservatives in the 
63-member group in the 1979-1984 EP, and so always remain a minority element 
in the group. Britain was the only member state to be mainly represented in 
only two party groups (although a Scottish Nationalist MEP sits in the EPD).
Transnationalltv:
In terns of transnational party cooperation, this is one of the disadvantages 
of the predominantly two-party system in Great Britain, as British influence 
has decreased in terms of input into EP decisions, and also because the parties 
are less well-informed than other nationalities, as they became aware of 
intiatives in other groups at a later stage, as they were not in regular contact 
with parties in other groups.
Organisation of the Conservative group.
The group's Rules of Procedure (1980) provide for a Bureau, group meetings and 
secretariat. It states that the group determines the policies to be pursued in 
the EP and the parliamentary business and administration of the group. Secrecy 
of the proceedings of group meetings is required.
The group possesses a sturdy tradition of good organisation and strong 
discipline. It organises regular study days in addition to ad hoc working 
groups on, for example, the EC budget and the Common Agricultural Policy. Xr. 
Christopher Prout, former Conservative group whip in the EP, is President of the 
EDs since 11 February 1987, when he was elected by the group to replace Sir 
Henry Plumb (Group President since 1982) who became President of the EP. Kr. 
Prout places emphasis on the international nature of the group, rather than its 
traditionally limited representation of nationalities.
Cohesion.
The group is perceived as being tightly disciplined until recently as English 
was its common language and most of its members formed one single party
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delegation. It consists of relatively young and enthusiastic HEPs, most of whom 
have little parliamentary experience. The group even travelled together in a 
separate aeroplane from Britain to Brussels or Strasbourg, and maintains a high 
level of organised attendance at voting sessions of the Plenary, along with an 
efficient system of replacement of members, or substitutes, in committees. In 
addition group meeetings were, until Spanish members Joined, almost invariably 
held in Britain or Denmark. The group in 1986 has become less cohesive and 
more transnational.
Policy conflict and cleavages.
The Rules of Procedure (Rule 28) provide that motions, PQs or interventions 
which are contrary to the policy of the group should be given prior notice to 
the group chairman. There is no explicit "conscience clause" for policy 
conflicts. The British Conservatives welcomed the entry of the Spanish into 
the group as it now has a structure which enables it to speak on issues of 
relevance to the CAP, such as olive oil, as well as policies towards South 
America, for example. On the issue of fisheries policy, however, the Danes and
Spanish may encounter resistance from the British. For the Conservatives,
representation is synonymous with representation of geographical constituency, 
as the Conservatives often see themselves as the agents of local industry. On 
the issue of the CAP, the Spanish Allianza Popular finds itself under pressure
to vote with the European Peoples Party.
There is regular contact between the British Conservative XEPs and Downing St. 
and the delegation receives regular instructions on policy issues, particularly
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on the Budget. Since 1979, the autonomy of the Conservative XEPs from the 
parent party has been curtailed. Most of the KEPs are regarded by London as 
being more progressive than the national XPs.
Attitudes to membership of the European Community and the future of European 
integration constitute a divisive issue among the Conservative Party's XEPs. 
Before 1979, the approach to European integration was markedly tepid and one 
observer suggested that up to the 1979 European elections, "the Conservatives 
hardly distinguished themselves from Labour as regards their general attitiude 
towards the functioning of the institutions" (16). After direct elections, many 
Conservative XE?s showed themselves to be pro-European but conflict on this 
issue has arisen on occasion. The group has also experienced difficulties In 
relations with other groups regarding its representation of the Tory government 
position, for example in 1960, on the issue of the British demand for a 
reduction of its Budget contribution. The Tories in the EP then felt obliged to 
repair the strained relations especially with the EPP and the Liberals.
Reports in autumn 1988 pointed to rows between the pro-Thatcherite Blue Circle 
group which favours an approach of "Britain first" and those federalist 
Conservative XEFs who advocate a stronger EP and new EC policies. Estimates 
would suggest that each of these groupings constitutes a third of the KEPs, 
while the remaining 15 were devoting their energies to the development of 
publicity or business contacts for 1992. A leader of the Blue Circle group 
suggested that the grcup should take a stronger pro-British line. The group 
leader, Xr. Prout, denied any divisions in October 1988, and added that "we all
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share the Prime Minister's firm commitment to Britain in Europe and her 
practical step-by-step approach to the future development" of the EC. He added 
that it was on this basis that the British Conservatives would fight the direct 
elections in June 1989 (17). This is slightly less enthusiastic than the 
information leaflet "Conservatives in the EP" produced before the 1984 
elections, which stated unequivocally "Being in Europe means trade Investment 
and jobs for Britain " and that "2 1/2 million Jobs now depend on our trade 
with the European Community". Nevertheless, the pragmatic step-by-step 
approach of the domestic party is at times Europeanised by the group.
The party leader, Mrs. Thatcher, has made a speech in Bruges on 20 September 
1988 in which she regarded a centralised European government as a "nightmare". 
This view is not shared by at least a third of the HEPs of the Conservative 
Party. Her opposition to "a European superstate exercising a new dominance 
from Brussels" was tempered somewhat by her assertion that "certainly we want 
to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common purpose" although 
national identity was underlined (18). Furthermore, such "arcane institutional 
debates" as giving the EP direct legislative power were, for her, a waste of 
energy. In such matters, her attitude was not unlike that of the traditional 
RPR stance of de Gaulle and the French newspaper Libération referred to her as 
more Gaullist than ever in refuting a European superstate and suggesting a 
simple cooperation between sovereign independent states (19). The national 
leader of the Gaullist RPR, Hr. Chirac, has also made a statement to young RPR 
members in which his support for Europe was less than enthusiastic. He stated 
that a large number of French people are worried about Europe, about its
consequences for daily life (20) although he expressed qualified support for 
European integration.
The issue of policy attitude to the European Community remains a conflictual 
one among the Conservative group's British members. In the wake of Xrs. 
Thatcher's Bruges speech, the EP's Institutional Affairs committee wished to 
express its opposition to Xrs. Thatcher's vision of Europe. On this occasion, 
Xr. Derek Prag, Conservative XEP, felt obliged to write to the Financial Times 
(5/10/88) in order to state that "we warded off a threat by a Dutch Liberal 
member of the committee" to table a motion criticising Xrs. Thatcher. In fact 
several political groups drafted resolutions for the plenary urging that her 
remarks be "deplored", Including the British Labour KEPs. He continues that the 
45 British Conservative XEPs "cannot all be expected to hold the same views of 
the future of Europe" and indeed "they hold 45 different sets of views". He 
sees this as the essence of democracy. His attitude serves to illustrates the 
diversity of opinion among a grouping which had until comparatively recently 
(i.e., the second direct elections to the EP) been regarded as well-whipped and 
united on the issue of the EC.
Leadership.
The group leader attempts to reconcile the divergent views on the development 
of the EC within the group while at the same time, he has regular meetings with 
the Conservative Prime Xinister on policy attitudes to be adopted by the group. 
The leader places emphasis on regular attendance at plenary and committee 
meetings.
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The extraparliamentary links of the Group
(fl) relations with national parliaments and parties.
Vithin the UK, relations between the domestic Conservative party and the MEPs 
are not always smooth, as the public image as well as the conception of the 
party workers at home is that the MEPs are overpaid (21). In addition, the 
Conservative MEPs are, in terms of legislative socialisation and knowledge of 
Europe, becoming Europeanised in a manner which may alienate the» from the 
policies of the national party and of the Prime Minister. The group's self 
perception and performance bears this out since the first direct elections. By 
February 1987, the newly-elected President of the European Democrats could 
state :
"we are an international group and we are sometimes at odds with the 
Council of Ministers, one member of which is a British Minister. This is 
a form of constitutional conflict which the Prime Minister understands 
well, and I may say that on no occasion has a British Minister attempted 
to impose the government's view on the group" (22).
This has not proven to be true, as seen in the case of the Bruges speech. The 
fact remains that the domestic party and the Prime Minister carry the day on 
issues of conflict between national and European interests.
Vith regard to the parliamentary links of the group, the Conservative party in 
Westminster formed in 1980 a "Conservative European Reform Group" with the 
aims of:
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2) reforming the EC budget system
3) restoring to national governments the right to deal with unfair trading 
practices by outsiders
4) reassertion of national parliament's powers which have been transferred to 
Community institutions.
The group stated that it was attempting to renegotiate from the inside (i.e. 
within the EC) to improve conditions of Britain's membership (23)
(b) Informal associations of the group and other parties.
The individual member parties of the Group have links with other national 
political parties, although the Group possesses no formalised federation-type 
structure. The British Conservatives have had electoral cooperation with the 
German CSU/CDU. Mrs. Thatcher spoke at a CDO meeting in Hanover before the 
1979 elections, and the Conservatives and the CSU/CSU hold many policies in 
common, and there is regular attendance of delegates of each party at the party 
conferences of the other.
In addition the European Democratic Union, an electoral combination of right 
wing parties, formed in April 1978, was based on a CDU/Conservatlve agreement. 
The EP's publication, Forging Ahead, states that in 1978 previous informal 
contacts between Conservative and Christian Democratic parties were 
"strengthened by the setting up" of the EDU, which also included Portuguese and 
Spanish members (1982, p.137).
1> eliminating the CAP and returning farm policy to national centres
2L£---The Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group
Transnatlonallty.
The group, founded on 20 June 1953 and formerly called the Liberal and 
Democratic group, consists of 46 members from nine member states of the 
Community (see Table 7.3). The British Liberal party was the largest liberal 
party in Europe, in terms of votes both at national and European elections. 
However, the party has not been represented in the EP since direct elections, 
due to the nature of the electoral laws in Great Britain. The system of "first- 
past-the-post" has resulted in a situation whereby over half a million votes 
(12.6% of the votes in Britain) are not accorded representation in the European 
Parliament and the 51 threshold in Vest Germany resulted in the FDP winning no 
seats. As a result, the issue of electoral laws has posed more problems for the 
Liberal group than for other groups. The basis of representation of member 
states in the EP is for the present controlled by the Individual member states 
and not by the EP or other EC institutions, thereby linking the European 
elections Irrevocably to the national polity and even alienating the EP KEPs 
and Groups from the means to influence the method whereby they are elected.
The British Liberal leader Mr. Steel has called for "a common voting system for 
the European Parliament based on proportional representation so that every vote 
cast throughout the Community is given equal weight" (24) and the Liberal Party 
Council of Britain called for such a voting system for the 1989 elections at 
its meeting in Sheffield in Hay 1985. Through the Liberal federation's liaison 
of all Liberal parties in Europe, those parties not represented in the EP
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maintain a close contact with their sister-parties in that umbrella 
organisation.
Table 7.3 Membership of the Liberal group bv nationality -1 lov 1988
Denmark (V) 2
Spain 2
France (UFE) 14
Ireland (Ind) 1
Italy (PLI/PRI) 6
Luxembourg (DP) 1
Netherlands (VVD) 5
Portugal 10
TOTAL 46
The Italian representatives come from two small political parties, the 
Republicans and Liberals, both of whom have played important roles in the 
national polity in contacts between the Christian Democrats and the parties of 
the left. The two parties are seen in some regards as rivals in Italy, and the 
Republicans had objected to the use of the name Liberal for the Group, and so 
the name "Democrat" was added to its title. In the 1979-84 EP, as in the 1984- 
89 EP, the largest national delegation in the Liberal group was the French one 
(14 MEPs from Simon Veil’s electoral list of several French parties which split 
among the EPP and the Liberals). The fact that the list included KEPs from
parties who ho Joined the EPP group angered the Liberal group. The 1984 
direct elections heralded a further decline in the number of Liberals in the EP 
and in elected office in the member states.
Organisation of the Liberal Group.
The group possesses few formal rules and relies on compromises rather than 
strictly outlined procedures in organisation. It has a Secretary General and 
group secretariat and holds regular working group meetings and study days. The 
Secretary General of the group is Dominique Catet who replaced Xassimo 
Silvestro on 6 May 1987. This role has been largely administrative in the 
organisation of the group and less politicised than in other groups.
Cohesion.
The Liberal group lacks cohesive structures and consists of members from very 
different political backgrounds, from traditional conservative to socially very 
liberal. The Liberals are seen as being traditionally very disparate in their 
views and this is regarded as part of their principle of freedom of speech 
although it presents problems at the organisational level. The group has 
experienced more difficulties in maintaining group discipline than any other 
group in the EP.
The Liberal group has many problems of internal discipline, with members each 
tending to follow their own ideas. The group has the worst attendance record 
of all groups as, like other groups, many of its members who have alternative 
incomes are absent in their capacity as journalists, lecturers or lawyers. The
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problem of Internal group discipline cane to a head in 1983, when Mr. Calvez 
the Chief Whip recruited a staff assistant to whip and put pressure on KEPs to 
attend the plenary sessions of the Parliament. This had previously been an ad 
hoc arrangement, as nenbers of the group secretariat responsible for a specific 
issue had attempted to raise support within the group on the relevant issue, 
and ensure attendance (25). This nethod had been largely unsuccessful. The 
group leader also speaks to the leaders of the parent party and lodges a 
conplaint about bad attendance records. The limitation of speaking tine for 
recalcitrant nembers has been used to good effect and by 1983*84 the group was 
becoming more cohesive than it had been in the past. Since 1984 it has further 
had a major restructuring in recognition of the fact that It lacked nembers 
from several member states and had not been as successful as anticipated in the 
second European elections.
Agreement on policies.
The group sees Itself as a progressive group, and points to the fact that it 
pioneered the discussion of defence and security in the European Parliament, 
with Lord Dodwin in the pre-1979 Assenbly and Xr. Haagerup in the 1979-1984 
one. It was a Liberal initiative which led to a working party on Human Rights 
outside the Community. It was also a Liberal rapporteur who was responsible 
for a major report on Sort hern Ireland, the Haagerup report. In addition, the 
Liberals have expressed clear support for the enlargement of the scope of the 
EC to a European Union, increased powers for the EP, majority voting in the 
Council and the adequate financing of Community policies. The group has 
actively supported the EP's Draft Treaty on European Union Initiated by
Spinelli, the conclusions of the Spaak II (Dooge) Committee and the bolding of 
an intergovernmental conference (IGC) on the SEA with Parliament's involvement.
Unlike some groups in the Parliament, the group has no division along the lines 
of pro or anti-EC. The group has more women than other groups and the largest 
proportion of Jewish members. The group also consists of members who are not 
traditionally party politicians, and hence there is a great disparity of ideas, 
ideology and parliamentary practice.
Policy conflict and cleavages.
The group encompasses very disparate interests within its ranks, from extreme 
right to left on social issues such as abortion, as became apparent when Irish 
member Mr. T.J. Xaher and French Xember Xme. Simone Veil voted at apposite 
poles on abortion. The group's proposal on Introducing abortion in Ireland, 
Greece and Belgium was withdrawn in September 1984 due to internal group 
disagreements (26). There is no consensus on the signing of motions for 
resolutions, on behalf of the group. However, the Veil UFE list members of the 
group have often shown themselves to be more sceptical of the Community than 
the other members of the group.
The cleavages within the group are most apparent on economic issues. The 
Liberals consider themselves as anti-conservatives and as critics of the status 
quo, whether conservative or socialist. Their belief is in free enterprise and 
welfare policies, and they point out that the welfare concept was essentially a 
liberal initiative, with regard to free education and pensions, for example.
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The Liberals profess themselves as anti-Marxist in ideology but not fully 
laissez-faire either, although the Belgian Walloon Liberals are essentially 
laissez-faire and are considered the most right wing party of the group. As 
the EP does not tend to concern Itself with national economic Issues conflict 
can in many cases be avoided within the group on such economic issues.
On the issue of agriculture, there are regional and geographical problems. The 
Liberals have been strongest in rural constituencies in the past, and this is 
reflected in the interests which are represented in the group. The group has 
internal tensions on the northern European issue of butter and dairy farming 
and the southern European issues of olive oil and wine. Such conflicts are also 
apparent in other groups of the EP. Industrial or urban interests and trade 
unions are represented in fewer numbers than in other groups.
The major subject of conflict on grounds of national interest in the group is 
fisheries, which has been a divisive issue within the Assembly Itself. The 
group has also had some divergence of opinions in the past over the issue of 
security. When the group met in Lisbon on 2 April 1987, it advocated a 
discussion by the EC on European security and the Vashington-Moscow 
negotiations on "Euromissiles" (27). There were however some reservations on 
this position within the group as the matter does not strictly fall within the 
EC Treaties.
Observers have suggested that the Liberals could be compared with the 
Socialists in that both groups in the mid-1980s had come to resemble little
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more than federations, with little cohesion or discipline and a lack of 
organisation which, it was suggested, bordered on chaos. The Liberal group is a 
grouping with diverse parties in the tradition of liberalism of thought and 
expression.
Leadership.
Leadership in the group has concentrated on conformity for issues of central 
relevance, with specific conformity rules on particular policy issues applying 
normally.
The extraparliamentary links of the Liberal group.
(a) Relations with national parties and parliaments.
The group has contact with other liberal parties through its federation. In 
addition, meetings are held at "summit" level of leaders of the group and 
national liberal leaders. One such conference was held in Copenhagen in April
1985 and prepared for the federation's congress in June of that year in 
Groningen. This conference called for economic and political progress in the 
community, with facilitating of customs formalities, increased R and D, and 
technological cooperation, along with a liberal external trade policy, and lastly 
a change to be promoted in order to encourage awareness of the opportunities 
offered by a united Europe (28).
The group possesses a federation structure outside and alongside its EP 
grouping. There is a close and overlapping link between the group and the 
federation. The federation also acts as a linkage mechanisa for the British 
Liberal party, who are not represented in the 1984 EP and fcr the German FDP 
which did not top the 5% threshold in the direct elections in Vest Germany.
The Federation of the Liberal and Democratic Parties of the European Community 
was founded in Xarch 1978 at the Constituent Congress in Stuttgart. The 
Stuttgart Declaration, which was based on the Oxford Manifesto of the Liberal 
International in 1947 outlined the federation's policy towards the EC.
The Liberal group of the EP and the Liberal and the Badical Touth Movement of 
the EC are member organisations of the Federation (EP, 1984d. p. 137). The 
Spanish Liberals were members of the federation before accession to the 
community. The Vice-Chairperson of the federation, Colette Flesch, stated at 
the federation's executive meeting of 10 December 1984:
"Today we have expressed our support to Spain on its return to democracy 
by giving the Partido Reformista Democratico observer status in our 
federation" (29).
The Irish political party, the Progressive Democrats, joined tie Federation of 
Liberal Democratic and Reform parties in May 1988. It is the sixteenth member 
party to join the federation and has a pro-European stance. It is not 
represented in the EP. Its application was fully supported bj the Alliance 
party in Northern Ireland, also a member of the federation acd with no
ihl__The Liberal Federation.
representation in the EP. These parties are hence afforded a political voice at 
the EC level through the medium of the federation.
Lfi— The group of. the European Democratic Alliance
Transnationality.
The group was founded on 20 January 1965 with 15 members. The Gaullists had 
previously sat as associates of the Liberal group until relations became so 
strained that the RPR left the group. It was trinational until recently and 
resembles to a lesser extent the Conservatives in the dominant role played by 
one party. It is made up of the French RPR (19 members), eight Irish Fianna 
Fail party members and one member of the Scottish Nationalist party. In 1985 
it was Joined by the Greek former Minister Mr. John Boutos and in 1986 by one 
Portuguese member, thereby adding new nationalities, with their concomitant 
advantages which accrue to both MEP and Group. It now has 30 members and five 
nationalities (Table 7.4). The largest party of the Group, the RPR has been 
seen as the classic nationalist party and the party is seen as dominant in the 
group and as undermining the Irish members with its traditional Gaullism. The 
Group's parties are defined by very personalised leadership in nationalist 
parties. Nationalism is more important than class interests, and both the Irish 
and French parties have strong political machines at home. The group has few 
transnational features and the representatives formed this party group as a 
result of a "chance party configuration" in the 1973 EP rather than that of a 
"clear party-political option" (Stammen, 1982, p.223).
Table 7,4__The EDA group: membership by nationalitv
France 19
Ireland 8
Greece 1
Portugal 1
a x ___________l
Total_______ 30
Organisation of the Group.
The group of the European Progressive Democrats changed its name from the 
Union Démocratique Européen (European Democratic Union), a uninational group 
founded on 20 January 1965, when the 12 BPR members were Joined by the 5 Irish 
Fianna Fail members (who had been sitting as Independents) and one Dane in 
1973. The group then changed its name in 1979 to the European Progressive 
Democrats and in 1986 to the group of the European Democratic Alliance.
The organisation of the group was subjected to a radical overview in 1984, when 
the group underwent a fundamental change. In June and July of that year, the 
Fianna Fail party caused some controversy in Ireland regarding its continued 
membership of the group, and other options (such as opting out of the group and 
even Joining the Socialist group) were examined and ultimately rejected. The 
Irish saw the group as a form of "coalition" with specific agreements such as 
the refusal to discuss the issue of defence . The Irish XEPs have adopted a 
unilateral approach, as they have been meeting separately since 1984. A set of
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rules governing the functioning of the group have now been agreed on as the 
basis of the statutes of the group. Joint political programmes are no longer a 
feature of group organisation, unlike the 1979 group document on behalf of the 
constituent parties. Internal cohesion, already under threat, was further 
undermined by the arrival In 1986 of four Portuguese PHD XEPs, which led to a 
dilution of Internal cohesion. Some observers have cast doubt on the continued 
existence of the group in its present fora after the third direct elections, due 
to Internal divisions (30).
Until the French law of 1986 eliminating the Cumul or the holding of several 
political elected positions at the same time, the French members of the Group 
were often absent and the other nationalities had a large share of the speaking 
time in plenary. The Cuoul law and the decline in the dual mandate have 
resulted in a more active participation by the French members, who are now 
anxious to avail of their full quota of speaking time. They also wish to re­
establish the image of the group in line with the majority political thinking 
within the group, with less emphasis on left of centre ideas or on Irish 
preference for neutrality. The French members now express a more participatory 
approach to group membership and wish to have a more consensual group.
Cohesion.
Stammen (1982, p.223) rightly claims that there is no fundamental agreement 
between the Gaullists and Fianna Fail on policy which might justify their 
cooperation. The group possesses no formalised Rules of Procedure although 
KEPs are penalised by the leadership for non-conformity in informal ways,
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rather than by formal sanctions. Such penalisation would include the removal 
of members from committees and delegations, or the withholding of 
spokesmanships from the "offender".
There is a provision within the group for a conscience clause, whereby the 
member may vote against the group line on moral grounds. A sanction is applied 
if a member fails to comply on a matter considered to be of paramount 
importance that requires conformity with the group line. Precedents on 
conformity are established on EDA study days and positions are recorded at 
group sessions. The President of the group decides on the sanctions and the 
Secretary General implements them, and while the XEP may be aggrieved, s/he can 
have little recourse to appeal and finds him/herself in an Isolated position.
It is common practice, as an unwritten rule, that group members sign motions 
for resolutions only after checking with the group, and this forms the basis of 
discussion at every group meeting, when time is allocated to deal with private 
members' motions.
Divisions within the group have until the second direct elections been rare in 
public. The Irish member Mr. fiall Andrews has publicly criticised what he 
considers the right wing stance of the RPR on some international political 
issues, such as human rights and International Issues. Kr. Andrews had stated 
that he regarded the Gaullists as right-wing on human rights issues and they 
had failed to vote with Fianna Fail on such issues as the health hazard from
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the Sellafleld nuclear plant in England. He stated that he hoped that Fianna
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Fail would be able to find other "centrist" partners in the Parliament before 
the 1989 elections
These statements reflect tensions within the group although Xr. Lalor, the FF 
delegation leader, described this tension as an agreement to differ on issues 
such as nuclear power to European defence. In November 1985, when the conflict 
between the party delegations arose, Xr. Lalor stated that the two parties 
worked closely together on most Issues, notably on the defence of the CAP, and 
"agreed to differ in areas such as nuclear power and defence". He continued 
"Xr. Andrews should accept that the Gaullists are not a French version of 
Fianna Fall" (31). Xr. Lalor is reported as further stating that the French had 
consistently supported Fianna Fail in the CAP. He said that the "Gaullist 
Republican Party" was the best possible alliance for Fianna Fail in the 
Parliament.
There have some attempts in the past to expel members from the group.
Expulsion is threatened by the leadership only on an issue which would damage 
the group's image vis A vis the national party or the public. Although the 
group would lose the concomitant amount of speaking time and financial 
allocations for numbers in groups, this is considered preferable to loss of 
Image (32).
Both the major parties of the group, the RPR and the Fianna Fail party, have 
similar origins, developments and leadership patterns. Neither party is 
completely in favour of European Integration although neither is totally opposed
to the Community, and each appreciates the advantages to be gained from the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the Community.
Group cohesion has in the past been severely weakened by the RPR's turnatyle 
(tourniquet) system, whereby members are obliged to resign from the BP after 
one year in order to provide an opportunity for all candidates on the 1979 
electoral list to sit in the Parliament. This has weakened the group's 
influence in the EP as there was a rapid turnover of French members who lacked 
an in-depth knowledge of the workings of the Parliament. French influence in 
the group was also weaker than their numbers would at first have suggested. 
Some Gaullist XEPs defied this system of tourniquet, and were expelled from the 
party at home, while remaining in the EP as French Progressive Democrats. This 
was the case of Vincent Asqueur and Gerard Israel, for example.
The reputation of the RPR had thus been damaged in the group and in the 
Parliament as a whole. Coordination of policy at group meetings is based on 
the awareness of the national stance of the national parties, and the conscience 
clause theme is evoked here, although the EPDs have no rules of procedure, 
unlike the Socialists, the CDs and the Liberals. Conformity is based on 
precedent decisions of the group, from Group Study Days, and decisions from all 
groups are on record.
Policy conflict and cleavages.
At the group meetings in advance of the Plenary, national positions on issues 
of debate are clearly enunciated. In the early years of the group's formation,
fisheries policy was the main issue of divergence, although this is a less 
contentious issue now. In this case and in other cases of dissent, a free vote 
is accorded to the KEPs in the group. This is decided after all attempts to 
reach a compromise have failed. A negotiated compromise position or policy 
document is considered preferable to division or a free vote, even if the result 
is a weak parliamentary initiative. If the issue under discussion is of "vital 
national interest", a free vote is still the norm, and here the importance of 
the representation of national Interests is made clear. Each party remains 
aware of the other's national political approach and hence a mutual sensitivity 
to these positions develops.
Vith regard to the formulation of Issues it has traditionally been held that 
Fianna Fail had a pragmatic approach to Irish economic Issues. Although FF is 
in favour of the maintenance of neutrality for Ireland, it would have no 
objection to debating European Political Cooperation, the EC's foreign policy, at 
a European level, as it considers that EPC is relevant to the European level of 
politics, but not to the national arena (33).
The SEA has been a major Issue of debate within the group, as the Fianna Fail 
party is in favour of its content while the RPR has expressed its vehement 
opposition to the Act, particularly Its supposed denial of national sovereignty. 
As early as 1975, the group had differed over an issue of European Integration 
when the Gaullists abstained from voting on the Patijn report on direct 
elections while FF and the Danish member voted in favour (Jouve, 1984, p.16).
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Leadership.
A political leadership role is played by both the group's president, Mr. de la 
Malone and Secretary General, Mr. Earlie, in attempting to reach compromises and 
a common voting position among the two major parties.
The extraparliamentary links of the EDA.
(a) Relations with national parliament« and parties.
Although there is no specific or formalised liaison structure, both the Fianna 
Fail and the RPR parties maintain links with their parent parties on a regular 
basis. The FF party leadership has had some conflicts with its MEPs and the 
Secretary General of the group, based on cleavages with the national party and 
personality issues. The RPR delegation reflects to a large extent the pragmatic 
attitude towards Europe which its parent party adopts in the French Sational 
Assembly.
(b) Federation.
There is no federation of the EDA and there are no indications that one could 
be considered useful or necessary by either the MEPs or the parent party.
7.7 The group of the European Right.
The group of the European Right is characterised by the labels of right-wing 
totalitarianism which are appended to it by observers and other groups.
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The Group consists of 17 members of parties and four nationalities. Its most 
recent member is Mr. John Taylor, of the Ulster Unionist party, who Joined it on 
his resignation from the European Democrats, on 21 January 1987.
Tablfi 7.5__Group of the European Right: membership by nationality
Transnationality.
France (National Front) 10
Italy (MSI) 5
Greece (EPS) 1
U-K. (PUP)_______________________ L
Total__________________________ LZ
The Group's policies include a stand against International terrorism and in 
favour of NATO and Western European Union. The group's leader is Jean-Marie Le
Pen, leader of the French National Front, a controversial force in both national
and European politics. He is regularly criticised by members of other groups 
in the EP, for such matters as absenteeism, a personality cult in the person of
Mr. Le Pen and for fascist theories. In September 1988, Mr. Le Pen was
qualified as "anti-semitic" by the leader of the Socialist group, Mr. Arndt, and 
as being opposed to human rights by the British Labour HEPs, especially Mr. 
Glenn Ford. A great deal of political advantage accrues to the critics of the 
group of the European Right.
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The emergence of the extreme right in the EF has presented problems to the 
right in the EP which have also had echoes in France, home of the extreme 
right-wing national Front leader Xr. Le Pen. The right does not wish to be 
identified with the European Right and tends hence to leave them to their own 
devices. It ostracises the European Right and that group is never included in 
even the compromise amendments tabled by all groups. The EPP never seeks the 
European Right's voting support and that group is never invited to meetings, 
when such compromise amendments are being drafted. The ER group is ignored in 
the legislative business of the EP and constitutes a small number of KEPs in a 
parliament of 518 members. It is noted that in the EP's publication, the 
calendar of meetings in 1988 (committees, groups, delegations), no meetings were 
scheduled for the group of the European Right to meet as a group.
The group experienced a great deal of criticism amongst much controversy when 
the Parliament made a declaration on the fight against racism and xenophobia. 
The extreme right-wing KEPs did not countenance the existence of racism or 
xenophobia in the Community.
In October 1988, the group of the European Right sought to introduce on the 
agenda on 12 October a motion for urgent debate on the restoration of the death 
penalty (Doc. B 2-815/88). The motion was rejected by a roll call vote, in 
which 210 KEPs voted. 10 voted in favour, 199 against and one member 
abstained (34). The French authorities, in late 1988, requested the waiving of 
Kr. Le Pen's diplomatic immunity in connection with statements made by him 
concerning other French politicians.
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He is known for his frequent interventions in plenary on the issue of Northern 
Ireland, particularly regarding his strong apposition to the Anglo-Irish 
agreement between the governments of Ireland and Britain. Mr. Paisley, dubbed 
as "vocal Protestantism's gift to the European Parliament" (35) concerns himself 
largely with matters relating to Northern Ireland, especially regional social 
policy, with occasional forays into moods of volatile attacks on the Pope as 
"anti-Christ" and the EC as a Papist plot. Mr. Paisley's presence serves to 
illustrate one of the current cleavages within the EC in a very vocal manner.
In September 1987, a new political group of non-affiliated MEPs was formed and 
named the "Group for Technical Coordination and Defence of Independent Groups 
and Members". The members are seven members of the Spanish Social Democratic 
Centre Party who are pro-Suarez, three Italian Radical MEPs (Pannella, Bonino, 
Cicclomessere), and a Dutch non-attached MEP, Mr. Leen van der Vaal. The MEPs 
wished to avail of the benefits of a political group, such as speaking time, 
secretariat and other resources, "while remaining independent from the big 
parties dominating the assembly" (36).
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Chapter Eight
Conclusions - Party Groups in a Fluid Polity

The literature on the complex subject of political groups in the EP serves as a 
descriptive, pragmatic body of information which is largely historical. The 
problem, nevertheless, challenges the political scientist to undertake a 
different approach, involving attitudinal and behavioural research within 
scientific perspectives. For this reason, I have attempted to study 
representation by the groups in the context of organisational cohesion and 
Ideological cleavages. Much research still remains to be carried out on the 
subject of the European Parliament and the party groups. On the basis of the 
research carried out since the first direct elections, we now draw together the 
themes of the study in order to form some conclusions. The EUI Survey has been 
utilised throughout the thesis insofar as it is pertinent to the theme of 
representation by the party groups in the EP.
The groups and the nature of conflict, consensus and representation in the EP 
can be studied from different approaches. A comparative study of the EP with 
national parliaments would not have been worthwhile, as the EP and its actors 
are different from national parliaments in the ways outlined in this thesis. 
There is a need to reassess the EP, not with regard to parliaments or even as a 
supernational parliament, but rather as an EC institution.
8.1 The EC system of decision-making and the HP's powers and influence
In the development of the EC as a "fluid polity", the EP has attempted to assume 
new authority and influence in its growing institutionalisation. The balance of 
initiative has, to an extent, altered as the EP is beginning to take over some
of the functions expected of the Commission, as it drafts its "own initiative" 
reports. The Parliament's draft Treaty on European Union and the declaration on 
fascism, both "own initiatives", were accepted by the Commission and the EP 
regularly institutes public hearings, unheard of in the pre-1979 EP. It now 
threatens to take action on infringements of the Treaty, under Article 169 of 
the EEC Treaty, which had previously been the prerogative of the Commission.
The Parliament is still far from redressing the "democratic deficit" of the 
Community. Despite its weak electoral basis and isolation from central power, 
it is involved in the decision-making processes of the EC, especially in its 
relations with the Commission. In addition, the EP already forms part of the 
EC Budget authority. It is now asserting itself as it attempts to shed its 
alienation and is putting pressure on the Commission and the Council to carry 
out their functions and threatening censure. In addition, the Commission has 
shown an increased willingness to accept the Assembly's own initiative reports 
and to use them as the basis of the Commission's initiatives to the Council. It 
also accepted many of the EP's amendments even before the implementation of the 
Single Act.
The Single European Act has challenged the EP to become aware of new procedural 
demands, as it realises that it needs to fully utilise its role under the SEA in 
order to attain political leverage with the other institutions. The SEA offers 
the party groups of the EP a new objective rationale to strengthen group 
cohesion and leadership control of those groups. The SEA has also given rise 
to new procedures in the EP and its decision-making circuits. In particular,
the procedure for emergency debate challenges the political groups to reach 
compromise in order to have motions adopted under Rule 48. This procedure can 
be quick and effective in an informal manner if compromise can be achieved.
The political groups are the agents which ensure if a compromise can come 
about.
Under the SEA, the EP is now obliged to come to a decision on its strategy, 
particularly on the EC Budget, swiftly, for the second reading, in order to form 
a coherent long-term strategy. For this it is obliged to trust the group whips 
and expert KEPs to attempt to reach consensus. In order to achieve consensus, 
therefore, the vote coalition-building process must be handed over to the 
political groups. The SEA and the enlargement of the EC to twelve member 
states have both served to challenge the EP and their groups to create a 
revised political organisation.
It was the EP which brought about the European Union (Spinelli) Treaty 
Initiative. This in turn led to intergovernmental analysis in the Dooge 
Committee and to the Intergovernmental Conference on the Single European Act. 
The EP is emerging from its comparative isolation as it becomes more 
politicised. This has been due in large part to the active role taken by the 
political groups, and also by the committees which act as forums for the 
exchange of ideas and for negotiation an compromised texts.
The EP produced three reports in late 1988 which evaluated the first 15 months' 
application of the Single European Act and these pointed to the fact that much
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remains to be achieved in the quest for European Union. The KEPs denounced the 
democratic deficit in EC decision-making, which alienates them from the 
representation of the voters and from control over the other EC Institutions. 
The majority of the KEPs consider that the SEA has led to some progress and 
believe that due to improved decision-making procedures the EP is more closely 
associated with the legislative tasks of the Community. "Association" does not 
however denote "powers" and the EP itself has pointed out that decision making 
still lacks "democracy" as the Council can adopt a text rejected by the 
Parliament (1).
Because of problems encountered by the European parliamentarians with regard to 
the three different locations of the major Community institutions, the EP has 
again called on the Council to take the initiative to fix one EC Institutional 
seat. The French Government had taken the EP to the Court of Justice against 
the Parliament's resolution adopted on 24 October 1985, concerning the holding 
of EP sessions in Brussels. The EP has therefore taken the Initiative regarding 
its place of work and has been successful in this regard.
The Parliament has noted that the Single Act has extended and strengthened the 
Community's legal competences in three ways: firstly, by adding new chapters 
which deal with previously understated or ignored policy areas such as economic 
and social cohesion, the environment, monetary affairs, research and the social 
sector; secondly by formalising the process of foreign policy coordination 
known as European Political Cooperation; and thirdly by setting the year 1992 
as the deadline for the completion of the Internal Market (Doc. A2-176/88). It
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has welcomed the allocation of adequate financial resources to the Community in 
order to ensure the success of the SEA, and it noted that the SEA sought to 
enhance the effectiveness of the EC in decision-making, and in this area the 
number of Council decisions taken by majority vote, rather than unanimity, 
increased. Nevertheless, with regard to the EP's role, the Parliament is aware 
that the genuine power of co-decision of the EP and the Council applies in a 
very limited way (in the assent procedure which applies to only two articles of 
the Treaty).
The EP has criticised the Council and Commission on several counts, in its 
resolutions of November 1988 on the results obtained from the implementation of 
the Single Act, on those institutions' involvement in the aspects of the 
legislative process which also relate to the EP. It believes that the fact that 
the Council can adopt legislative texts which it has rejected is anti­
democratic. The EP has called on the Commission to provide an undertaking that 
it will withdraw proposals rejected by the Parliament "in order to ensure that 
Community legislation is acceptable to the elected representatives chosen by the 
electorate specifically to ensure democratic control at this level" (Doc. A2- 
176/88, point 6). In this way, the EP is emphasising its representative role as 
a watchdog of Community legislation. It further wishes to extend its exercise 
this function and its information function (as representative of EC citizens) by 
recommending that it be informed of the Council's position under the 
cooperation procedure and of the position adopted on each amendment and vote of 
each member state (Doc. A2-176/88, point 11). The EP also sees a role for active 
involvement in European Political Cooperation where its role could be "extended",
where it could "exercise political control" (Doc. A2-201/38, point C of 
resolution), and in the appointment of the Coamission, which under the Treaty 
is limited.
In general terms of legislative roles, the EP has often requested the Council 
that the conciliation procedure be extended to all major areas of legislation. 
It justifies this request, which is tantamount to joint decision making, on the 
grounds that this allows a dialogue in the "search for compromises between the 
two arms of the legislative authority" (Doc. A2-176/88, point 14). The EP has 
never been regarded by the other EC institutions as one of two arms of 
legislative authority, yet it is attempting to assume a substantial legislative 
function as it develops as a sui generis body. Vith regard to its political 
relationship with the national parliaments, the EP has urged those assemblies 
to secure an undertaking from the governments to "take a stand in Council 
against any proposal rejected by the EP* (Doc. A2-176/88, point 7).
12__The changing functions of representation in the European Parliament.
Vhile national parliaments are composed of legislator« involved in first order 
elections, the EP's election is a second order election in terms of political 
importance and the conception of political representation. The national arena 
caters for a system of conflict-resolution which results in the formation of a 
government coalition or government of one party as the spoils of electoral 
competition. In the EP, there is no government within or directly related to 
the Assembly, and no stable opposition (a prerequisite in Anglo-Saxon studies
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of parliaments). Whereas in the national arena of politics the links between 
the constituency and the capital are already established and self-evident, in 
the EP there is no direct link between the constituency and the EC capital.
We can provide an answer to what the groups are as representative organisations 
only by rethinking our premises with regard to the EP. We enquire into the 
nature of representation, not in relation to national parliaments, but rather in 
relation to the development of the EP as a Community institution in a fluid 
polity. In analysing the groups, we find an uneasy co-existence of modes of 
political and organisational behaviour, where some KEPs have adopted an 
individualistic concept of KEPs as single actors while others see themselves as 
KEPs "in combinations" recognising the advantages of group membership and yet 
others perceive the KEP as the representative of different things at different 
times.
The KEPs who choose to participate in groups, something which is encouraged by 
the EP's Rules of Procedure, perceive an advantage in acting together and 
pursuing the logic of collective action despite the Free Riders. Olsen (1965) 
has pointed out that it is wrong to assume that if everyone in a group has an 
interest in common, the group would always tend to further that interest. The 
disadvantage to group participation is that as the groups are often large and 
aggregate interests from diverse origins, the great diversity among KEPs of 
several regional bases and nationalities becomes clear. The representative 
function of the KEPs is evident with regard to agricultural interests (e.g. 
dairy or Kediterraneanfocus, or increased CAP expenditure versus industrial
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policy). fisheries, regional interests, industrial and other sectors. Here the 
sometimes uneasy coexistence of the concepts of group representation and 
individual representation becones apparent. The groups are now adapting 
themselves to the coexistence of different representational styles. There is a 
form of collective representation in the group which gives the group its 
identity and unique character which is the result of collective experience and 
shared concepts and political language.
The major cleavages which emerge in the EP concern the future of the EC, the 
financing of the EC and the social Issues of cohesion which have left-right 
relevance. These cleavages are not always identifiable along group lines. The 
vote on the Spinelli Treaty on European Union reveals this cleavage (207 in 
favour, €3 -British Socialists, Danish anti-marketeers, Rainbow, EDA -against, 
40 abstentions, and this concurs with the EUI survey replies by groups on the 
future of the EC. The voting on the Single Act was EPP 78, Socialists 67, 
Communists 22, Liberals 16, ED 5, and 4 non-aligned in favour, while 19 ED, 7 
Rainbow, 5 liberal and 2 Socialist members voted against the Act in January 
1986. In most groups there is a cleavage on the issue of the EC, its political 
role and the future development of the EP therein.
The nature of conflict in the EP has evolved since the direct elections as a 
tension between representatives of agricultural Interests and the proponents of 
a more developed Industrial policy, with more overt differences between the 
groups. For example, the Socialists places emphasis on employment whereas the 
EDA favours the primacy of the CAP. Tensions within the groups also reflect
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this cleavage, as when the Irish and French members of the Socialist group 
place the CAP higher on their priority lists. These tensions reflect problems 
which also face national party governments, regarding agricultural interests 
versus other interests of the industrialised society such as unemployment, 
environmental and consumer issues. On the whole, Bourguignon-Vittke et al have 
demonstrated that the EP as an institution has shown an inconsistent voting 
record on agricultural prices, leading to a lack of credibility of the assembly. 
They point out that the political groups sometimes experience problems in 
finding an acceptable balance among different regional and national interests 
and they instance the conflict between the agrarian lobby and those forces in 
favour of a reduction of agricultural costs.
The groups, in addition, are in the process of politicising the EP, not only by 
their behaviour but also by political developments in which they are involved, 
such as the Court of Justice case in May 1986 regarding the use of financial 
allocations for electoral campaigns, when it was considered that the political 
groups overstepped their roles in this regard.
A criticism that is occasionally levelled at the groups is that they have too 
much money at their disposal and waste it on unproductive activities such as 
trips which may not yield tangible results. It is also alleged that the groups' 
secretariats are overstaffed and overresourced (3).
A criticism levelled equally at the EP and the group concerns the procedural 
organisation of the Assembly which makes it possible to put forward several
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similar motions for urgent debate rather than composite motions by compromise. 
This duplication of motions illustrates that in such issues there is little 
cooperation between the eight groups on legislative initiatives. For instance, 
In September 1988, motions for emergency debate (urgency procedure uncar rules 
64 and 75 of the EP's Rules of Procedure) were put forward on such subjects as 
the wine market, European photography, torrential rain in Spain, Bangladesh, 
northern Ireland, Burma, South Africa and Burundi by all groups. It is not 
unusual for all the motions to be defeated, rather than a compromise ensuing. 
This is a serious failing on the part of the groups as each of the groupe 
appears to be aiming to seek the limelight for its own ends. Vhlle efforts 
were made in 1983 to curb the proliferation of the motions, the system is still 
in need of organisation and rigorous adherence to discipline.
Discipline is also a key word in the organisation of the groups' membership as 
absenteeism continues to be high, partly because many of the members da not 
need the sessional allowance in order to remain financially buoyant. Xast 
groups are large and made up of disparate elements, and none are unitary 
actors. It has been suggested that the Socialists and the Liberals now 
resemble little more than confederations, as their organisation and discipline 
are regarded as disorganised and uncohesive.
Xany analysts view the weakness of the EP as an institution as directly 
pertinent to the weakness of the constituency system of representation and the 
differences in the electoral systems in the member states. As direct contact 
with the constituency is not easily maintained, contacts are difficult za
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establish. MEPs attempt to compensate for this by tabling urgency debates on 
specific issues of relevance to the citizens.
The EP is developing as a body of interest representation, particularly in the 
second directly-elected Parliament. Criticisms of the EP members as the agents 
or even tools of multinational as well as national Industries are not unusual. 
The 1984-1989 Parliament is remarkable for the fact that there is more "Big 
Business” than Union representation in the House. The Tories in particular refer 
to their representation of business interests, and many XEPs are anxious to 
meet interest groups in order to fulfill the communication function of the EP.
8.3 The European Parliament as a new form of Institution.
In order to provide a meaningful contribution to knowledge on the EP, it is 
important to start with the proposition that the EP be analysed first and 
foremost as an EC institution. It is also important to bear in mind what 
exactly the EP has achieved as an EC institution and to analyse the sum of such 
achievements. In this light it would seem that the EP is fulfilling the 
functions assigned to it in the Treaties and is adapting to new challenges such 
as the reexamination of its role following direct elections and the impact of 
the SEA. It is no exaggeration to say that many of the predictions of 
academics and politicians regarding the future role of the EP were quite simply 
wrong. It is necessary to understand why this is so. Without doubt we need to 
study the EP in new ways. The focus should be on the EP as a participant 
institution in the decision-making process of the European Community.
The political actors have been challenged in procedural terms by institutional 
developments which illustrate the evolving nature of the EC as a fluid polity. 
The SEA requires a clear majority (in practice 260 votes at least in the EP) on 
a position or amendment within a three-month deadline. Organisation and 
discipline are new imperatives in the formal (group/conmittee) structures and 
informal groupings. The committees have been criticised as being interest 
coteries of specialised lobbies such as agriculture or the environment and hence 
their "representativeness" has been questioned. On decisions to be made under 
the SEA, there is a tendency developing to utilise an informal structure of 
contacts between coordinators of the groups and the more Influential members of 
the groups along with secretarial contacts. Such informal structures as these 
assemble a negotiation package which could be capable of attracting the 
necessary majority even for the first reading stage.
In order to achieve the success of a "package" and the 260 plus votes in this 
new legislative process under the SEA, a core coalition is essential. Observers 
maintain that this "core axis" must be worked out by the EPP group and the 
Socialist group, the two largest groups in the Parliament, in order to ensure a 
majority on an acceptable common position. Coalition building will thus be 
transformed in this scenario and such a pattern is already in process (4).
The EP is now obliged to be more precise, in the style of a legislature which 
takes decisions rather than passes resolutions or vague legislative proposals.
It possesses a large and capable staff and could avail of Commission advice on 
parliamentary drafting and now has established contacts with Interests groups
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and is obliged to avail of these resources effectively in its r «*w role as a 
quasi-legislative body.
This scenario illustrates a process which began with the creation of the 
Crocodile Club, founded by Altiero Spinelli, which met regularly to discuss the 
future of European Union. The result was the Draft Treaty on European Union, 
adopted by the EP in 1984. Vhat is striking about this Club is that it crossed 
group boundaries and consisted of HEPs of all political persuasions and 
nationalities who had an abiding interest in intensified European Integration.
In 1987, a Federalist Intergroup for European Union was founded in the European 
Parliament by KEPs, Lizin, Roelants de Vivier, Pannella, Grazlani and Efremidis. 
Its aims were to inform public opinion of all aspects of European Integration 
and to ensure that the EP is given the mandate of drawing up the text of a 
European constitution (5). The group consists of 180 KEPs and has raised the 
problem of the effective application of the Single Act.
The Intergroup wishes to create similar intergroups in national parliaments and 
joint EP-natlonal parliament committees on this matter and thereby reduce its 
potential political alienation from the member states. In this regard, it 
supports the declaration of the Union of European Federalists, calling for a 
general assembly made up of KEPs elected in June 1989 and KPs from the member 
states (Agence Europe, 2 June 1988). In April 1988, the Intergroup called for 
"the holding of a plebiscite on the political union of Europe and the 
constituent powers of the European Parliament". In this declaration, it called
on the Spanish Presidency in January 1989 to call an extraordinary summit of 
the European Council for the purpose of defining the powers to be conferred on 
the EP, in its aim to achieve "democracy". The declaration was supported by 
XEPs from all political groups. It illustrates the desire on the part of the 
XEPs to have a distinct political role and to abolish marginalisation, from the 
other EC institutions and member states. The vagueness of the declaration, 
however, required little commitment to action, even by those XEPs who were less 
than enthusiastic about European Integration.
Other intergroups have also been formed across group boundaries in response to 
perceived interests or needs which may not be fully dealt with in committee. 
They vary in subject matter from cycling to hunting and environment to Chile to 
the disabled to minority languages. These illustrate the diverse interests of 
representatives in the EP, often in response to pressure from the relevant 
interest groups. The intergroups focus on specific issues rather than general 
policy questions, and alleviate pressure on the group to cater for all interests 
in its ranks as intragroup coordination is quite productive in these cases.
8.3.1 The party groups of the EP as future European part las.
The EP Is the only EC body with a "European and party flavour" in the sense 
that the members are elected on party platforms to a distinctly European 
mandate which does not have political ties to the home base other than 
electoral links. Although it is expected that some XEPs maintain contacts with
their national party, this is not always the case, especially given that the 
parliamentary dual mandate is on the decline.
Some KEPs experience difficulty in maintaining contact with the national party. 
This separation results in contact with only EC decision making on policy, 
although some contact with the constituency would be maintained. This has led 
to the question of whether the possession of a single European mandate might 
lead to a European party system with primary loyalty to the European arena of 
politics, or a system where loyalty to the group or the EC is the primary 
loyalty of many KEPs. Even before the debate on the single mandate, many early 
observers, such as Van Oudenhove, Fitzmaurice and Pridham, had believed that 
groups would constitute proto-parties in a European federal political system.
Bonvicini (1981, p.3) points out that European party organisations cannot be 
considered true political parties with an Identity and role distinct from that 
of the national parties which make up their structural base and that it is 
difficult to consider the attitude of a particular European party organisation 
as a unit. The parties in the EP are not comparable to national parties because 
of the fact that they work in an EC institution and not a national one.
The hypothesis that the origins of a European party system will emerge from 
the EP is undermined by the actual development of the Parliament following 
direct elections. However, there has been a shift of loyalties from the 
national to the European level of politics rather as Haas had optimistically
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predicted in the 1950s, as evidenced by the creation of a European bureaucracy 
in the Commission.
This European awareness is marked by the process of legislative socialisation 
and a congruence of attitudes and behaviour of group members through procedure, 
the exchange of views in groups and an acquaintance with the EC institutions 
and their workings, and contacts with European Brussels-based Interest groups 
such as ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), UHICE (Union of Industries 
in the EC) and COPA (Agricultural Co-operatives Movements). The replies to EUI 
questions Illustrate that XEPs have emphasised that many problems can only be 
solved transnationally and the Ionescu-Korgan study (1988) further reinforces 
this in showing that KEPs frequently express the view that "communitarian" 
solutions are preferable to national solutions.
The domestic parties have on the whole failed to create and maintain consistent 
and reciprocal contact with their KEPs and groups, although formal links 
remained in the dual mandate. The lack of such relations creates a dependence 
on the part of the KEP on information and the resources of the party group and 
the HEP inevitably receives the group or "European" perspective on the issue.
The European party federations failed to live up to expectations in the mid- 
1970s that they would constitute the European extra-parliamentary element of 
the party group and have since virtually vanished, as they are handicapped by 
the fact that any decision made by the federation is not binding on their 
constituent parties. They do not (and indications are strong that they never
will) reach the stage of being a European party. The minimum criteria for the 
group, however, to constitute a political organisation are set out clearly by the 
Rules of Procedure of the EP and are further elaborated by the informal and 
formal rules of the political groups so that a distinct pattern of behaviour and 
organisational network emerges.
The issue as to whether the Groups constitute European proto-parties or pan- 
European parties remains unresolved, and this may not be the pertinent question 
as the groups are not comparable to parties (transnational or otherwise), given 
what we know of the developing role of the EP.
Vhile a certain "European" influence and "Communitarian" commitment is evident 
in the party groups, MEPs remain at present nationally based politicians in 
terms of their constituencies and local party organisations, with some shift of 
loyalty to the political group, Sot only is the EP developing as an 
institution, there are also signs of a distinct Europeanisation of the members 
on the basis on legislative socialisation and shared experiences in a 
transnational and multicultural environment. This is borne out in the replies 
to some of the open questions of EU I survey of the KEPs and the Ionescu-Morgan 
study and has been the subject of studies as early as the 1960s (Kerr, 1973).
In addition, frequent changes of EC and EP membership reflect its very nature 
as a fluid polity and the nature of the groups as political organisations 
evolving in a process of institutionalisation. The Iberians' arrival levelled 
out the Left-Right balance in the EP and this process should strengthen the
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groups as organisers of conflict resolution in the Assembly. This reorientation 
has taken place at Council level and it has forced the groups within the EP to 
take more notice of Mediterranean issues and to reexamine attitudes to the EC 
in the light of the Iberians' generally positive stance with regard to European 
Integration.
Furthermore, the input of the Iberians to the ED (Conservative) and Socialist 
groups has emphasised the need felt by many Socialist MEPs that their group 
tighten up its organisation. The Spanish Socialists in particular have 
challenged the group to reform its workings, impose stronger discipline and 
ensure policy co-ordination among all delegations (including the French and 
British, who have been criticised for lack of co-ordination). A similar 
challenge was given to the Conservatives. In addition, the Sight no longer has 
an absolute majority unless it chooses to seek the support of the extreme right.
Under the SEA, the EP needs to decide on strategy early in the legislative cycle 
and evolve a coherent long term strategy on the Budget in particular. For this, 
the Parliament must trust the whips and experts in order to achieve consensus. 
This consensus can best be achieved by handing over the coalition-building to 
the political groups. The committees would thus be allocated the very 
substantive technical details of the political agreements, once they have been 
elaborated by the groups.
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8.3.2— The cohesion nf the party groups In the EP:
The groups In general maintain a modicum of cohesion based on specific 
conformity. There are bonds and influences which encourage cooperation among 
group members, generate positive feelings towards the group and encourage them 
to remain in the group and even in some cases develop an esprit de corps. Vith 
regard to group cohesion, critics have suggested that the groups do not make 
substantial attempts to discipline their members or to oblige them to attend 
the plenary session of the Parliament. The lack of dependence on the sessional 
financial allowance renders any such attempts difficult. Turnout for voting is 
seldom over 5OX.
In the groups, decisions on voting are not binding on members but some form of 
conformity is demanded by the group leadership. Barber (1966) asserts that the 
legislative party leader seeks to establish conformity of which the three 
degrees are generalised, normal and specific conformity. Results of non­
structured interviews with leaders of the groups' secretariats suggest that 
generalised conformity is never expected by the group leadership, in recognition 
of the national or local representative functions of the members. Normal 
conformity is demanded on Issues such as the European Budget vote, although 
even in these matters comprehension of other considerations is in evidence, as 
witnessed by the "conscience clause" appeal. Specific conformity applies in 
most case of group voting in the EP.
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Kurwitz (1984) suggests that the specific party group is a stronger explanatory 
variable for voting behaviour than national identity. This needs to be 
qualified, however. Vhile on many issues the groups vote cohesively there is 
evidence that such a vote is already the result of coapromise on both the group 
and national stances, in the coamittee and even in plenary. The KEPs are 
afforded the opportunity of an explanation of vote or the use of the conscience 
clause in cases of non-agreement with the group line. In these cases, 
nationality is most consistently the reason for not voting with the group.
Vith regard to the explanatory variables for cohesion enumerated in the 
introduction, we can suaaarise the following points. Firstly, leadership and 
the exercise of leadership pressure, although strong, varies according to group, 
and selection of leadership for the EP is indicative of the desire for an 
Involvement in European politics. In reality, according to respondents, 
allocation of offices is in accordance with party or group membership and 
nationality as distinct from attitude towards Europe (see Table S.l).
The factor of transnationality, relating to the number and diversity of 
nationalities in the group, is a strain on group cohesion due to the perceived 
need to reach compromise across a broad spectrum of interests. This also 
applies to ideological diversity which results in specific and, in some cases, 
normalised conformity. All groups experience problems with regard to policy 
differences and priorities. This is due as much to the different heritages of 
party systems and origins of the constituent parties in the group as to the 
fact that the EC and its institutions are sui generis.
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• COUNT PJCRCKNT OP 
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PERCENT OP 
CASKS
COUNT PERCENT OP 
RESTONSES
ITCRCEHT OF
CASKS
ATTXTUDKS TO EUROrK 192 2 3 .9  % 4 7 ,4  X 26 4 ,0  % 1o , 9 %
GUn.TARL. WORK 2o1 24#3 % 7 4 ,4  % 39 4 ,0  t 1 4 ,4  \
EUR.rAJIL. SECURITY 13 1*2 % 4 .9  % To 1 o ,9  % 2 9 ,4  t
IDEOLOGICAL VICVS 40 S ,2  1 1 4 ,9  % 34 9 ,3  I 1 4 ,3  1
NAT ION XL ITT 19 2 .5  % 7 ,0  t 141 2 4 ,9  % 4 7 ,4  \
NATIONAL SECURITY f 1 .0  i 1 3 ,0  % .4 6 ,9  \ 1 9 ,5  % *
p a r t t  o r  c r o u p  kembca 49 4 .4  % 1 9 ,1  1 17° 2 4 ,3  % 7 1 ,4  I
PERSONAL STAND IKS 149 1 9 ,S 1 % S ,2 . l 9o .1 2 ,4  % . 3 3 , 4  %
SPECIALIZED KKOWLEDCE 1o2 1 3 ,4  % 3 7 ,9  % 23 3 ,4  % 9 ,7  %
TOTAL HUHfiCH OF RESPONSES 763 1 0 0 ,0  % 2 9 2 ,4  % 1 647 1 0 0 ,0  \ 2 7 1 ,4  1 .
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Kurwitz (1984) suggests that the specific party group is a stronger explanatory 
variable for voting behaviour than national identity. This needs to be 
qualified, however. While on many issues the groups vote cohesively there is 
evidence that such a vote is already the result of compromise on both the group 
and national stances, in the committee and even in plenary. The KEPs are 
afforded the opportunity of an explanation of vote or the use of the conscience 
clause in cases of non-agreement with the group line. In these cases, 
nationality is most consistently the reason for not voting with the group.
With regard to the explanatory variables for cohesion enumerated in the 
introduction, we can summarise the following points. Firstly, leadership and 
the exercise of leadership pressure, although strong, varies according to group, 
and selection of leadership for the EP is indicative of the desire for an 
Involvement in European politics. In reality, according to respondents, 
allocation of offices is in accordance with party or group membership and 
nationality as distinct from attitude towards Europe (see Table 8.1).
The factor of transnationality, relating to the number and diversity of 
nationalities in the group, is a strain on group cohesion due to the perceived 
need to reach compromise across a broad spectrum of interests. This also 
applies to ideological diversity which results in specific and, in some cases, 
normalised conformity. All groups experience problems with regard to policy 
differences and priorities. This is due as much to the different heritages of 
party systems and origins of the constituent parties in the group as to the 
fact that the EC and its institutions are sui generis.
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ATTITUDKS TO EUROPE 112 2 3 .9  % 6 7 ,4  % I 26 4 ,0  t 1 0 ,9  %
n iA .rA R L . WORK 2o1 2 4 ,3  % 7 4 ,4  t 39 6 ,0  %
?
1 6 ,4  l  !
I
EUR-PAUL. SECURITY 13 1*7 % 4 ,1  % 7o l o , t  %
1
2 9 ,4  % j
IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS 40 3 ,2  1 1 4 ,8  % 34 3 ,3  l
i
1 4 ,3  \ . j
MAT XON AL ITT 19 2 ,S  % 7 ,0  % 161 2 4 ,9  % !
i»
NATIONAL SECURITY S 1 ,0  t 1 3 ,0  \ 1 44 6 ,6  % 1 6 ,5  % •
PARTY OR GROUP HilKBCR 49 6 ,4  % 1 6 ,1  % 1 17°
2 6 ,3  % 7 1 ,4  %
PCRSOllAL STANDING 149 1 9 ,S X » 4 . 1 l o .1 2 ,4  %. ^ 3 3 ,6  %
SPUTIALIXED KXOWLCOCZ 1o2 1 3 ,4  % 3 7 ,6  \ 23 3 ,6  % » .7  %
TOTAL MUHSEK OP RESPONSES 763 1 0 0 ,0  % 2 6 2 ,6  % B 147 1 0 0 ,0  % 2 7 1 ,6  1 ,
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Moreover the groups have different origins and different agendas, such as those 
who had transnational links from the 1950s and those who form groups for 
pragmatic or specific policy attainment or the use of the advantages of the 
group structure. Vithin the groups, MEPs have different goals and objectives, 
whether defined by nationality or other interests. See Tables 8.2 and 6.3, 
where the Communists in particular place priority on nationality. The 
perception of group membership shows that although there is no overt opposition 
to the group structure, there is some evidence of dissatisfaction as 28% of EUI 
Survey respondents thought that group meetings took up too much of their time 
(Table 8.4).
Vith regard to the perceptions of the EP and its role, most MEPs C84X) across 
all groups favoured the increase of the EP's influence on policy formation, 
while 8.6Z said it should remain the same (Table 8.5). This variable is 
therefore not a factor influencing group cohesion in general, although there are 
internal divisions in some groups, such as the Socialists where the Danes, 
British and Greeks are less in favour of Increasing the EP's powers. In the 
Communist group, the French and Greeks do not wish to Increase the EP's powers. 
The Liberals in particular favour such an increase in line with their promotion 
of European Integration.
The sense of identification of the MEP with the group is linked to legislative 
socialisation, the learning of the rules of the game and the need to initiate 
group as distinct from individual motions, nationalism is predominantly the 
divisive issue, although many MEPs and officials point to the need to follow the
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group line and play down the nationalist element. The "Europeanism” of the 
groups differs according to group with the Liberals and EPP appearing most in 
favour of European Integration. A different type of Europeanism to that 
professed by the group is not a conflictual issue as most groups can 
accommodate varying measures in favour of European Integration in the drafting 
of compromise proposals.
The personal desire of the XEP to stand out and be different is normally 
related to the individual XEP's concept of constituency or interest 
representation. In replies to EUI open questions, respondents refer repeatedly 
to the need to couch personal constituency Interests in European or group 
terms. Party loyalty is the second issue undermining group cohesion although 
once again accommodation and compromise have been cited as keys to a modus 
vivendi. The concept of representation and representational styles is 
developing as the XEPs react to the need to represent special and constituency 
interests. Loyalty to specific interests or interests groups is therefore more 
evident in the election literature and the newsletters of Individual XEPs or 
group delegations than in group documents. These would undermine group 
cohesion if generalised conformity were always required but in practice the 
group structure demands less then total conformity.
Interviews with XEPs and group and EP officials confirm that the following 
incentives to cohesion apply to all groups. These include pay-offs such as 
committee positions, spokespersonships and rapporteur appointments. These are 
allocated by the group in their function as organisers of the EP and constitute
the aajor structure for the attainment of political advancement. Publicity in 
the group is ensured by working diligently on an issue and producing a group 
document or committee report which is well received in plenary or the media.
The use of group resources, contact networks and support is essential to all 
KEPs. The group network, as organiser of political debate and documentation on 
controversial issues, offers a form of procedural socialisation, thereby saving 
the new KEP from having to find everything for him/herself. The sense of 
membership and belonging offers not only the possibility of Influencing the 
group and its leaders, but also peer group support and solidarity.
Pay-offs in the group leadership structure and the allocation of offices are 
offered to members after a certain amount of time "In training" proving 
themselves competent. Moreover, conformity to group membership serves to 
combat fear of alienation from the group and loss of peer group esteem. The 
fear of disaproval of colleagues, according to EUI respondents, is strong as 
KEPs realise that such disapproval undermines the chance of collaboration with 
peers on an issue where they require support.
The behaviour of the party groups follows three lines which fall into 
recognisable theoretical categories. The first is that of the classic European 
ideologies whether Marxist/Socialist, Communist, Conservative, Liberal or 
Christian Democrat, and the second strand is European federalist, in favour of 
the expansion of the European Community and of European Union, and the 
deepening of cooperation between meobei states and the supranational structures 
of the EC institutions in an integrationist manner. The third general category
is that of delegations or trends which can be found within most groups on a 
cross-cutting cleavage. These are the XEPs who choose to represent and defend 
precisely defined national (or in some cases regional) interests.
This latter trend is being supplemented by the defence of special Interest 
groups and lobbies, giving rise to the definition of the EP as a lobby 
parliament. The groups are facing up to the need to provide effective 
organisation and party discipline which will serve to strengthen their power in 
their role as political organisers of the EP.
The members of the European Parliament can also be classified according to 
their representational roles and conceptions of their role as a European deputy. 
These can broadly be described as, firstly, the "expert" or legislator, secondly 
the agitator and thirdly the "surgeon" who holds a high regard for geographical 
constituencies and "clinics" (Vildenmann, 1963). Barber (1972) also describes 
the lawmakers according to the differing conceptions held regarding the 
representational function.
The EU I XEP Survey questioned the NEPs on their perception of their 
commitments (Tables 8.6 and 8.7) and the results indicate that the 
lawmaker/control function was accorded some 23% of preferences, while 20% 
regarded it as important to look after the constituency.
•ill
Table fl.S— Camml tniAnts of tho MFP
Question 37 (BUI Survey).
As an elected representative, you may feel yourself to be under a 
number of commitments. Please rank the the three which you regard as 
being most important.
(a) Advance national
Kesponaeats
20
----- Z joi .respondents,
6
interests
(b) Adhere to national party 27 8.2
policy
(c) Contribute to European 36 10.9
poliev making
(d) Further European integration 29 s.a
(e> Look after special special/local 14 4.2
(f) Oversee European executive bodies: 77 23.3
Commiss ion/Counc i 1 /Summits
(g) Oppose European Integration 2 0.6
(h) Represent ethnic/linguistic/ 12 3.6
Ci) Look after constituency---------- 67 20.2 ----
JTo. of respondents: 331.
Table 3.7— gPI Questions 37.2 and 38.2: WEPs' Percaptiana at Caam.fnta and 
Constituency Expectations.
OU. 3 7 .2 »  AS AN KLNCTUD RKPKHSEN- 
TATIXMC, YOU KAY KKK1.
r o u K S tx r  t o  hk u w »cr  a numukh o r
Cl*. 3«* 2 1 WOULD YOU CARYC Tv* TAF.C 
* * * * * * * * *  ANOTHER UlOK AT THIS 
LIST AND TELL MU WHAT YOU THINK
»
i
COMMITMENTS. PLEASE RANK T1IK 
TtlRKE WITCH YOU REGARD AS 0E1NC 
HOST IMPORTANT.
YOUK CONSTITUENTS ITXPKCT YOU TU fO  
WillIX IN O m C K . PLEASE HANK TUE
I t h r e e  m o st  im p o r t a n t .
COUNT PKRCKNT O r 
RESPONSES
PFRCFNT OP 
CASES
COUNT PERCENT OK 
RESPONSES
p e r c e n t  o i*
CASKS
• ) ADVANCE NATIONAL INTERESTS I I M  % 2 1 ,4  X 77 I S . 3 X < 0 .7  X
b ) ADHERE TO NATIONAL PASTY 
POLICY
U 7 .§  1 2 1 .9  % 3o 6 . 0  % 1 5 ,9  A
c ) CONTRIBUTE TO EUROPEAN 
POLICY MAKING
221 2 4 .6  X 7 1 .3  X 12 1 6 .3  X 4 3 ,4  %
d ) rURTBER EUROPEAN INTEC RATIOS 193 . 2 1 ,5  % 6 2 .3  % 66 1 3 .1  % 3 4 .9  1
e ) LOOK AFTER SPECIAL/LOCAL 
INTEREST CROUPS
26 2 .9  X •  •4 I 72 1 4 ,3  % 3B .1  X
I
i
n OVERSEEN EUROPEAN EXECUTIVE 
BOOZES : COHM15 SION/COUNCIL, 
SUMMITS
134 1 4 ,9  X 4 3 .4  X 44 t j  % 2 3 .3  I
OPPOSE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 7 o , 6  1 2 ,3  X • 1 ,6  X 4 ,2  %
h ) REPRESENT UTHN'IC/LINGUISTIC/ 
REGIONAL INTERESTS
IB 2 . 0  % 5 .«  % 1* 3 ,1  X 1 o ,1  I
i ) LOOK AFTER CONSTITUENCY 144 1 6 .0  X 4 6 .5  % 104 2 o ,7  % 5 5 .0  X
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES 199
•
l o o . o  X 2 9 o .o  % So 2 1 0 0 .0  X 2 6 5 .6  X
Vith regard to constituency representation and the influence of socialisation 
processes, the MEPs experience a learning period, concerning BP rules and 
attitudes. Vhile for many the constituency is of prime importance, the 
political actors come to see it within the overall machinery of the EP and the 
political environment of the European Community, and realise that the structure 
of the EC is not necessarily geared towards brokerage politics. Lobbies have 
meanwhile discovered the importance of the EP, and approach committees, groups 
and individuals.
£L4__The EP'a institutionalisation.
A measure of the Parliament's institutionalisation and politicisation is the 
development of greater emphasis on policies which had previously not been 
discussed in the forum of the EP or even of the EC itself. Disarmament and 
security issues are examples of this. In addition, the Parliament consistently 
urges the Commission to greater cooperation and consultation, an approach to 
which the Commission has proven open. The Commission reports regularly to the 
EP on the action it takes in response to Parliament's amendments to its 
proposals, and on emergency aid granted by the Commission (6).
The educational function of parliaments espoused by Bagehot finds expression in 
the education by HEPs of each other in the Assembly, most particularly in the 
committees, and this is one of the most important functions of the EP 
committees. The European Parliament is largely a forum for the exchange of 
ideas and for mutual education. In the committees, it is imperative that
It is often in the committee that the political hue of the plenary is determined 
by the groups. Positions adopted in plenary may reflect this.
It is in committees that the members learn to cooperate and appreciate each 
other's expertise. They come to know each other so well that it becomes common 
practice to invite committee colleagues to conferences and national events.
This is also true of the party groups and parties now invite group colleagues 
of other nationalities to their national party congresses and conventions. The 
younger members adapt to the EP's institutional system with more ease than the 
older ones, and often bring fresh ideas to the organisation of the Parliament.
In the EP, XEPs have leamt to use the constituency as a microcosm of 
representation and to then look to the EP for an overall Community approach.
The first directly-elected parliamentarians learnt that local questions cannot 
be put to the EP in plenary, as under Rule 47 of the EP's Rules of Procedure 
such questions are referred to the competent committee. This misuse of 
parliamentary time and resources has thus declined as the questions are 
rejected for debate in plenary. Many new XEPs need to learn the essence of 
European politics and compromise, rather than of a polarised governmental 
versus opposition system. The very fact that representatives of twelve member 
states come together in a parliament on a regular basis is in itself a 
compromise.
members cooperate with others of all shades of opinion and all nationalities,
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The MEPs therefore undergo a learning period with regard to both rules and 
attitudes, and this results in many modifications of attitude and behaviour, as 
witnessed by the replies to questions of the EtJI MEP survey, regarding the need 
for adaptation to the rules of the game in the EP and the norms of acceptable 
behaviour.
8.5 A new look at representational stvlas - the EP and the groups
The EP is evolving as a multinational, multiparty and group-based institution 
which is attempting to represent ideologies and interests in a sui generis 
environment in which it is combating its original isolation at both the EC and 
national levels. The diverse strands of political Europe are brought together 
and combined in a manner which is unique to the EP's sui generis role. This is 
a function of integration which is specific to the EP and its groups and not to 
national parliaments in general. This functional integration is based on the 
interdependence of MEPs in the groups and the need to cooperate in order to 
achieve group goals and policies.
Membership of the EP has had varying implications for the careers of the 
individual KEPs. Vhile some view it as a stepping stone to career advancement, 
others view it as viable and interesting career in its own right. The EP has 
also been offered as a consolation prize in some circumstances due to purely 
national considerations. An example of the EP playing second fiddle to the 
national legislature can be seen in the internal conflicts of the parties of the 
right in France when a candidate to the Rational Assembly "accepted a deal"
when opposed by a more successful candidate of the right, i.e. "the promise to 
become an HEP" (7).
The dual mandate system has been apposed by the EP itself and on 7 July 1988 
it passed a resolution calling for a ban on the members of national parliament 
from being MEPs. Article 5 of the Council Act regarding the direct election of 
representatives of the EP provides that:
"The office of representative in the assembly shall be compatible with 
membership of the Parliament of a Member State" (O.J.L. 278, 8 October 
1976).
The EP Itself however cannot pass any legislation on this matter and so it has 
called on the national governments to make the necessary amendments to the 
1976 election legislation. Some MEPs apposed their national parties' ruling on 
the dual mandate, for example when the Irish Fine Gael MEPs voted in favour of 
the EP Resolution (the Hoon Report) despite the national party's decision to 
permit the dual mandate after the 1989 elections.
The abolition of the dual mandate raises the issue of a separate political 
entity and the practical problem of linkage with national political structures, 
should this be considered desirable. A two-way linkage between the EC and 
member state is under active consideration by parties in the EP and the member 
states, as it is not only the MEP who might be isolated from contact with the 
national capital but also the member state which could suffer from a lack of
political information from the EP. Structural links between parliaments and the 
EP have for this reason been considered by most member states.
In the EP after the 1979 elections, almost one third of the XEFs (125 of 410) 
held a dual mandate. By 1984, just before the second direct elections, this had 
reduced to 13% (57 of 434, including the Greek members who had joined in 1981), 
The trend continues to favour single parliamentary mandates but the involvement 
of MEPs with interest groups and business or other associations has increased« 
The representational styles of the XEPs has inevitably been influenced by the 
single mandate. If we consider that the purpose of the political group is to 
express opinions and exercise a communications function, then it has been 
successful. If its role is to enact political decisions, then it falls short.
The problem of representation at the Community level has not been adequately 
dealt with by the old EP and by the Economic and Social Committee. The party 
groups now, in this institutionalising Parliament, are claiming for themselves 
the role of active representatives of the citizens of Europe. They have a 
distinct advantage in the EP as the groups are part of a constitutional body 
and have a legally recognised role, unlike national parties in most national 
political systems where many parties have no constitutional role.
In this thesis we have queried whether the groups represent the sum of the 
policy attitudes of the individual party delegations. The groups are amalgams 
of disparate parts and on that basis it would not be reasonable to expect them 
to manifest any measure of conformity beyond Barber*s specific, or in some 
cases, normalised conformity. Nevertheless, they come to agreement on issues
T>\%
they are the major providers of structure in the EP and provide a coherent
identity for the HEP with an adequate amount of lee-way for representation of
constituent or social interests by Individual KEPs.
Ve have asked whether the members of the EP can be seen to be acting on a 
distinctly European basis or rather as delegates from parties and 
constituencies. The conclusion to be drawn is that the XEPs and groups are 
neither distinctly European nor party/constituency representatives and their 
representational styles do not necessarily conform with their perceptions of 
the expectations of the electorate. Table 8.5 bears this out in the illustration 
of the commitments of the KEPs and their perceptions of constituency 
expectations. The NEPs in the EUI survey place more emphasis on advancing 
national interests and adhering to national party policy than they presumed the 
constituents expected. It is with regard to the contributions to European 
policy making that the gap between the conceptions of representation is most 
evident as most KEPs wish to advance European Integration despite the 
perception that this is not required by the constituency. The representational 
style of the KEP therefore appears to be that of trustee rather than delegate 
according to these figures.
Moreover, the very fact that MEPs in reply to the EUI survey actually stated 
that EP group membership influences an MEP's position on political issues in 
the EP more than nationality (although voting records tend to bely this) is an
which do not always reflect the positions of the domestic party. Furthermore,
indication that the representational style is becoming increasingly European- 
oriented.
The European elections were second-order elections. They concentrated on many 
issues which differ from those facing party governments in the member states.
A new type of political élite is therefore involved and this carries with it a 
new type of representational style. The HEP relates to a fluid polity which can 
by its very nature render effective representation and political action 
challenging in a new way. The groups are the aggregates of these new tensions 
and representative styles, and they act as the sifters of interests in a 
political entity which is developing organisational skills and Integrative 
functions.
In conclusion, therefore, it is clear that the groups are undergoing 
institutionalisation with regard to membership, rules and the means to attain 
policies. It has become apparent in this study that the nature of the political 
entity under the microscope, the party group, contains within itself the 
contradictory strands of group organisation and differing concepts of the MEPs* 
notions of the representative and political role.
The research has shown us that there are pressures and tendencies which 
reinforce group cohesion. However, there are very real limitations to the 
freedom of action of the groups in pursuing that cohesion. One major limiting 
factor is the lack of power of the groups within an institution which is often 
alienated from the centre of EC decision making.
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Pridham (1975, p.376) argued that the main reason for the party groups' alleged 
lack of legitimacy is that the members then were largely national politicians 
following national political careers. The party groups had been seen as 
ambassadors of their national political parties before being European 
parliamentarians. Vhlle the ambassadorial notion is still evident in the 
representational styles of the XEPs, the composition and alas of groups have 
altered with the fact that their members became full time politicians and that 
they assumed a legitimacy from direct elections which strengthened their 
Influence if not their power. Thus the conflict of political roles referred to 
by Pridham has now been resolved into a process of allocating priorities. Even 
when nationality is more important than party group, the group remains the 
nucleus of political organisation and debate in the Parliament.
It is clear that the EP is developing its "competences" concurrent to the 
national political parties and that the groups are now maturing politically in 
terms of organisation and conflict resolution. All the while the EP is 
functioning in the environment of a still fluid polity which is developing its 
own identity and function.
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APPEBfDIX A
Interview Schedule: Group secretariat officials.
In the interviews with the officials of the secretariats of the political groups, 
a number of standard questions were asked. These were supplemented by 
additional questions depending on the time available. These questions were 
administered orally, over time, 1983-1986, with some follow-up interviews in 
1988 <22 February 1983 to 14 March and 2 April to 28 April 1983, September
1983 to February 1984, Kay to July 1984 and Kay to July 1986).
Standard Questions:
1. Profile of the group:
1.1. How would you describe your group?
1.2 How would you describe the other groups (named individually) e.g. with
regard to attitude to Europe, cohesiveness?
2. Cohesion, agreement in the group:
2.1 Vould you say that your group is, in general, a cohesive structure?
2.2 Vhat are the major problems in gaining agreement in the group?.
2.3 Vhat would you describe as the major divisions or cleavages in your group?
2.4 Is there a left-right cleavage in the group?
2.5 Is there a fforth-South division in the group?
2.6 Vhat problems, if any, tend to occur at group meetings?
2.7 Does the group possess formal rules of procedure?
2.8 How does the group come to agreement on policy and voting positions?
2.9 Are there any unwritten rules or expectations in your group with regard to 
behaviour and discipline?
2.10 On which issues is there a free vote, and on which is a whipped one 
obligatory, in your group?
3. Group Conformity:
3.1 How can a member express dissent from the group line? Is there, for 
example, a conscience clause?
3.2 Vhat is the position of the group leadership and what are the sanctions, if 
any, in cases of non-conformity by individual KBPs.
3.3 Vhat is the group's attitude if a party delegation chooses to differ from 
group policy?
4. Leadership and group positions:
4.1 How would you describe the role of the leaders of the group?
4.2 How are offices, spokes persons hips, rapporteurships etc., allocated by your
group?
4.3 Vhat is your role, as Secretary General/higher official, within the group 
and in the EP?
5. Group structure, development and future:
5.1 How would you describe the group structure in the BP?
5.2 Vhat was the impact of direct elections on the EP and on the groups?
5.3 How would you envisage the future of your group?
6. European party System.
6. Vhat do you think of the idea that the EP groups may develop Into a 
European party party system?
Additional Questions
7. Are there any general comments or criticisms you would care to make about
the group system in general and specific group« in particular?
8. How long does it take new MEPs to get to know their Job and become
competent at this job?
9. How would you describe the relationship between the group and the
extraparliamentary federation?
10. Vhat is the relationship between the group and the national part las?
11. In general, what is the relationship between the political group loadership 
and the group's senior officials.
Characteristics nf the respondent.«
The ranks of the officials interviewed were as follows:
Secretaries General- EPD, EPP, Soc, Lib, Coma, TC, Rainbow, 
Deputy Secretaries General- Lib, Soc(2), Comm, ED,
Higher officials- 2 EPP, 3 Comm, 2 Soc,
Council and Coreper officials responsible for relations with the European 
Parliament.
Officials of Political committee, Energy committee,
Commissioner responsible for relations with the EP 
Head of Division for Parliamentary Committees, BP.
2 Officials of Social Affairs committee, EP.
4 officials of EP Secretariat.
Officials of Division responsible for relations with the European Parliament, 
Secretariat General, EC Commission.
3 officials of the federations.

APPEIDIX B
European University Institute 
Study of the European Parliament, 1984
Directed hv: Rudolf Wildenmann
With the cooperation of: Karlheinz Reif and Cars ten Lehman Sorenson.
Research Personnel! Luciano Bardi (General Coordinator), Robert Danziger 
(Computer Assistant), Patrice Xanigand, Philooena Kurray, Hermann Schmitt, 
Sieglinde Schreiner Rau (Xethodological Assistant), Kartin Westlake.
Services also rendered by: Paolo Bellucci, Edi Clijsters, James Hanning, Kario 
Hirsch, Klaus Schubert and Silke Wollweber.
All rights of the study reserved by the European University Institute. Other 
than members of the research team, all those wishing to use/quote from the 
study must have written consent from Rudolf Wildenmann.
1. Uature and Alms of the Study
The EUI study is based on a survey of members of the European Parliament. The
principal aims of the survey were to discover and examine the experiences,
attitudes and perceptions of XEPs with respect to:
-their satisfaction with their work as individuals and more generally, with the 
performance of the first directly elected European Parliament 
-their perceived roles and status within their own national parties and party 
groups within the Parliament, the committees and other decision making bodies 
of the Parliament
-their commitment to European development in general and the Parliament in 
particular, and their commitment to national politics and institutions 
-their perception of the distribution of power between the various bodies of the 
EC and of the need for institutional reform
-their opinions as to the policy problems confronting European politics, the 
magnitude of such problems and possible solutions or approaches to them 
-the career patterns of XEPs
-the demographic, social and political backgrounds of members.
In general, the EUI Study of the European Parliament represents a concerted, 
carefully planned attempt to direct the instruments of social science towards
the Parliament and its individual members. It is one of the first large-scale 
systematic studies of the new Parliament.
2. Organisation and Time scale
Preparations began in 1982, and a preliminary version of the questionnaire was 
reqdy by December of the same year. "Pretest" Interviews were carried out in 
the UK, Italy and Germany, and the final English version of the questionnaire 
was ready by the middle of March 1983. It was then translated into the other 
official languages of the EC. The interviewing began at the end of March 1983 
and most of it was carried out In Brussels and Strasbourg, although a few 
Interviews were also carried out in the various members' countries. For 
technical reasons, we were unable to interview Greek members of the EP 
contemporaneously. Greek Interviews took place between April and May 1984. 
Interviewing was completed by August 1983. Atempts were made to interview all 
MEPs and the overall response rate was 80.7%.
Interviewers administered a partially structured and pre-coded questionnaire, 
while interviewees were also allowed to "speak their minds" at some length 
(through the use of open questions).
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y o u  *i*czm<i za t r .«  l u r s -
?«* .' ? t r l : 4 M n :  y<su p r o b ^ o i /  iiAd 
q u ¿ t*  i  ¿«w « x ? « c ? * ? io i t s  i  t r a d ­
in g  / c u r  r o i«  am u i  ME7, tä «  v o r*  
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b) partigli/ fa!íiliad
c) n o t  f u l f i l l e d
7^ «r» r.i* ±#«.n icxt dueuasisn 
i s c u t  zr. t  * ¿ í » c t  o¿  :iM X « rs íi¿ 3  
c i  t¿i« l u r s e t a n  P t r i i J M n t  - ? c n  
» so.itinin'i :i:h:. what ¿s /su cf ¿t?
' r r r . ï  :<tlzzz  :cwn a x w h  a::o :- a »  ? ? z - c c t £ .
Prt-coc«
&. ¿«r.aiisiAl
3 ,  im t r i c a n zìi
Zi r.QZ ±2?Il ZIO**
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2Sb
An x £ ? ' s  ? o i i n c a  on  ? o i i c . i c a i  
Lsauas 1 -  ?*ri^ *2*nr so
iailuoncoci ay £? Sraupa =«aa«r- 
Jiii? o :  :y  r.atiO G Aiiv/. On ±±io 
a a a l s  - o f  * /o u r  : 6 s « r 7 i t i o a s »  v f c l s h  
do you thiaX* c « a « r » lly  spo 4x1:19,
U  I l k * I ?  to  bo 3 c r t  i a p o r t * n t ?
a) I? Sreup .<M6ors.ii?
b) s*eloa*li;y
l a  4 d l l t l c n ,  7 i r i9 u *  i i c t o r i  a*y  u: finite« tao Tocia* :oh«vicur of 
XE7s. l a  c*j«s oi doufcc, tiov o f t # a  
w ould you sa y  «4Cii o£ turn f o l lo w in g  
b c d ia s  iiAvm 4 d o c i s iv o  l a f l i o a e o  an  
t a o  r o f a  o f  ML?«?
rvr.: s h c w  ::s: i. i jiovor
4) T h o i r  a 4 t i s r . 4 l  ? * r t y  * i  ¿ a l t ^ a u a a 2 5
l a  t i io  l u r a p o a a  P i r l l A a o n t
a ) ? > .o i r  ¿ 7  ¿ r a u p 2 4 S
C) T ^ m ir  n 4 C i o n 4 l  p a r r y  l 4 * d o r i i i i p 2 4 s
d ) I ?  C £ s t i s r « « ( s ) 2 4 5
• : 3 * a o r :  s p o c i f y * 3 5
cresrrcei C ed i .luistion Zzi.
i.l. I would iiki to snow you 4 ««ri«*
I o f  t t i t t a t n t i  c a n c i r r .m g  t s i
| p c v i r a  o f  v . i  Surop iA n ?ArliAaint
a v i r  t h i  m x t  fiw  / « A n .  2c you 
-M a x  t r . iy  m o u ld  ¿1 d ic r iA S id #  
n a j u r .  a s  thiy i r * , 31 ir.eriAsid vin:n :!\i pruine Tristy ì:im- 
I varie , o r  in c r iA s id  o iy o n d  t h i
p r u i n e  T r iA ty  f r ia iw o rfc ?
j n r ? .  shcw  l i s t  2 . 
. A*SVI* ?OSSZ3L£*
3NL? CMC
t )  T ill p o w irs  o f  t h i  £? 
a h o u ld  s i  d ic r sA A id .
&) r h i  p o w ir s  o f  zhm  IP  
s h o u l d  r s n i i n  as - r . i y  
& » .
c) T ill pow ori o f  t r . i  Z9 
s h o u ld  s i  L n c m s i d  
w i th in  t h i  p r i s m ?  
T r u r y  frAMwork.
ti ? h i  p c v i r s  c f  » 1  I ?  
s h o u ld  o i  l a c r m i d  
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a n c v i a *  ^ u A l l t i a s .  C o u ld  / o u
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h) £l o q u a r e a
1 ) S a s d la a s s  to  f o l ì c v  n a t i o n a l  p a r ty
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c f )  E n v i r o n m e n t I ) 42
eg ) w o r k e r s ; i 44
c h )  U a e a p lo y e d < ) 43
c i )  S t h n l c  G roup* ( ) 4« j
zz)  l i n g u i s t i c  G ro u p s i ) 47 I 1
cic ) R a g io n a ( )
43 i
c l ;  R e l i g i o u s  G ro u p s í )
°  !
t a )  A ged *. ) 50  !
sr.) H a n d ic a p p e d .* )
ä '  !
c o  > ï o u t h < » X • f
:p  > Werner. ( » n
t o  J S a i f  - t a p  l o y e d ,  f r a a  p r r i s s -  
s i c n s í j 94 I
: r î  ? t a c e  3 » v a s a r . t í ) , s  i
f
cw» C t.- .a rs  : p l e a s e  s p e c i f y ( ) S i  ! 1 1
i
I
3S")
:3
C uA Stion Col.
: -¿culi IIxa *3 naar /our viavs on 
cartam politicAl usua*. Could 
yac tali sa vft«t--.AT you *gr«« or 
ilaAgria vith aach oí ^st io I low­
ing StltASAtttJ?
a) S t r o n c a r  p u b l i c  c o n t r o l  s h o u ld  
i a  t x a r s i i A d  o v « r  u «  A c t i 'n -  
: : a i  3 Í  s u l t m a t i c n A l  c o r p o r ­
a t i o n s .
b) M uelaa t  a n a rg y  i a c u l i  ba ¿AVAlopod *o sh: futuri 
« n t : ^  r .« « d i.
o  M ora s a m a ra  p A n a ltiA S  s h o u ld  
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í o r  i n a m a a l vas i n  s a t t a r s  c o n ­
c a  m m g  a b o r t i o n .
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